From: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: "xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>, Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>,
Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>,
George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 02/17] x86: split __{get,put}_user() into "guest" and "unsafe" variants
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 16:27:36 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YCKp6Cm0wtja7D1i@Air-de-Roger> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <11d58555-97d2-0489-b123-cbcf084a0094@suse.com>
On Tue, Feb 09, 2021 at 04:14:41PM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 09.02.2021 15:55, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> > On Thu, Jan 14, 2021 at 04:04:11PM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote:
> >> The "guest" variants are intended to work with (potentially) fully guest
> >> controlled addresses, while the "unsafe" variants are not. (For
> >> descriptor table accesses the low bits of the addresses may still be
> >> guest controlled, but this still won't allow speculation to "escape"
> >> into unwanted areas.)
> >
> > Descriptor table is also in guest address space, and hence would be
> > fine using the _guest accessors? (even if not in guest control and
> > thus unsuitable as an speculation vector)
>
> No, we don't access descriptor tables in guest space, I don't
> think. See read_gate_descriptor() for an example. After all PV
> guests don't even have the full concept of self-managed (in
> their VA space) descriptor tables (GDT gets specified in terms
> of frames, while LDT gets specified in terms of (VA,size)
> tuples, but just for Xen to read the underlying page table
> entries upon 1st access).
I see, read_gate_descriptor uses gdt_ldt_desc_ptr which points into
the per-domain Xen virt space, so it's indeed an address in Xen
address space. I realize it doesn't make sense for the descriptor
table to be in guest address space, as it's not fully under guest
control.
> >> --- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
> >> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
> >> @@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static void compat_show_guest_stack(stru
> >> {
> >> if ( (((long)stack - 1) ^ ((long)(stack + 1) - 1)) & mask )
> >> break;
> >> - if ( __get_user(addr, stack) )
> >> + if ( get_unsafe(addr, stack) )
> >> {
> >> if ( i != 0 )
> >> printk("\n ");
> >> @@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ static void show_guest_stack(struct vcpu
> >> {
> >> if ( (((long)stack - 1) ^ ((long)(stack + 1) - 1)) & mask )
> >> break;
> >> - if ( __get_user(addr, stack) )
> >> + if ( get_unsafe(addr, stack) )
> >
> > Shouldn't accessing the guest stack use the _guest accessors?
>
> Hmm, yes indeed.
>
> > Or has this address been verified by Xen and not in idrect control of
> > the guest, and thus can't be used for speculation purposes?
> >
> > I feel like this should be using the _guest accessors anyway, as the
> > guest stack is an address in guest space?
>
> I think this being a debugging function only, not directly
> accessible by guests, is what made me think speculation is
> not an issue here and hence the "unsafe" variants are fine
> to use (they're slightly cheaper after all, once the
> subsequent changes are in place). But I guess I will better
> switch these two around.
With that:
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Thanks, Roger.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-09 15:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-01-14 15:01 [PATCH 00/17] x86/PV: avoid speculation abuse through guest accessors plus Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:03 ` [PATCH 01/17] x86/shadow: use __put_user() instead of __copy_to_user() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:04 ` [PATCH 02/17] x86: split __{get,put}_user() into "guest" and "unsafe" variants Jan Beulich
2021-02-05 15:43 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-05 16:13 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-05 16:18 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-05 16:26 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 13:07 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 13:15 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 14:46 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 14:57 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 15:23 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 14:55 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 15:14 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 15:27 ` Roger Pau Monné [this message]
2021-01-14 15:04 ` [PATCH 03/17] x86: split __copy_{from,to}_user() " Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 16:06 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 17:03 ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:04 ` [PATCH 04/17] x86/PV: harden guest memory accesses against speculative abuse Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 16:26 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-10 16:55 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-11 8:11 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-11 11:28 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-12 10:41 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-12 12:48 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-12 13:02 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-12 13:15 ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:05 ` [PATCH 05/17] x86: rename {get,put}_user() to {get,put}_guest() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:05 ` [PATCH 06/17] x86/gdbsx: convert "user" to "guest" accesses Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:06 ` [PATCH 07/17] x86: rename copy_{from,to}_user() to copy_{from,to}_guest_pv() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:07 ` [PATCH 08/17] x86: move stac()/clac() from {get,put}_unsafe_asm() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:07 ` [PATCH 09/17] x86/PV: use get_unsafe() instead of copy_from_unsafe() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:08 ` [PATCH 10/17] x86/shadow: " Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:08 ` [PATCH 11/17] x86/shadow: polish shadow_write_entries() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:09 ` [PATCH 12/17] x86/shadow: move shadow_set_l<N>e() to their own source file Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:09 ` [PATCH 13/17] x86/shadow: don't open-code SHF_* shorthands Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:10 ` [PATCH 14/17] x86/shadow: SH_type_l2h_shadow is PV-only Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:10 ` [PATCH 15/17] x86/shadow: drop SH_type_l2h_pae_shadow Jan Beulich
2021-01-22 13:11 ` Tim Deegan
2021-01-22 16:31 ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-22 20:02 ` Tim Deegan
2021-01-25 11:09 ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-25 11:33 ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:10 ` [PATCH 16/17] x86/shadow: only 4-level guest code needs building when !HVM Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:11 ` [PATCH 17/17] x86/shadow: adjust is_pv_*() checks Jan Beulich
2021-01-22 13:18 ` [PATCH 00/17] x86/PV: avoid speculation abuse through guest accessors plus Tim Deegan
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