All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/8] kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall
Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 16:26:51 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1531254411.3332.146.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1530542283-26145-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Hi Eric,

Can I get your Ack on this patch?

Mimi

On Mon, 2018-07-02 at 10:37 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> In order for LSMs and IMA-appraisal to differentiate between kexec_load
> and kexec_file_load syscalls, both the original and new syscalls must
> call an LSM hook.  This patch adds a call to security_kernel_load_data()
> in the original kexec_load syscall.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> ---
>  kernel/kexec.c | 8 ++++++++
>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
> index aed8fb2564b3..68559808fdfa 100644
> --- a/kernel/kexec.c
> +++ b/kernel/kexec.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
>  #include <linux/capability.h>
>  #include <linux/mm.h>
>  #include <linux/file.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
>  #include <linux/kexec.h>
>  #include <linux/mutex.h>
>  #include <linux/list.h>
> @@ -195,10 +196,17 @@ static int do_kexec_load(unsigned long entry, unsigned long nr_segments,
>  static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments,
>  				   unsigned long flags)
>  {
> +	int result;
> +
>  	/* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
>  	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled)
>  		return -EPERM;
> 
> +	/* Permit LSMs and IMA to fail the kexec */
> +	result = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
> +	if (result < 0)
> +		return result;
> +
>  	/*
>  	 * Verify we have a legal set of flags
>  	 * This leaves us room for future extensions.


_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: zohar@linux.ibm.com (Mimi Zohar)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 2/8] kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall
Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 16:26:51 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1531254411.3332.146.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1530542283-26145-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Hi Eric,

Can I get your Ack on this patch?

Mimi

On Mon, 2018-07-02 at 10:37 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> In order for LSMs and IMA-appraisal to differentiate between kexec_load
> and kexec_file_load syscalls, both the original and new syscalls must
> call an LSM hook.  This patch adds a call to security_kernel_load_data()
> in the original kexec_load syscall.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> ---
>  kernel/kexec.c | 8 ++++++++
>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
> index aed8fb2564b3..68559808fdfa 100644
> --- a/kernel/kexec.c
> +++ b/kernel/kexec.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
>  #include <linux/capability.h>
>  #include <linux/mm.h>
>  #include <linux/file.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
>  #include <linux/kexec.h>
>  #include <linux/mutex.h>
>  #include <linux/list.h>
> @@ -195,10 +196,17 @@ static int do_kexec_load(unsigned long entry, unsigned long nr_segments,
>  static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments,
>  				   unsigned long flags)
>  {
> +	int result;
> +
>  	/* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
>  	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled)
>  		return -EPERM;
> 
> +	/* Permit LSMs and IMA to fail the kexec */
> +	result = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
> +	if (result < 0)
> +		return result;
> +
>  	/*
>  	 * Verify we have a legal set of flags
>  	 * This leaves us room for future extensions.

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/8] kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall
Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 16:26:51 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1531254411.3332.146.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1530542283-26145-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Hi Eric,

Can I get your Ack on this patch?

Mimi

On Mon, 2018-07-02 at 10:37 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> In order for LSMs and IMA-appraisal to differentiate between kexec_load
> and kexec_file_load syscalls, both the original and new syscalls must
> call an LSM hook.  This patch adds a call to security_kernel_load_data()
> in the original kexec_load syscall.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> ---
>  kernel/kexec.c | 8 ++++++++
>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
> index aed8fb2564b3..68559808fdfa 100644
> --- a/kernel/kexec.c
> +++ b/kernel/kexec.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
>  #include <linux/capability.h>
>  #include <linux/mm.h>
>  #include <linux/file.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
>  #include <linux/kexec.h>
>  #include <linux/mutex.h>
>  #include <linux/list.h>
> @@ -195,10 +196,17 @@ static int do_kexec_load(unsigned long entry, unsigned long nr_segments,
>  static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments,
>  				   unsigned long flags)
>  {
> +	int result;
> +
>  	/* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
>  	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled)
>  		return -EPERM;
> 
> +	/* Permit LSMs and IMA to fail the kexec */
> +	result = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
> +	if (result < 0)
> +		return result;
> +
>  	/*
>  	 * Verify we have a legal set of flags
>  	 * This leaves us room for future extensions.


  reply	other threads:[~2018-07-10 20:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 84+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-07-02 14:37 [PATCH v5 0/8] kexec/firmware: support system wide policy requiring signatures Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:37 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:37 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:37 ` [PATCH v5 1/8] security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:37   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:37   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 18:45   ` J Freyensee
2018-07-02 18:45     ` J Freyensee
2018-07-02 18:45     ` J Freyensee
2018-07-02 18:45     ` J Freyensee
2018-07-03 12:35     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-03 12:35       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-03 12:35       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-03 12:35       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:37 ` [PATCH v5 2/8] kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:37   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:37   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-10 20:26   ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2018-07-10 20:26     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-10 20:26     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:37 ` [PATCH v5 3/8] ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:37   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:37   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 18:31   ` J Freyensee
2018-07-02 18:31     ` J Freyensee
2018-07-02 18:31     ` J Freyensee
2018-07-02 18:31     ` J Freyensee
2018-07-03 13:07     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-03 13:07       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-03 13:07       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-03 13:07       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:37 ` [PATCH v5 4/8] firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:37   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:37   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-03 12:04   ` kbuild test robot
2018-07-03 12:04     ` kbuild test robot
2018-07-03 12:04     ` kbuild test robot
2018-07-03 12:04     ` kbuild test robot
2018-07-02 14:38 ` [PATCH v5 5/8] ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback) Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:38   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:38   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:38 ` [PATCH v5 6/8] ima: add build time policy Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:38   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:38   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:38 ` [PATCH v5 7/8] ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer) Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:38   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:38   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 15:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-07-02 15:30     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-07-02 15:30     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-07-09 19:41     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-09 19:41       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-09 19:41       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-09 19:41       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-10  6:51       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-07-10  6:51         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-07-10  6:51         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-07-10  6:56         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-07-10  6:56           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-07-10  6:56           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-07-10 18:47           ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-10 18:47             ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-10 18:47             ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-10 18:47             ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-10 19:19           ` Bjorn Andersson
2018-07-10 19:19             ` Bjorn Andersson
2018-07-10 19:19             ` Bjorn Andersson
2018-07-11  6:24             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-07-11  6:24               ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-07-11  6:24               ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-07-12 20:03               ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-12 20:03                 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-12 20:03                 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-12 20:03                 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-12 20:37                 ` Bjorn Andersson
2018-07-12 20:37                   ` Bjorn Andersson
2018-07-12 20:37                   ` Bjorn Andersson
2018-07-12 20:37                   ` Bjorn Andersson
2018-07-02 14:38 ` [PATCH v5 8/8] module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:38   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-02 14:38   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-07-03  9:35   ` kbuild test robot
2018-07-03  9:35     ` kbuild test robot
2018-07-03  9:35     ` kbuild test robot

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1531254411.3332.146.camel@linux.ibm.com \
    --to=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kexec@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.