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From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: "xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: "Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	"Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>, "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>,
	"Tim Deegan" <tim@xen.org>,
	"George Dunlap" <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH 07/17] x86: rename copy_{from,to}_user() to copy_{from,to}_guest_pv()
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 16:06:23 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f49d61e6-42da-3f1e-0fb3-c619ebc75fcd@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4f1975a9-bdd9-f556-9db5-eb6c428f258f@suse.com>

Bring them (back) in line with __copy_{from,to}_guest_pv(). Since it
falls in the same group, also convert clear_user(). Instead of adjusting
__raw_clear_guest(), drop it - it's unused and would require a non-
checking __clear_guest_pv() which we don't have.

Add previously missing __user at some call sites and in the function
declarations.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

--- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-inv-op.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-inv-op.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static int emulate_forced_invalid_op(str
     eip = regs->rip;
 
     /* Check for forced emulation signature: ud2 ; .ascii "xen". */
-    if ( (rc = copy_from_user(sig, (char *)eip, sizeof(sig))) != 0 )
+    if ( (rc = copy_from_guest_pv(sig, (char __user *)eip, sizeof(sig))) != 0 )
     {
         pv_inject_page_fault(0, eip + sizeof(sig) - rc);
         return EXCRET_fault_fixed;
@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ static int emulate_forced_invalid_op(str
     eip += sizeof(sig);
 
     /* We only emulate CPUID. */
-    if ( ( rc = copy_from_user(instr, (char *)eip, sizeof(instr))) != 0 )
+    if ( (rc = copy_from_guest_pv(instr, (char __user *)eip,
+                                  sizeof(instr))) != 0 )
     {
         pv_inject_page_fault(0, eip + sizeof(instr) - rc);
         return EXCRET_fault_fixed;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/iret.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/iret.c
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ unsigned long do_iret(void)
     struct iret_context iret_saved;
     struct vcpu *v = current;
 
-    if ( unlikely(copy_from_user(&iret_saved, (void *)regs->rsp,
-                                 sizeof(iret_saved))) )
+    if ( unlikely(copy_from_guest_pv(&iret_saved, (void __user *)regs->rsp,
+                                     sizeof(iret_saved))) )
     {
         gprintk(XENLOG_ERR,
                 "Fault while reading IRET context from guest stack\n");
--- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/ro-page-fault.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/ro-page-fault.c
@@ -90,7 +90,8 @@ static int ptwr_emulated_update(unsigned
 
         /* Align address; read full word. */
         addr &= ~(sizeof(full) - 1);
-        if ( (rc = copy_from_user(&full, (void *)addr, sizeof(full))) != 0 )
+        if ( (rc = copy_from_guest_pv(&full, (void __user *)addr,
+                                      sizeof(full))) != 0 )
         {
             x86_emul_pagefault(0, /* Read fault. */
                                addr + sizeof(full) - rc,
--- a/xen/arch/x86/usercopy.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/usercopy.c
@@ -109,19 +109,17 @@ unsigned int copy_from_guest_ll(void *to
 #if GUARD(1) + 0
 
 /**
- * copy_to_user: - Copy a block of data into user space.
- * @to:   Destination address, in user space.
- * @from: Source address, in kernel space.
+ * copy_to_guest_pv: - Copy a block of data into guest space.
+ * @to:   Destination address, in guest space.
+ * @from: Source address, in hypervisor space.
  * @n:    Number of bytes to copy.
  *
- * Context: User context only.  This function may sleep.
- *
- * Copy data from kernel space to user space.
+ * Copy data from hypervisor space to guest space.
  *
  * Returns number of bytes that could not be copied.
  * On success, this will be zero.
  */
-unsigned copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned n)
+unsigned int copy_to_guest_pv(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned int n)
 {
     if ( access_ok(to, n) )
         n = __copy_to_guest_pv(to, from, n);
@@ -129,16 +127,16 @@ unsigned copy_to_user(void __user *to, c
 }
 
 /**
- * clear_user: - Zero a block of memory in user space.
- * @to:   Destination address, in user space.
+ * clear_guest_pv: - Zero a block of memory in guest space.
+ * @to:   Destination address, in guest space.
  * @n:    Number of bytes to zero.
  *
- * Zero a block of memory in user space.
+ * Zero a block of memory in guest space.
  *
  * Returns number of bytes that could not be cleared.
  * On success, this will be zero.
  */
-unsigned clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned n)
+unsigned int clear_guest_pv(void __user *to, unsigned int n)
 {
     if ( access_ok(to, n) )
     {
@@ -168,14 +166,12 @@ unsigned clear_user(void __user *to, uns
 }
 
 /**
- * copy_from_user: - Copy a block of data from user space.
- * @to:   Destination address, in kernel space.
- * @from: Source address, in user space.
+ * copy_from_guest_pv: - Copy a block of data from guest space.
+ * @to:   Destination address, in hypervisor space.
+ * @from: Source address, in guest space.
  * @n:    Number of bytes to copy.
  *
- * Context: User context only.  This function may sleep.
- *
- * Copy data from user space to kernel space.
+ * Copy data from guest space to hypervisor space.
  *
  * Returns number of bytes that could not be copied.
  * On success, this will be zero.
@@ -183,7 +179,8 @@ unsigned clear_user(void __user *to, uns
  * If some data could not be copied, this function will pad the copied
  * data to the requested size using zero bytes.
  */
-unsigned copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned n)
+unsigned int copy_from_guest_pv(void *to, const void __user *from,
+                                unsigned int n)
 {
     if ( access_ok(from, n) )
         n = __copy_from_guest_pv(to, from, n);
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/guest_access.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/guest_access.h
@@ -16,15 +16,15 @@
 #define raw_copy_to_guest(dst, src, len)        \
     (is_hvm_vcpu(current) ?                     \
      copy_to_user_hvm((dst), (src), (len)) :    \
-     copy_to_user((dst), (src), (len)))
+     copy_to_guest_pv(dst, src, len))
 #define raw_copy_from_guest(dst, src, len)      \
     (is_hvm_vcpu(current) ?                     \
      copy_from_user_hvm((dst), (src), (len)) :  \
-     copy_from_user((dst), (src), (len)))
+     copy_from_guest_pv(dst, src, len))
 #define raw_clear_guest(dst,  len)              \
     (is_hvm_vcpu(current) ?                     \
      clear_user_hvm((dst), (len)) :             \
-     clear_user((dst), (len)))
+     clear_guest_pv(dst, len))
 #define __raw_copy_to_guest(dst, src, len)      \
     (is_hvm_vcpu(current) ?                     \
      copy_to_user_hvm((dst), (src), (len)) :    \
@@ -33,10 +33,6 @@
     (is_hvm_vcpu(current) ?                     \
      copy_from_user_hvm((dst), (src), (len)) :  \
      __copy_from_guest_pv(dst, src, len))
-#define __raw_clear_guest(dst,  len)            \
-    (is_hvm_vcpu(current) ?                     \
-     clear_user_hvm((dst), (len)) :             \
-     clear_user((dst), (len)))
 
 /*
  * Pre-validate a guest handle.
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/uaccess.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/uaccess.h
@@ -10,9 +10,11 @@
 
 #include <asm/x86_64/uaccess.h>
 
-unsigned copy_to_user(void *to, const void *from, unsigned len);
-unsigned clear_user(void *to, unsigned len);
-unsigned copy_from_user(void *to, const void *from, unsigned len);
+unsigned int copy_to_guest_pv(void __user *to, const void *from,
+                              unsigned int len);
+unsigned int clear_guest_pv(void __user *to, unsigned int len);
+unsigned int copy_from_guest_pv(void *to, const void __user *from,
+                                unsigned int len);
 
 /* Handles exceptions in both to and from, but doesn't do access_ok */
 unsigned int copy_to_guest_ll(void __user*to, const void *from, unsigned int n);



  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-01-14 15:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-14 15:01 [PATCH 00/17] x86/PV: avoid speculation abuse through guest accessors plus Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:03 ` [PATCH 01/17] x86/shadow: use __put_user() instead of __copy_to_user() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:04 ` [PATCH 02/17] x86: split __{get,put}_user() into "guest" and "unsafe" variants Jan Beulich
2021-02-05 15:43   ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-05 16:13     ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-05 16:18       ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-05 16:26         ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 13:07           ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 13:15             ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 14:46               ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 14:57                 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 15:23                   ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 14:55   ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 15:14     ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 15:27       ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-01-14 15:04 ` [PATCH 03/17] x86: split __copy_{from,to}_user() " Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 16:06   ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-09 17:03     ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:04 ` [PATCH 04/17] x86/PV: harden guest memory accesses against speculative abuse Jan Beulich
2021-02-09 16:26   ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-10 16:55     ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-11  8:11       ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-11 11:28         ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-12 10:41   ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-12 12:48     ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-12 13:02       ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-12 13:15         ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:05 ` [PATCH 05/17] x86: rename {get,put}_user() to {get,put}_guest() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:05 ` [PATCH 06/17] x86/gdbsx: convert "user" to "guest" accesses Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:06 ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2021-01-14 15:07 ` [PATCH 08/17] x86: move stac()/clac() from {get,put}_unsafe_asm() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:07 ` [PATCH 09/17] x86/PV: use get_unsafe() instead of copy_from_unsafe() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:08 ` [PATCH 10/17] x86/shadow: " Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:08 ` [PATCH 11/17] x86/shadow: polish shadow_write_entries() Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:09 ` [PATCH 12/17] x86/shadow: move shadow_set_l<N>e() to their own source file Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:09 ` [PATCH 13/17] x86/shadow: don't open-code SHF_* shorthands Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:10 ` [PATCH 14/17] x86/shadow: SH_type_l2h_shadow is PV-only Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:10 ` [PATCH 15/17] x86/shadow: drop SH_type_l2h_pae_shadow Jan Beulich
2021-01-22 13:11   ` Tim Deegan
2021-01-22 16:31     ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-22 20:02       ` Tim Deegan
2021-01-25 11:09         ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-25 11:33         ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:10 ` [PATCH 16/17] x86/shadow: only 4-level guest code needs building when !HVM Jan Beulich
2021-01-14 15:11 ` [PATCH 17/17] x86/shadow: adjust is_pv_*() checks Jan Beulich
2021-01-22 13:18 ` [PATCH 00/17] x86/PV: avoid speculation abuse through guest accessors plus Tim Deegan

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