From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: "xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: "Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
"Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>, "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>,
"Tim Deegan" <tim@xen.org>,
"George Dunlap" <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH 14/17] x86/shadow: SH_type_l2h_shadow is PV-only
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 16:10:02 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <005651ab-4af5-edf4-3bc1-f68635cd97d8@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4f1975a9-bdd9-f556-9db5-eb6c428f258f@suse.com>
..., i.e. being used only with 4 guest paging levels. Drop its L2/PAE
alias and adjust / drop conditionals. Use >= 4 where touching them
anyway, in preparation for 5-level paging.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static void sh_audit_gw(struct vcpu *v,
if ( mfn_valid((smfn = get_shadow_status(d, gw->l2mfn,
SH_type_l2_shadow))) )
(void) sh_audit_l2_table(v, smfn, INVALID_MFN);
-#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS == 3
+#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4 /* 32-bit PV only */
if ( mfn_valid((smfn = get_shadow_status(d, gw->l2mfn,
SH_type_l2h_shadow))) )
(void) sh_audit_l2_table(v, smfn, INVALID_MFN);
@@ -937,7 +937,8 @@ sh_make_shadow(struct vcpu *v, mfn_t gmf
/* Lower-level shadow, not yet linked form a higher level */
mfn_to_page(smfn)->up = 0;
-#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS == 4
+#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
+
#if (SHADOW_OPTIMIZATIONS & SHOPT_LINUX_L3_TOPLEVEL)
if ( shadow_type == SH_type_l4_64_shadow &&
unlikely(d->arch.paging.shadow.opt_flags & SHOPT_LINUX_L3_TOPLEVEL) )
@@ -969,14 +970,12 @@ sh_make_shadow(struct vcpu *v, mfn_t gmf
}
}
#endif
-#endif
// Create the Xen mappings...
if ( !shadow_mode_external(d) )
{
switch (shadow_type)
{
-#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS == 4
case SH_type_l4_shadow:
{
shadow_l4e_t *l4t = map_domain_page(smfn);
@@ -988,8 +987,7 @@ sh_make_shadow(struct vcpu *v, mfn_t gmf
unmap_domain_page(l4t);
}
break;
-#endif
-#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 3
+
case SH_type_l2h_shadow:
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(l2_pgentry_t) != sizeof(shadow_l2e_t));
if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(d) )
@@ -1000,11 +998,12 @@ sh_make_shadow(struct vcpu *v, mfn_t gmf
unmap_domain_page(l2t);
}
break;
-#endif
default: /* Do nothing */ break;
}
}
+#endif /* GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4 */
+
shadow_promote(d, gmfn, shadow_type);
set_shadow_status(d, gmfn, shadow_type, smfn);
@@ -1334,7 +1333,7 @@ void sh_destroy_l2_shadow(struct domain
SHADOW_DEBUG(DESTROY_SHADOW, "%"PRI_mfn"\n", mfn_x(smfn));
-#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 3
+#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
ASSERT(t == SH_type_l2_shadow || t == SH_type_l2h_shadow);
#else
ASSERT(t == SH_type_l2_shadow);
@@ -1858,7 +1857,7 @@ int
sh_map_and_validate_gl2he(struct vcpu *v, mfn_t gl2mfn,
void *new_gl2p, u32 size)
{
-#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 3
+#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
return sh_map_and_validate(v, gl2mfn, new_gl2p, size,
SH_type_l2h_shadow,
shadow_l2_index,
@@ -3359,9 +3358,7 @@ sh_update_cr3(struct vcpu *v, int do_loc
gl2gfn = guest_l3e_get_gfn(gl3e[i]);
gl2mfn = get_gfn_query_unlocked(d, gfn_x(gl2gfn), &p2mt);
if ( p2m_is_ram(p2mt) )
- sh_set_toplevel_shadow(v, i, gl2mfn, (i == 3)
- ? SH_type_l2h_shadow
- : SH_type_l2_shadow,
+ sh_set_toplevel_shadow(v, i, gl2mfn, SH_type_l2_shadow,
sh_make_shadow);
else
sh_set_toplevel_shadow(v, i, INVALID_MFN, 0,
@@ -3663,7 +3660,7 @@ void sh_clear_shadow_entry(struct domain
(void) shadow_set_l1e(d, ep, shadow_l1e_empty(), p2m_invalid, smfn);
break;
case SH_type_l2_shadow:
-#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 3
+#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
case SH_type_l2h_shadow:
#endif
(void) shadow_set_l2e(d, ep, shadow_l2e_empty(), smfn);
@@ -4115,10 +4112,8 @@ int sh_audit_l3_table(struct vcpu *v, mf
mfn = shadow_l3e_get_mfn(*sl3e);
gmfn = get_shadow_status(d, get_gfn_query_unlocked(
d, gfn_x(gfn), &p2mt),
- ((GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS == 3 ||
- is_pv_32bit_domain(d))
- && !shadow_mode_external(d)
- && (guest_index(gl3e) % 4) == 3)
+ (is_pv_32bit_domain(d) &&
+ guest_index(gl3e) == 3)
? SH_type_l2h_shadow
: SH_type_l2_shadow);
if ( !mfn_eq(gmfn, mfn) )
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/types.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/types.h
@@ -195,7 +195,6 @@ static inline shadow_l4e_t shadow_l4e_fr
#define SH_type_l1_shadow SH_type_l1_pae_shadow
#define SH_type_fl1_shadow SH_type_fl1_pae_shadow
#define SH_type_l2_shadow SH_type_l2_pae_shadow
-#define SH_type_l2h_shadow SH_type_l2h_pae_shadow
#elif GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS == 4
#define SH_type_l1_shadow SH_type_l1_64_shadow
#define SH_type_fl1_shadow SH_type_fl1_64_shadow
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-01-14 15:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-01-14 15:01 [PATCH 00/17] x86/PV: avoid speculation abuse through guest accessors plus Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:03 ` [PATCH 01/17] x86/shadow: use __put_user() instead of __copy_to_user() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:04 ` [PATCH 02/17] x86: split __{get,put}_user() into "guest" and "unsafe" variants Jan Beulich
2021-02-05 15:43 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-05 16:13 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-05 16:18 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-05 16:26 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 13:07 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 13:15 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 14:46 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 14:57 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 15:23 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 14:55 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 15:14 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 15:27 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-01-14 15:04 ` [PATCH 03/17] x86: split __copy_{from,to}_user() " Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 16:06 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 17:03 ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:04 ` [PATCH 04/17] x86/PV: harden guest memory accesses against speculative abuse Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 16:26 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-10 16:55 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-11 8:11 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-11 11:28 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-12 10:41 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-12 12:48 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-12 13:02 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-12 13:15 ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:05 ` [PATCH 05/17] x86: rename {get,put}_user() to {get,put}_guest() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:05 ` [PATCH 06/17] x86/gdbsx: convert "user" to "guest" accesses Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:06 ` [PATCH 07/17] x86: rename copy_{from,to}_user() to copy_{from,to}_guest_pv() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:07 ` [PATCH 08/17] x86: move stac()/clac() from {get,put}_unsafe_asm() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:07 ` [PATCH 09/17] x86/PV: use get_unsafe() instead of copy_from_unsafe() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:08 ` [PATCH 10/17] x86/shadow: " Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:08 ` [PATCH 11/17] x86/shadow: polish shadow_write_entries() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:09 ` [PATCH 12/17] x86/shadow: move shadow_set_l<N>e() to their own source file Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:09 ` [PATCH 13/17] x86/shadow: don't open-code SHF_* shorthands Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:10 ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2021-01-14 15:10 ` [PATCH 15/17] x86/shadow: drop SH_type_l2h_pae_shadow Jan Beulich
2021-01-22 13:11 ` Tim Deegan
2021-01-22 16:31 ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-22 20:02 ` Tim Deegan
2021-01-25 11:09 ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-25 11:33 ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:10 ` [PATCH 16/17] x86/shadow: only 4-level guest code needs building when !HVM Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:11 ` [PATCH 17/17] x86/shadow: adjust is_pv_*() checks Jan Beulich
2021-01-22 13:18 ` [PATCH 00/17] x86/PV: avoid speculation abuse through guest accessors plus Tim Deegan
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