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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
	linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>,
	Matthew Garret <matthew.garret@nebula.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com>,
	George Wilson <gcwilson@linux.ibm.com>,
	Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@us.ibm.com>,
	Eric Ricther <erichte@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Oliver O'Halloran" <oohall@gmail.com>,
	Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>,
	Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 0/8] powerpc: Enabling IMA arch specific secure boot policies
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2019 08:10:43 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1572264643.4532.244.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191024034717.70552-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com>

On Wed, 2019-10-23 at 22:47 -0500, Nayna Jain wrote:
> This patchset extends the previous version[1] by adding support for
> checking against a blacklist of binary hashes.
> 
> The IMA subsystem supports custom, built-in, arch-specific policies to
> define the files to be measured and appraised. These policies are honored
> based on priority, where arch-specific policy is the highest and custom
> is the lowest.
> 
> PowerNV system uses a Linux-based bootloader to kexec the OS. The
> bootloader kernel relies on IMA for signature verification of the OS
> kernel before doing the kexec. This patchset adds support for powerpc
> arch-specific IMA policies that are conditionally defined based on a
> system's secure boot and trusted boot states. The OS secure boot and
> trusted boot states are determined via device-tree properties.
> 
> The verification needs to be performed only for binaries that are not
> blacklisted. The kernel currently only checks against the blacklist of
> keys. However, doing so results in blacklisting all the binaries that
> are signed by the same key. In order to prevent just one particular
> binary from being loaded, it must be checked against a blacklist of
> binary hashes. This patchset also adds support to IMA for checking
> against a hash blacklist for files. signed by appended signature.
> 
> [1] http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/cover/1149262/ 

Thanks, Nayna.

Please feel free to add my Signed-off-by tag on patches (2, 4, 5, 7 &
8).

thanks,

Mimi


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
	linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Eric Ricther <erichte@linux.ibm.com>,
	Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com>,
	Matthew Garret <matthew.garret@nebula.com>,
	Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>, Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>,
	Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@us.ibm.com>,
	Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>,
	George Wilson <gcwilson@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 0/8] powerpc: Enabling IMA arch specific secure boot policies
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2019 08:10:43 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1572264643.4532.244.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191024034717.70552-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com>

On Wed, 2019-10-23 at 22:47 -0500, Nayna Jain wrote:
> This patchset extends the previous version[1] by adding support for
> checking against a blacklist of binary hashes.
> 
> The IMA subsystem supports custom, built-in, arch-specific policies to
> define the files to be measured and appraised. These policies are honored
> based on priority, where arch-specific policy is the highest and custom
> is the lowest.
> 
> PowerNV system uses a Linux-based bootloader to kexec the OS. The
> bootloader kernel relies on IMA for signature verification of the OS
> kernel before doing the kexec. This patchset adds support for powerpc
> arch-specific IMA policies that are conditionally defined based on a
> system's secure boot and trusted boot states. The OS secure boot and
> trusted boot states are determined via device-tree properties.
> 
> The verification needs to be performed only for binaries that are not
> blacklisted. The kernel currently only checks against the blacklist of
> keys. However, doing so results in blacklisting all the binaries that
> are signed by the same key. In order to prevent just one particular
> binary from being loaded, it must be checked against a blacklist of
> binary hashes. This patchset also adds support to IMA for checking
> against a hash blacklist for files. signed by appended signature.
> 
> [1] http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/cover/1149262/ 

Thanks, Nayna.

Please feel free to add my Signed-off-by tag on patches (2, 4, 5, 7 &
8).

thanks,

Mimi


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-10-28 12:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-10-24  3:47 [PATCH v9 0/8] powerpc: Enabling IMA arch specific secure boot policies Nayna Jain
2019-10-24  3:47 ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-24  3:47 ` [PATCH v9 1/8] powerpc: detect the secure boot mode of the system Nayna Jain
2019-10-24  3:47   ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-24 17:26   ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-24 17:26     ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-25 16:49     ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-25 16:49       ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-24  3:47 ` [PATCH v9 2/8] powerpc/ima: add support to initialize ima policy rules Nayna Jain
2019-10-24  3:47   ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-24 17:35   ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-24 17:35     ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-25 17:02     ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-25 17:02       ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-25 18:03       ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-25 18:03         ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-28 23:42         ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-28 23:42           ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-26 23:52       ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-26 23:52         ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-28 11:54         ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-28 11:54           ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-24  3:47 ` [PATCH v9 3/8] powerpc: detect the trusted boot state of the system Nayna Jain
2019-10-24  3:47   ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-24 17:38   ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-24 17:38     ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-25 16:50     ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-25 16:50       ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-24  3:47 ` [PATCH v9 4/8] powerpc/ima: define trusted boot policy Nayna Jain
2019-10-24  3:47   ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-24 17:40   ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-24 17:40     ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-24  3:47 ` [PATCH v9 5/8] ima: make process_buffer_measurement() generic Nayna Jain
2019-10-24  3:47   ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-24 15:20   ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-24 15:20     ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-25 17:24     ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-25 17:24       ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-25 17:32       ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-25 17:32         ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-27  0:13         ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-27  0:13           ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-30 15:22   ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-30 15:22     ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-30 16:35     ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-30 16:35       ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-24  3:47 ` [PATCH v9 6/8] certs: add wrapper function to check blacklisted binary hash Nayna Jain
2019-10-24  3:47   ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-24  3:47 ` [PATCH v9 7/8] ima: check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig Nayna Jain
2019-10-24  3:47   ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-24 17:48   ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-24 17:48     ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-25 17:36     ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-25 17:36       ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-24  3:47 ` [PATCH v9 8/8] powerpc/ima: update ima arch policy to check for blacklist Nayna Jain
2019-10-24  3:47   ` Nayna Jain
2019-10-28 12:10 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2019-10-28 12:10   ` [PATCH v9 0/8] powerpc: Enabling IMA arch specific secure boot policies Mimi Zohar

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