From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/8] Fix TPM 2.0 trusted keys
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2019 17:59:14 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191211175914.GM4516@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1575936272.31378.50.camel@HansenPartnership.com>
On Mon, Dec 09, 2019 at 04:04:32PM -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
> This fixes a wide array of problems with the current TPM 2.0
> implementation of trusted keys. Since policy based trusted keys never
> worked in the current implementation, I've rewritten the policy
> implementation to make it easier to use and so the trusted key handler
> can understand what elements of a policy are failing and why.
>
> Apart from fixing bugs like volatile object leakage, I've changed the
> output format to use the standardised ASN.1 coding for TPM2 keys,
> meaning they should interoperate with userspace TPM2 key
> implementations. Apart from interoperability, another advantage of the
> existing key format is that it carries all parameters like parent and
> hash with it and it is capable of carrying policy directives in a way
> that mean they're tied permanently to the key (no having to try to
> remember what the policy was and reconstruct it from userspace). This
> actually allows us to support the TPM 1.2 commands like pcrinfo easily
> in 2.0.
>
> The big problem with this patch is still that we can't yet combine
> policy with authorization because that requires proper session
> handling, but at least with this rewrite it becomes possible (whereas
> it was never possible with the old external policy session code).
> Thus, when we have the TPM 2.0 security patch upstream, we'll be able
> to use the session logic from that patch to imlement authorizations.
Testing as soon as we have more urgent issues out of the table.
/Jarkko
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/8] Fix TPM 2.0 trusted keys
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2019 19:59:14 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191211175914.GM4516@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1575936272.31378.50.camel@HansenPartnership.com>
On Mon, Dec 09, 2019 at 04:04:32PM -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
> This fixes a wide array of problems with the current TPM 2.0
> implementation of trusted keys. Since policy based trusted keys never
> worked in the current implementation, I've rewritten the policy
> implementation to make it easier to use and so the trusted key handler
> can understand what elements of a policy are failing and why.
>
> Apart from fixing bugs like volatile object leakage, I've changed the
> output format to use the standardised ASN.1 coding for TPM2 keys,
> meaning they should interoperate with userspace TPM2 key
> implementations. Apart from interoperability, another advantage of the
> existing key format is that it carries all parameters like parent and
> hash with it and it is capable of carrying policy directives in a way
> that mean they're tied permanently to the key (no having to try to
> remember what the policy was and reconstruct it from userspace). This
> actually allows us to support the TPM 1.2 commands like pcrinfo easily
> in 2.0.
>
> The big problem with this patch is still that we can't yet combine
> policy with authorization because that requires proper session
> handling, but at least with this rewrite it becomes possible (whereas
> it was never possible with the old external policy session code).
> Thus, when we have the TPM 2.0 security patch upstream, we'll be able
> to use the session logic from that patch to imlement authorizations.
Testing as soon as we have more urgent issues out of the table.
/Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-12-11 17:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-12-10 0:04 [PATCH v2 0/8] Fix TPM 2.0 trusted keys James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:04 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:05 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] security: keys: trusted: flush the key handle after use James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:05 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:06 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] lib: add asn.1 encoder James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:06 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 8:18 ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-10 13:20 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 13:20 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 14:08 ` David Howells
2019-12-10 18:53 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 18:53 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 22:37 ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-11 13:02 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-11 13:02 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-18 10:50 ` David Howells
2019-12-18 23:10 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-18 23:10 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-20 16:06 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-20 16:06 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:06 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:06 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 8:18 ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-10 13:22 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 13:22 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:07 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 tpm2 key format for the blobs James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:07 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:08 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:08 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:08 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] security: keys: trusted: add PCR policy to TPM2 keys James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:08 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:09 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] security: keys: trusted: add ability to specify arbitrary policy James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:09 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:10 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] security: keys: trusted: implement counter/timer policy James Bottomley
2019-12-10 0:10 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-11 17:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2019-12-11 17:59 ` [PATCH v2 0/8] Fix TPM 2.0 trusted keys Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-12-14 20:37 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-14 20:37 ` James Bottomley
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