All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>,
	KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>,
	security@kernel.org, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
	Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] taskstats: restrict access to user
Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2011 16:09:22 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1308917362-4795-1-git-send-email-segoon@openwall.com> (raw)

taskstats information may be used for gathering private information.
E.g. for openssh and vsftpd daemons read_characters/write_characters may
be used to learn the precise password length.  Restrict it to processes
being able to ptrace the target process.

For TASKSTATS_CMD_ATTR_REGISTER_CPUMASK the fix is euid check instead of
a ptrace check as the handler is processed in the context of the target
process, not the listener process'.  When ptrace_task_may_access_current()
is introduced, it should be used instead of euid check.  Currently there
is a small race when a process temporarily changes its euid (e.g. to
access user's files), until the process sets euid back user's processes
may gather privileged process' statistics.

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
---
 kernel/taskstats.c |   23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/taskstats.c b/kernel/taskstats.c
index 9ffea36..d92c95a 100644
--- a/kernel/taskstats.c
+++ b/kernel/taskstats.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/cgroup.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
 #include <net/genetlink.h>
 #include <asm/atomic.h>
 
@@ -132,6 +133,8 @@ static void send_cpu_listeners(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	struct sk_buff *skb_next, *skb_cur = skb;
 	void *reply = genlmsg_data(genlhdr);
 	int rc, delcount = 0;
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct task_struct *task;
 
 	rc = genlmsg_end(skb, reply);
 	if (rc < 0) {
@@ -142,6 +145,15 @@ static void send_cpu_listeners(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	rc = 0;
 	down_read(&listeners->sem);
 	list_for_each_entry(s, &listeners->list, list) {
+
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		task = find_task_by_vpid(s->pid);
+		if (!task || __task_cred(task)->euid != cred->euid) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			continue;
+		}
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+
 		skb_next = NULL;
 		if (!list_is_last(&s->list, &listeners->list)) {
 			skb_next = skb_clone(skb_cur, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -199,14 +211,19 @@ static void fill_stats(struct task_struct *tsk, struct taskstats *stats)
 static int fill_stats_for_pid(pid_t pid, struct taskstats *stats)
 {
 	struct task_struct *tsk;
+	int rc = -ESRCH;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	tsk = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
+	if (tsk && !ptrace_may_access(tsk, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
+		tsk = NULL;
+		rc = -EACCES;
+	}
 	if (tsk)
 		get_task_struct(tsk);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	if (!tsk)
-		return -ESRCH;
+		return rc;
 	fill_stats(tsk, stats);
 	put_task_struct(tsk);
 	return 0;
@@ -224,6 +241,10 @@ static int fill_stats_for_tgid(pid_t tgid, struct taskstats *stats)
 	 */
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	first = find_task_by_vpid(tgid);
+	if (first && !ptrace_may_access(first, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
+		rc = -EACCES;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	if (!first || !lock_task_sighand(first, &flags))
 		goto out;
-- 
1.7.0.4


             reply	other threads:[~2011-06-24 12:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-06-24 12:09 Vasiliy Kulikov [this message]
2011-06-29  1:27 ` [PATCH 2/2] taskstats: restrict access to user Balbir Singh
2011-06-29 11:42   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-29 20:17   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-02  7:36     ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-02  7:36       ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-04  2:57       ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2011-07-04  2:57         ` Balbir Singh
2011-07-04 17:45         ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-04 17:45           ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-07  8:55           ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-07  8:55             ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-07 11:53             ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2011-07-07 11:53               ` Balbir Singh
2011-07-07 16:23               ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-07 16:23                 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-09 15:36                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2011-07-09 15:36                   ` Balbir Singh
2011-07-11 14:07                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-11 14:07                     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-29 20:09 ` [Security] " Linus Torvalds
2011-06-30  7:57   ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-30  7:57     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-30 10:59     ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2011-06-30 10:59       ` Balbir Singh
2011-06-30 12:08       ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-30 12:08         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-30 16:40       ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2011-06-30 16:40         ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-01  3:02         ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2011-07-01  3:02           ` Balbir Singh
2011-09-19 16:40           ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2011-09-19 16:40             ` Linus Torvalds
2011-09-19 17:20             ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2011-09-19 17:20               ` Balbir Singh
2011-09-19 17:39             ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 17:39               ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 17:45               ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2011-09-19 17:45                 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-09-20  3:35                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2011-09-20  3:35                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-09-20  5:47                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexey Dobriyan
2011-09-20  5:47                   ` Alexey Dobriyan
2011-09-19 17:47               ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2011-09-19 17:47                 ` Balbir Singh
2011-09-19 18:29             ` [kernel-hardening] " Andi Kleen
2011-09-19 18:29               ` Andi Kleen
2011-09-19 18:32               ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2011-09-19 18:32                 ` Linus Torvalds

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1308917362-4795-1-git-send-email-segoon@openwall.com \
    --to=segoon@openwall.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    --cc=eparis@redhat.com \
    --cc=kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=rientjes@google.com \
    --cc=security@kernel.org \
    --cc=solar@openwall.com \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    --cc=wilsons@start.ca \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.