RE: Labeled networking packets

[Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@mentalrootkit.com>]

On Mon, 2006-09-25 at 14:25 -0400, Joshua Brindle wrote:
> On Mon, 2006-09-25 at 14:04 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:

<snip>

> > > The remote socket is probably good enough, though, and as Josh points
> > > out policy can enforce that the socket type matches the current process
> > > domain type (or at least a domain type).
> > 
> > It doesn't need to do that, and setsockcreatecon() wouldn't exist if we
> > always wanted that relationship to be fixed.
> > 
> 
> what was the use case behind adding setsockcreatecon? For guards its
> helpful so that you don't have to alternate ipc mechanisms in the
> pipeline but for client server relationships.. not sure. 
> 

xinetd was one - it allows the creation of sockets with the "correct"
label (e.g., telnetd_t) so that all processes spawned by xinetd to have
to have permissions on all xinetd sockets.

Any time sockets are going to be created by one process and passed to
another it is useful to have setsockcreatecon.

Karl


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