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From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Shailabh Nagar <nagar@us.ibm.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, security@kernel.org,
	Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>, Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>,
	KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [Security] [PATCH 2/2] taskstats: restrict access to user
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2011 21:39:05 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110919173905.GA3804@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFxXS9z=NwoYug+qGoYufqN-6dCo4fm5ggTsoDonsMi4Dw@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 09:40 -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> diff --git a/kernel/taskstats.c b/kernel/taskstats.c
> index e19ce1454ee1..5874d4866b3c 100644
> --- a/kernel/taskstats.c
> +++ b/kernel/taskstats.c
> @@ -457,6 +457,8 @@ static int cmd_attr_register_cpumask(struct genl_info *info)
>  	cpumask_var_t mask;
>  	int rc;
>  
> +	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> +		return -EPERM;

Shouldn't it simply protect taskstats_user_cmd()?  You may still poll
the counters with TASKSTATS_CMD_ATTR_PID/TASKSTATS_CMD_ATTR_TGID.

Or ptrace_may_access() in taskstats_user_cmd().

>  	if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&mask, GFP_KERNEL))
>  		return -ENOMEM;
>  	rc = parse(info->attrs[TASKSTATS_CMD_ATTR_REGISTER_CPUMASK], mask);
> diff --git a/kernel/tsacct.c b/kernel/tsacct.c
> index 24dc60d9fa1f..110ca5a03bd6 100644
> --- a/kernel/tsacct.c
> +++ b/kernel/tsacct.c
> @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ void bacct_add_tsk(struct taskstats *stats, struct task_struct *tsk)
>  
>  #define KB 1024
>  #define MB (1024*KB)
> +#define KB_MASK (~(KB-1))
>  /*
>   * fill in extended accounting fields
>   */
> @@ -100,9 +101,9 @@ void xacct_add_tsk(struct taskstats *stats, struct task_struct *p)
>  	stats->read_syscalls	= p->ioac.syscr;
>  	stats->write_syscalls	= p->ioac.syscw;
>  #ifdef CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING
> -	stats->read_bytes	= p->ioac.read_bytes;
> -	stats->write_bytes	= p->ioac.write_bytes;
> -	stats->cancelled_write_bytes = p->ioac.cancelled_write_bytes;
> +	stats->read_bytes	= p->ioac.read_bytes & KB_MASK;
> +	stats->write_bytes	= p->ioac.write_bytes & KB_MASK;
> +	stats->cancelled_write_bytes = p->ioac.cancelled_write_bytes & KB_MASK;
>  #else
>  	stats->read_bytes	= 0;
>  	stats->write_bytes	= 0;


-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Shailabh Nagar <nagar@us.ibm.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, security@kernel.org,
	Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>, Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>,
	KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [Security] [PATCH 2/2] taskstats: restrict access to user
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2011 21:39:05 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110919173905.GA3804@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFxXS9z=NwoYug+qGoYufqN-6dCo4fm5ggTsoDonsMi4Dw@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 09:40 -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> diff --git a/kernel/taskstats.c b/kernel/taskstats.c
> index e19ce1454ee1..5874d4866b3c 100644
> --- a/kernel/taskstats.c
> +++ b/kernel/taskstats.c
> @@ -457,6 +457,8 @@ static int cmd_attr_register_cpumask(struct genl_info *info)
>  	cpumask_var_t mask;
>  	int rc;
>  
> +	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> +		return -EPERM;

Shouldn't it simply protect taskstats_user_cmd()?  You may still poll
the counters with TASKSTATS_CMD_ATTR_PID/TASKSTATS_CMD_ATTR_TGID.

Or ptrace_may_access() in taskstats_user_cmd().

>  	if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&mask, GFP_KERNEL))
>  		return -ENOMEM;
>  	rc = parse(info->attrs[TASKSTATS_CMD_ATTR_REGISTER_CPUMASK], mask);
> diff --git a/kernel/tsacct.c b/kernel/tsacct.c
> index 24dc60d9fa1f..110ca5a03bd6 100644
> --- a/kernel/tsacct.c
> +++ b/kernel/tsacct.c
> @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ void bacct_add_tsk(struct taskstats *stats, struct task_struct *tsk)
>  
>  #define KB 1024
>  #define MB (1024*KB)
> +#define KB_MASK (~(KB-1))
>  /*
>   * fill in extended accounting fields
>   */
> @@ -100,9 +101,9 @@ void xacct_add_tsk(struct taskstats *stats, struct task_struct *p)
>  	stats->read_syscalls	= p->ioac.syscr;
>  	stats->write_syscalls	= p->ioac.syscw;
>  #ifdef CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING
> -	stats->read_bytes	= p->ioac.read_bytes;
> -	stats->write_bytes	= p->ioac.write_bytes;
> -	stats->cancelled_write_bytes = p->ioac.cancelled_write_bytes;
> +	stats->read_bytes	= p->ioac.read_bytes & KB_MASK;
> +	stats->write_bytes	= p->ioac.write_bytes & KB_MASK;
> +	stats->cancelled_write_bytes = p->ioac.cancelled_write_bytes & KB_MASK;
>  #else
>  	stats->read_bytes	= 0;
>  	stats->write_bytes	= 0;


-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments

  parent reply	other threads:[~2011-09-19 17:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-06-24 12:09 [PATCH 2/2] taskstats: restrict access to user Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-29  1:27 ` Balbir Singh
2011-06-29 11:42   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-29 20:17   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-02  7:36     ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-02  7:36       ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-04  2:57       ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2011-07-04  2:57         ` Balbir Singh
2011-07-04 17:45         ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-04 17:45           ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-07  8:55           ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-07  8:55             ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-07 11:53             ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2011-07-07 11:53               ` Balbir Singh
2011-07-07 16:23               ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-07 16:23                 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-09 15:36                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2011-07-09 15:36                   ` Balbir Singh
2011-07-11 14:07                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-11 14:07                     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-29 20:09 ` [Security] " Linus Torvalds
2011-06-30  7:57   ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-30  7:57     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-30 10:59     ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2011-06-30 10:59       ` Balbir Singh
2011-06-30 12:08       ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-30 12:08         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-30 16:40       ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2011-06-30 16:40         ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-01  3:02         ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2011-07-01  3:02           ` Balbir Singh
2011-09-19 16:40           ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2011-09-19 16:40             ` Linus Torvalds
2011-09-19 17:20             ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2011-09-19 17:20               ` Balbir Singh
2011-09-19 17:39             ` Vasiliy Kulikov [this message]
2011-09-19 17:39               ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 17:45               ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2011-09-19 17:45                 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-09-20  3:35                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2011-09-20  3:35                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-09-20  5:47                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexey Dobriyan
2011-09-20  5:47                   ` Alexey Dobriyan
2011-09-19 17:47               ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2011-09-19 17:47                 ` Balbir Singh
2011-09-19 18:29             ` [kernel-hardening] " Andi Kleen
2011-09-19 18:29               ` Andi Kleen
2011-09-19 18:32               ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2011-09-19 18:32                 ` Linus Torvalds

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