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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/8] lib: add asn.1 encoder
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2019 14:08:49 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <10037.1575986929@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1575984010.3459.4.camel@HansenPartnership.com>

James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> wrote:

> > Didn't you say you were going to make it return an error when it ran
> > out of space or was asked to encode a negative number?
> 
> it follows the pattern of all the other functions in that it dumps a
> kernel warning on problems and bails.

I don't see any bounds checking there, let alone anything that dumps a kernel
warning and bails - except if the length is so large that the ASN.1 cannot be
constructed.  That said, there is a check in patch 4.

> ... as long as the buffer doesn't overflow.

Yes, but that's Dave's point.

[from patch 4]

> +	 * Assume both ovtet strings will encode to a 2 byte definite length

octet, btw.

At least I've found a preliminary bounds check there

> +	 */
> +	if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + 8 > SCRATCH_SIZE,
> +		 "BUG: scratch buffer is too small"))
> +		return -EINVAL;

which I presume makes the correct calculation.

I thought TPM comms were slow - slow enough that putting bounds checking in
your asn1_encode_* routines will be insignificant.

Further, you're promoting this ASN.1 encoder as a general library within the
kernel, presumably so that other people can make use of it.  Please therefore
put bounds checking and error handling in it.  And please *don't* just produce
broken ASN.1 when something goes wrong.

David

  reply	other threads:[~2019-12-10 14:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-12-10  0:04 [PATCH v2 0/8] Fix TPM 2.0 trusted keys James Bottomley
2019-12-10  0:04 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10  0:05 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] security: keys: trusted: flush the key handle after use James Bottomley
2019-12-10  0:05   ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10  0:06 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] lib: add asn.1 encoder James Bottomley
2019-12-10  0:06   ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10  8:18   ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-10 13:20     ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 13:20       ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 14:08       ` David Howells [this message]
2019-12-10 18:53         ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 18:53           ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 22:37           ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-11 13:02             ` James Bottomley
2019-12-11 13:02               ` James Bottomley
2019-12-18 10:50               ` David Howells
2019-12-18 23:10                 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-18 23:10                   ` James Bottomley
2019-12-20 16:06                   ` James Bottomley
2019-12-20 16:06                     ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10  0:06 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys James Bottomley
2019-12-10  0:06   ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10  8:18   ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-10 13:22     ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 13:22       ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10  0:07 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 tpm2 key format for the blobs James Bottomley
2019-12-10  0:07   ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable James Bottomley
2019-12-10  0:08   ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] security: keys: trusted: add PCR policy to TPM2 keys James Bottomley
2019-12-10  0:08   ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10  0:09 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] security: keys: trusted: add ability to specify arbitrary policy James Bottomley
2019-12-10  0:09   ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10  0:10 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] security: keys: trusted: implement counter/timer policy James Bottomley
2019-12-10  0:10   ` James Bottomley
2019-12-11 17:59 ` [PATCH v2 0/8] Fix TPM 2.0 trusted keys Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-12-11 17:59   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-12-14 20:37 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-14 20:37   ` James Bottomley

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