From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/8] Fix TPM 2.0 trusted keys
Date: Sat, 14 Dec 2019 20:37:12 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1576355832.4035.10.camel@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1575936272.31378.50.camel@HansenPartnership.com>
On Mon, 2019-12-09 at 16:04 -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
[...]
> The big problem with this patch is still that we can't yet combine
> policy with authorization because that requires proper session
> handling, but at least with this rewrite it becomes possible (whereas
> it was never possible with the old external policy session code).
> Thus, when we have the TPM 2.0 security patch upstream, we'll be able
> to use the session logic from that patch to imlement authorizations.
I had a discussion with Ken Goldman on Friday where he told me this
wasn't true: we can actually persuade a policy session to do a non-HMAC
authorization (for the interested, the trick is to use
TPM2_PolicyPassword in place of TPM2_PolicyAuthValue. It hashes to the
same policy but the former sets the session up for non-HMAC and the
latter for HMAC) so I'll add password based authorization to policies
when I respin the patch set.
James
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/8] Fix TPM 2.0 trusted keys
Date: Sat, 14 Dec 2019 12:37:12 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1576355832.4035.10.camel@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1575936272.31378.50.camel@HansenPartnership.com>
On Mon, 2019-12-09 at 16:04 -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
[...]
> The big problem with this patch is still that we can't yet combine
> policy with authorization because that requires proper session
> handling, but at least with this rewrite it becomes possible (whereas
> it was never possible with the old external policy session code).
> Thus, when we have the TPM 2.0 security patch upstream, we'll be able
> to use the session logic from that patch to imlement authorizations.
I had a discussion with Ken Goldman on Friday where he told me this
wasn't true: we can actually persuade a policy session to do a non-HMAC
authorization (for the interested, the trick is to use
TPM2_PolicyPassword in place of TPM2_PolicyAuthValue. It hashes to the
same policy but the former sets the session up for non-HMAC and the
latter for HMAC) so I'll add password based authorization to policies
when I respin the patch set.
James
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-12-14 20:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-12-10 0:04 [PATCH v2 0/8] Fix TPM 2.0 trusted keys James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:04 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:05 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] security: keys: trusted: flush the key handle after use James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:05 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:06 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] lib: add asn.1 encoder James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:06 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 8:18 ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-10 13:20 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 13:20 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 14:08 ` David Howells
2019-12-10 18:53 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 18:53 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 22:37 ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-11 13:02 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-11 13:02 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-18 10:50 ` David Howells
2019-12-18 23:10 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-18 23:10 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-20 16:06 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-20 16:06 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:06 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:06 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 8:18 ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-10 13:22 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 13:22 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:07 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 tpm2 key format for the blobs James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:07 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:08 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:08 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:08 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] security: keys: trusted: add PCR policy to TPM2 keys James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:08 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:09 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] security: keys: trusted: add ability to specify arbitrary policy James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:09 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:10 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] security: keys: trusted: implement counter/timer policy James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:10 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-11 17:59 ` [PATCH v2 0/8] Fix TPM 2.0 trusted keys Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-12-11 17:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-12-14 20:37 ` James Bottomley [this message]
2019-12-14 20:37 ` James Bottomley
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