Re: concept of a permissive domain

[Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@mentalrootkit.com>]

On Thu, 2007-09-13 at 10:08 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Tue, 2007-09-11 at 17:26 -0400, Karl MacMillan wrote:
> > On Tue, 2007-09-11 at 16:31 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> > [...]
> > > One other feature/requirement would be to not override dontaudit rules.
> > > So if I have a domain in permissive mode and I have a dontaudit rule  on
> > > reading /etc/shadow.  The app should still be denied reading
> > > /etc/shadow.  (This is not a show stopper, but would allow us to force
> > > apps to take the code paths they will take in enforcing mode.)
> > 
> > This isn't specific to per-domain permissive, right? It would be useful
> > in general for permissive.
> 
> I would be opposed to such a change, as it is a semantic change to what
> dontaudit means.
> 
> Keep in mind that allow, auditallow, and dontaudit/auditdeny are all
> independent of one another today and none of them imply the other, e.g.
> 	allow a b:file read;
> 	auditallow a b:file *;
> 	dontaudit a b:file *;
> is perfectly valid and means:
> - Let a read files labeled b,
> - Audit all permission grantings from a to files labeled b,
> - Don't audit any permission denials from a to files labeled b.
> 

I agree that changing the dontaudit semantic has problems - however the
reason Dan suggested is still valid. Currently, generating policy in
permissive mode can lead to bogus or overly permissive policy. It would
be nice to have some solution to that problem.

Karl


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