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From: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>,
	Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>,
	"Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>, Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>,
	Ian Campbell <ijc@hellion.org.uk>,
	Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Chris Fries <cfries@google.com>,
	Dave Weinstein <olorin@google.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 0/6] add more kernel pointer filter options
Date: Wed, 04 Oct 2017 20:29:15 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1507163355.1273.63.camel@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFwEZCT6=BCdmaNn5LGeU8g-2qi4OnM9MTOep3NOZVXjMg@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, 2017-10-04 at 16:52 -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 4, 2017 at 2:58 PM, Roberts, William C
> <william.c.roberts@intel.com> wrote:
> > 
> > I agree with you 100% kptr restrict is odd, and I don't think anyone
> > should have had to opt in to be
> > cleansed via kptr_restrict value via %pK. Opt-in never works. One
> > nice thing now, is that checkpatch
> > has checking of %p usages and warns.
> 
> Yeah, the checkpatch thing may help for future patches.
> 
> > As far as broken things, I can't comment on desktop systems where I
> > think it's harder to make that claim.
> > I see value in embedded systems where I am shipping the whole image,
> > So I know when/what will
> > break.
> > 
> > If this was in-tree, Android would be setting this to 4 immediately
> > FWIW.
> 
> Does android set it to 2 right now?

Yes, as the universal baseline.

On Google Pixels it's set to this 4 level since August (Android 8.0)
which indicates they plan on moving to that universally.

They only allow dmesg access for core system services so I think their
concern is with formatted strings leaking it elsewhere, not to dmesg.

These are the only services they allow to read dmesg:

private/system_server.te:  allow system_server kernel:system syslog_read;
public/dumpstate.te:allow dumpstate kernel:system syslog_read;
public/init.te:allow init kernel:system syslog_read;
public/logd.te:allow logd kernel:system syslog_read;
public/recovery.te:  allow recovery kernel:system syslog_read;

logd doesn't read it in production builds, but even when it does in
engineering builds it only gives out access to privileged apps with
READ_LOGS which isn't something a third party app can obtain.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-10-05  0:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-10-01  0:06 [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 0/6] add more kernel pointer filter options Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-01  0:06 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 1/6] lib: vsprintf: additional kernel pointer filtering options Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-04  8:55   ` Greg KH
2017-10-04 13:08     ` Steven Rostedt
2017-10-04 13:26       ` Greg KH
2017-10-04 13:29         ` Steven Rostedt
2017-10-04 13:54           ` Greg KH
2017-10-01  0:06 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 2/6] lib: vsprintf: whitelist stack traces Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-02 10:42   ` Will Deacon
2017-10-02 21:49     ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-04  8:56     ` Greg KH
2017-10-04  8:58       ` Will Deacon
2017-10-04  9:02         ` Greg KH
2017-10-04 10:42           ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-01  0:06 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 3/6] lib: vsprintf: physical address kernel pointer filtering options Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-04  8:58   ` Greg KH
2017-10-01  0:06 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 4/6] lib: vsprintf: default kptr_restrict to the maximum value Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-04  8:55   ` Greg KH
2017-10-04 16:42   ` Kees Cook
2017-10-04 16:48     ` Roberts, William C
2017-10-04 17:08     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-04 17:28       ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-04 19:13         ` Jann Horn
2017-10-04 19:23           ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-01  0:06 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 5/6] lib: vsprintf: add "%paP", "%papP", and "%padP" specifiers Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-04  8:58   ` Greg KH
2017-10-01  0:06 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 6/6] drivers: uio: un-restrict sysfs pointers for UIO Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-04  8:58   ` Greg KH
2017-10-01  0:11 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 0/6] add more kernel pointer filter options Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-04  8:57   ` Greg KH
2017-10-04 10:45     ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-04  8:58 ` Greg KH
2017-10-04 10:50   ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-04 12:42     ` Greg KH
2017-10-04 13:28       ` Steven Rostedt
2017-10-04 13:28         ` Steven Rostedt
2017-10-04 13:31         ` Steven Rostedt
2017-10-04 16:17   ` Roberts, William C
2017-10-04 15:41 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-04 16:22   ` Boris Lukashev
2017-10-04 16:29     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-04 16:54       ` Steven Rostedt
2017-10-04 18:58   ` Jordan Glover
2017-10-04 19:19     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-04 21:58       ` Roberts, William C
2017-10-04 23:21         ` Daniel Micay
2017-10-04 23:52         ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-05  0:09           ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-05 13:55             ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-10-05  0:29           ` Daniel Micay [this message]
2017-10-05  0:35             ` Kees Cook
2017-10-06  8:33               ` Djalal Harouni
2017-10-05  2:19           ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-05  3:10             ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-05  3:15               ` Kees Cook
2017-10-05 15:12               ` Roberts, William C
2017-10-05 16:19                 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-05 17:10                   ` Dave Weinstein
2017-10-07 23:44                   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-10-08  0:08                     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-13 16:32                       ` Roberts, William C
2017-10-13 18:11                         ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-13 19:34                           ` Kees Cook
2017-10-13 20:22                             ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-13 20:47                               ` Kees Cook
2017-10-13 21:45                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-10-13 22:48                                 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-10-13 16:14             ` Roberts, William C
2017-10-04 16:32 ` Ian Campbell

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