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From: Ian Campbell <ijc@hellion.org.uk>
To: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>, Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>,
	Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>,
	Chris Fries <cfries@google.com>,
	Dave Weinstein <olorin@google.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 0/6] add more kernel pointer filter options
Date: Wed, 04 Oct 2017 17:32:37 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1507134757.25548.20.camel@hellion.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1506816410-10230-1-git-send-email-me@tobin.cc>

On Sun, 2017-10-01 at 11:06 +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> Suggestion by Ian Campbell to add comments on the threat model being mitigated
> by use of %pa vs %paP etc is not implemented because I do not know the threat
> model (I'm only the janitor). Happy to add them if someone writes them.

Thanks for the CC on this repost, but no need for it for V3 onwards.

Thanks,
Ian.

      parent reply	other threads:[~2017-10-04 16:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-10-01  0:06 [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 0/6] add more kernel pointer filter options Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-01  0:06 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 1/6] lib: vsprintf: additional kernel pointer filtering options Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-04  8:55   ` Greg KH
2017-10-04 13:08     ` Steven Rostedt
2017-10-04 13:26       ` Greg KH
2017-10-04 13:29         ` Steven Rostedt
2017-10-04 13:54           ` Greg KH
2017-10-01  0:06 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 2/6] lib: vsprintf: whitelist stack traces Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-02 10:42   ` Will Deacon
2017-10-02 21:49     ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-04  8:56     ` Greg KH
2017-10-04  8:58       ` Will Deacon
2017-10-04  9:02         ` Greg KH
2017-10-04 10:42           ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-01  0:06 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 3/6] lib: vsprintf: physical address kernel pointer filtering options Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-04  8:58   ` Greg KH
2017-10-01  0:06 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 4/6] lib: vsprintf: default kptr_restrict to the maximum value Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-04  8:55   ` Greg KH
2017-10-04 16:42   ` Kees Cook
2017-10-04 16:48     ` Roberts, William C
2017-10-04 17:08     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-04 17:28       ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-04 19:13         ` Jann Horn
2017-10-04 19:23           ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-01  0:06 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 5/6] lib: vsprintf: add "%paP", "%papP", and "%padP" specifiers Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-04  8:58   ` Greg KH
2017-10-01  0:06 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 6/6] drivers: uio: un-restrict sysfs pointers for UIO Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-04  8:58   ` Greg KH
2017-10-01  0:11 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 0/6] add more kernel pointer filter options Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-04  8:57   ` Greg KH
2017-10-04 10:45     ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-04  8:58 ` Greg KH
2017-10-04 10:50   ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-04 12:42     ` Greg KH
2017-10-04 13:28       ` Steven Rostedt
2017-10-04 13:28         ` Steven Rostedt
2017-10-04 13:31         ` Steven Rostedt
2017-10-04 16:17   ` Roberts, William C
2017-10-04 15:41 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-04 16:22   ` Boris Lukashev
2017-10-04 16:29     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-04 16:54       ` Steven Rostedt
2017-10-04 18:58   ` Jordan Glover
2017-10-04 19:19     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-04 21:58       ` Roberts, William C
2017-10-04 23:21         ` Daniel Micay
2017-10-04 23:52         ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-05  0:09           ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-05 13:55             ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-10-05  0:29           ` Daniel Micay
2017-10-05  0:35             ` Kees Cook
2017-10-06  8:33               ` Djalal Harouni
2017-10-05  2:19           ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-05  3:10             ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-05  3:15               ` Kees Cook
2017-10-05 15:12               ` Roberts, William C
2017-10-05 16:19                 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-05 17:10                   ` Dave Weinstein
2017-10-07 23:44                   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-10-08  0:08                     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-13 16:32                       ` Roberts, William C
2017-10-13 18:11                         ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-13 19:34                           ` Kees Cook
2017-10-13 20:22                             ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-13 20:47                               ` Kees Cook
2017-10-13 21:45                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-13 22:48                                 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-10-13 16:14             ` Roberts, William C
2017-10-04 16:32 ` Ian Campbell [this message]

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