[PATCH 2/10] Fix leaking of kernel heap addresses in net/

[Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>]

diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
index 08ffe9e..5960ad7 100644
--- a/net/can/bcm.c
+++ b/net/can/bcm.c
@@ -165,9 +165,16 @@ static int bcm_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	struct bcm_sock *bo = bcm_sk(sk);
 	struct bcm_op *op;
 
-	seq_printf(m, ">>> socket %p", sk->sk_socket);
-	seq_printf(m, " / sk %p", sk);
-	seq_printf(m, " / bo %p", bo);
+	/* Only expose kernel addresses to privileged readers */
+	if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+		seq_printf(m, ">>> socket %p", sk->sk_socket);
+		seq_printf(m, " / sk %p", sk);
+		seq_printf(m, " / bo %p", bo);
+	else
+		seq_printf(m, ">>> socket %lu", sock_i_ino(sk));
+		seq_printf(m, " / sk %d", 0);
+		seq_printf(m, " / bo %d", 0);
+
 	seq_printf(m, " / dropped %lu", bo->dropped_usr_msgs);
 	seq_printf(m, " / bound %s", bcm_proc_getifname(ifname, bo->ifindex));
 	seq_printf(m, " <<<\n");
@@ -1520,8 +1527,8 @@ static int bcm_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int len,
 	bo->bound = 1;
 
 	if (proc_dir) {
-		/* unique socket address as filename */
-		sprintf(bo->procname, "%p", sock);
+		/* unique socket inode as filename */
+		sprintf(bo->procname, "%lx", sock_i_ino(sk));
 		bo->bcm_proc_read = proc_create_data(bo->procname, 0644,
 						     proc_dir,
 						     &bcm_proc_fops, sk);