From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@mentalrootkit.com>,
selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: concept of a permissive domain
Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2007 09:59:25 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1189691965.3391.28.camel@localhost.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1189689910.18713.37.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>
On Thu, 2007-09-13 at 09:25 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Thu, 2007-09-13 at 09:19 -0400, Karl MacMillan wrote:
> > > Is it truly something we want expressed in policy, or something that
> > > should just be controlled via selinuxfs (i.e. create
> > > a /selinux/permissive directory with one node per domain, and let you
> > > write a 0 or 1 to those nodes to make them permissive or enforcing)?
>
> On second thought, that should likely instead be a /selinux/domains
> directory with one subdirectory per domain and an "enforce" node in each
> subdirectory, so that it more closely matches the
> existing /selinux/enforce interface and so that we can later add other
> domain-related state and settings there.
>
> > > The latter would be more akin to the existing permissive mode and avoid
> > > needing to change anything in policy. Should be subject to a kernel
> > > config option too, so we can still build kernels with no permissive
> > > support at all.
> > >
> >
> > I suggested the policy option because:
> >
> > * it needs to persist across reboots and putting it in the policy makes
> > that simple.
>
> Put:
> echo -n 0 > /selinux/domains/httpd_t/enforce
> in the /etc/init.d/httpd script and you're done.
> But I'm not sure when/why you want that anyway.
I, the IT guy, just wrote policy for my large trading application. Here
on my machine/test environment I tried to test it every way I could to
exercise all of the code but I probably missed something. If I break
this application in production we lose X amount of money and I'm out of
a job. How many such people would pull that application out from
unconfined_t ???
How many would be willing to run the application in a permissive domain
for 3 months to see how many code paths they missed? Only then removing
the permissive portion of that domain and 'using' selinux.
Maybe they could do it in their init script, but now they have to
somehow manage their initscripts and their policy together. Its never
easy to make sure that multiple packages are updated at the same time,
we've seen that over and over. On an application like this, I wouldn't
even be surprised if they couldn't add such a thing to startup due to
some arcane requirement from the propietary vendor or just their own in
shop policies.
Then again do we really want to give initscripts the power to decide
themselves if they are going to be confined or not? /me doesn't think
giving initscripts loadpolicy permissions is a very good idea, nor does
giving a domain permission to turn on/off its own permissiveness....
>
> > * some of our customers want this to be used on production systems, so
> > the ability to analyze policy taking into account permissive domains
> > seems desirable.
>
> I don't quite follow that - if you are enabling permissive mode (whether
> system-wide or per-domain) in production use, what can you meaningfully
> say anyway in terms of "analysis" - all information flow is possible
> through that domain, period.
>
> Also, consider the parallel with the system-wide enforcing mode or with
> non-persistent boolean settings.
>
> Analysis tools can of course read the current settings from selinuxfs if
> they want to assess the current state of the machine.
Wow, I can't believe I just heard that after being railed on for
considering using selinuxfs for things like handle_unknown (something
which specifically doesn't have large atomicity issues like compat_net)
Wasn't your main argument post analysis tools? I can't imagine anything
worse than this to see how the system was set up. Now when you do
analysis you need to look at 'setenforce' 'compat_net' 'the booleans'
and 'every single friggin type on the whole system.' Your list of
things to look at in selinuxfs just got a bit larger....
I guess I'm in favor of doing it in policy...
-Eric
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2007-09-13 13:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2007-09-11 19:13 concept of a permissive domain Eric Paris
2007-09-11 20:31 ` Daniel J Walsh
2007-09-11 21:26 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-09-11 21:47 ` Eric Paris
2007-09-12 13:27 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-09-12 13:57 ` Daniel J Walsh
2007-09-13 14:08 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-09-13 14:46 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-09-13 14:57 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-09-13 15:25 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-09-13 19:25 ` Daniel J Walsh
2007-09-13 19:38 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-09-13 20:16 ` Eric Paris
2007-09-18 20:24 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-09-18 20:50 ` Joshua Brindle
2007-09-18 21:54 ` Chad Sellers
2007-09-19 12:56 ` Daniel J Walsh
2007-09-19 14:22 ` Chad Sellers
2007-10-12 13:50 ` Daniel J Walsh
2007-10-12 17:49 ` Joshua Brindle
2007-10-12 18:07 ` Eric Paris
2007-10-12 19:03 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-10-12 19:09 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-10-12 18:40 ` Chad Sellers
2007-10-12 19:05 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-10-12 20:43 ` Chad Sellers
2007-10-12 21:01 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-10-12 21:21 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-10-12 23:38 ` Chad Sellers
2007-10-13 13:38 ` Daniel J Walsh
2007-10-14 10:14 ` Stefan Schulze Frielinghaus
2007-10-15 12:40 ` Daniel J Walsh
2007-10-15 16:52 ` Brett Lentz
2007-10-15 16:58 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-10-15 18:32 ` Daniel J Walsh
2007-10-15 18:40 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-10-15 18:57 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-10-15 19:09 ` Eric Paris
2007-10-17 19:47 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-10-17 21:50 ` Recurring SELinux events for similar violations Hasan Rezaul-CHR010
2007-10-17 22:18 ` Eric Paris
2007-10-17 22:22 ` Hasan Rezaul-CHR010
2007-10-18 13:13 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-10-18 14:32 ` Hasan Rezaul-CHR010
2007-11-29 20:06 ` Hasan Rezaul-CHR010
2007-11-29 20:16 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-11-29 21:26 ` Hasan Rezaul-CHR010
2007-11-29 21:32 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-11-29 21:45 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-10-15 17:26 ` concept of a permissive domain Chad Sellers
2007-10-12 19:07 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-10-12 19:30 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-09-19 16:35 ` Martin Orr
2007-09-19 16:41 ` Eric Paris
2007-09-20 14:41 ` Joshua Brindle
2007-09-20 14:46 ` Joshua Brindle
2007-09-19 16:52 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-09-24 14:59 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-09-13 20:25 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-09-14 14:15 ` James Carter
2007-09-14 14:45 ` Joshua Brindle
2007-09-14 15:15 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-09-11 22:57 ` Joshua Brindle
2007-09-12 13:26 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-09-13 13:11 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-09-13 13:19 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-09-13 13:25 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-09-13 13:59 ` Eric Paris [this message]
2007-09-13 14:23 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-09-13 14:36 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-09-13 14:42 ` Karl MacMillan
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