* latest policy patch
@ 2002-10-16 22:17 Russell Coker
2002-10-17 8:40 ` Tom
2002-10-17 13:15 ` Stephen Smalley
0 siblings, 2 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Russell Coker @ 2002-10-16 22:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: selinux
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1462 bytes --]
This one has my latest patch. It's nothing serious at all.
A change to postgresql policy because the start scripts run "ps".
A new type for quota databases (which needs some improvement - apparently
different versions of quota use different names, also needs support for
multiple file systems).
The logrotate domain needs to read apache config files so it knows how to
restart it.
update-modules needs to read some sysctl's (the tail program which is called
from a script needs them). Could have used a dontaudit rule I guess, but for
what update-modules is doing there's no reason to prevent such access (and a
dontaudit rule could bite us later if the modutils change in an unexpected
way).
tmpreaper needs to be able to unlink files of home_type so that
"mv ~/file /tmp" on a machine with a single file system (/tmp and /home on the
same filesystem), doesn't result in files under /tmp that tmpreaper can't
remove. Sure there's probably lots of other ways of preventing tmpreaper
from removing files, but this is a really common one that's easy to fix.
tmpreaper can't search home_type directories so it can't invade your home dir
either...
Steve, I think this is worthy of the CVS.
--
http://www.coker.com.au/selinux/ My NSA Security Enhanced Linux packages
http://www.coker.com.au/bonnie++/ Bonnie++ hard drive benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/postal/ Postal SMTP/POP benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/~russell/ My home page
[-- Attachment #2: diff --]
[-- Type: text/x-diff, Size: 6023 bytes --]
diff -ru /tmp/policy/domains/program/apache.te policy/domains/program/apache.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/program/apache.te 2002-10-01 19:28:42.000000000 +0200
+++ policy/domains/program/apache.te 2002-10-14 10:29:41.000000000 +0200
@@ -401,6 +401,10 @@
###################################################
allow httpd_t httpd_config_t:file r_file_perms;
allow httpd_t httpd_config_t:dir r_dir_perms;
+# allow logrotate to read the config files for restart
+ifdef(`logrotate.te', `
+r_dir_file(logrotate_t, httpd_config_t)
+')
##################################################
##################################################
diff -ru /tmp/policy/domains/program/modutil.te policy/domains/program/modutil.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/program/modutil.te 2002-10-01 19:28:44.000000000 +0200
+++ policy/domains/program/modutil.te 2002-10-16 11:37:37.000000000 +0200
@@ -132,6 +132,8 @@
allow update_modules_t proc_t:dir search;
allow update_modules_t proc_t:file r_file_perms;
allow update_modules_t { self proc_t }:lnk_file read;
+allow update_modules_t sysctl_kernel_t:dir search;
+allow update_modules_t sysctl_kernel_t:file { getattr read };
allow update_modules_t self:dir search;
allow update_modules_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
diff -ru /tmp/policy/domains/program/mrtg.te policy/domains/program/mrtg.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/program/mrtg.te 2002-10-17 00:01:11.000000000 +0200
+++ policy/domains/program/mrtg.te 2002-10-13 17:10:48.000000000 +0200
@@ -72,4 +72,7 @@
# should not need this!
allow mrtg_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir { search read getattr };
dontaudit mrtg_t { boot_t device_t file_labels_t file_t lost_found_t }:dir getattr;
+ifdef(`quota.te', `
+dontaudit mrtg_t quota_db_t:file getattr;
+')
dontaudit mrtg_t root_t:lnk_file getattr;
diff -ru /tmp/policy/domains/program/passwd.te policy/domains/program/passwd.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/program/passwd.te 2002-09-26 13:37:04.000000000 +0200
+++ policy/domains/program/passwd.te 2002-10-17 00:03:13.000000000 +0200
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
domain_auto_trans(userdomain, passwd_exec_t, passwd_t)
domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, admin_passwd_exec_t, passwd_t)
+# for vipw - vi looks in the root home directory for config
+dontaudit passwd_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir { getattr search };
+
# Use capabilities.
allow passwd_t passwd_t:capability { chown dac_override fsetid setuid sys_resource };
diff -ru /tmp/policy/domains/program/postgresql.te policy/domains/program/postgresql.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/program/postgresql.te 2002-09-27 22:27:38.000000000 +0200
+++ policy/domains/program/postgresql.te 2002-10-16 12:03:52.000000000 +0200
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
# allow any user domain to connect to the database server
can_tcp_connect(userdomain, postgresql_t)
-allow postgresql_t proc_t:file { getattr read };
+allow postgresql_t { proc_t self }:file { getattr read };
allow postgresql_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
# Allow access to the postgresql databases
diff -ru /tmp/policy/domains/program/quota.te policy/domains/program/quota.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/program/quota.te 2002-10-01 19:28:47.000000000 +0200
+++ policy/domains/program/quota.te 2002-10-12 23:22:16.000000000 +0200
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
daemon_base_domain(quota)
type quota_flag_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
+type quota_db_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
rw_dir_create_file(initrc_t, quota_flag_t)
@@ -17,8 +18,8 @@
allow quota_t self:capability sys_admin;
allow quota_t file_t:file quotaon;
-# for /quota.* - should setup a new type for it
-allow quota_t file_t:file { read write };
+# for /quota.*
+allow quota_t quota_db_t:file { read write };
# Read /etc/mtab.
allow quota_t etc_runtime_t:file { read getattr };
diff -ru /tmp/policy/domains/program/tmpreaper.te policy/domains/program/tmpreaper.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/program/tmpreaper.te 2002-09-27 22:27:39.000000000 +0200
+++ policy/domains/program/tmpreaper.te 2002-10-13 10:27:38.000000000 +0200
@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@
allow tmpreaper_t fcron_t:fd use;
allow tmpreaper_t fcron_t:fifo_file { read write };
')
-create_dir_file(tmpreaper_t, tmpfile)
allow tmpreaper_t tmpfile:dir { rw_dir_perms rmdir };
allow tmpreaper_t tmpfile:notdevfile_class_set { getattr unlink };
+allow tmpreaper_t home_type:notdevfile_class_set { getattr unlink };
allow tmpreaper_t self:process { fork sigchld };
allow tmpreaper_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search fowner };
diff -ru /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/fingerd.fc policy/file_contexts/program/fingerd.fc
--- /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/fingerd.fc 2002-09-27 22:27:39.000000000 +0200
+++ policy/file_contexts/program/fingerd.fc 2002-10-12 23:23:27.000000000 +0200
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# fingerd
/usr/sbin/in.fingerd system_u:object_r:fingerd_exec_t
/usr/sbin/[cef]fingerd system_u:object_r:fingerd_exec_t
-/etc/cron.weekly/fingerd system_u:object_r:fingerd_exec_t
+/etc/cron.weekly/(c)?fingerd system_u:object_r:fingerd_exec_t
/etc/cfingerd(/.*)? system_u:object_r:etc_fingerd_t
/var/log/cfingerd.log.* system_u:object_r:var_log_fingerd_t
diff -ru /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/quota.fc policy/file_contexts/program/quota.fc
--- /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/quota.fc 2002-07-12 17:19:44.000000000 +0200
+++ policy/file_contexts/program/quota.fc 2002-10-12 23:23:55.000000000 +0200
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
# quota system
/var/lib/quota(/.*)? system_u:object_r:quota_flag_t
/sbin/quota(check|on) system_u:object_r:quota_exec_t
+/quota.(user|group) system_u:object_r:quota_db_t
diff -ru /tmp/policy/macros/program/ssh_macros.te policy/macros/program/ssh_macros.te
--- /tmp/policy/macros/program/ssh_macros.te 2002-10-17 00:01:27.000000000 +0200
+++ policy/macros/program/ssh_macros.te 2002-10-16 11:38:10.000000000 +0200
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@
# This domain is granted permissions common to most domains (including can_net)
every_domain($1_ssh_t)
+# for sshing to a ssh tunnel
+can_tcp_connect($1_ssh_t, $1_ssh_t)
+
# Use capabilities.
allow $1_ssh_t self:capability { setuid setgid dac_override dac_read_search };
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* Re: latest policy patch
2002-10-16 22:17 latest policy patch Russell Coker
@ 2002-10-17 8:40 ` Tom
2002-10-17 8:50 ` Russell Coker
2002-10-17 13:15 ` Stephen Smalley
1 sibling, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Tom @ 2002-10-17 8:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Russell Coker; +Cc: selinux
On Thu, Oct 17, 2002 at 12:17:38AM +0200, Russell Coker wrote:
> This one has my latest patch. It's nothing serious at all.
Will you update your policy.tgz file on coker.com.au as well? I've
deviated somewhat from the old default policy, and believe it's easier
and cleaner to install a new one and redo the few changes that were not
added with the apache diff.
--
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pub 1024D/2D7A04F5 2002-05-16 Tom Vogt <tom@lemuria.org>
Key fingerprint = C731 64D1 4BCF 4C20 48A4 29B2 BF01 9FA1 2D7A 04F5
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* Re: latest policy patch
2002-10-17 8:40 ` Tom
@ 2002-10-17 8:50 ` Russell Coker
2002-10-17 12:48 ` Tom
0 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Russell Coker @ 2002-10-17 8:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tom; +Cc: selinux
On Thu, 17 Oct 2002 10:40, Tom wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 17, 2002 at 12:17:38AM +0200, Russell Coker wrote:
> > This one has my latest patch. It's nothing serious at all.
>
> Will you update your policy.tgz file on coker.com.au as well? I've
> deviated somewhat from the old default policy, and believe it's easier
> and cleaner to install a new one and redo the few changes that were not
> added with the apache diff.
OK. But why not just use the Debian package for this?
--
http://www.coker.com.au/selinux/ My NSA Security Enhanced Linux packages
http://www.coker.com.au/bonnie++/ Bonnie++ hard drive benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/postal/ Postal SMTP/POP benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/~russell/ My home page
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: latest policy patch
2002-10-17 8:50 ` Russell Coker
@ 2002-10-17 12:48 ` Tom
2002-10-17 13:46 ` Russell Coker
0 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Tom @ 2002-10-17 12:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Russell Coker; +Cc: selinux
On Thu, Oct 17, 2002 at 10:50:09AM +0200, Russell Coker wrote:
> > Will you update your policy.tgz file on coker.com.au as well? I've
> > deviated somewhat from the old default policy, and believe it's easier
> > and cleaner to install a new one and redo the few changes that were not
> > added with the apache diff.
>
> OK. But why not just use the Debian package for this?
I can extract the .tgz to some other directory and check for diffs
_before_ applying it. :)
--
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pub 1024D/2D7A04F5 2002-05-16 Tom Vogt <tom@lemuria.org>
Key fingerprint = C731 64D1 4BCF 4C20 48A4 29B2 BF01 9FA1 2D7A 04F5
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* Re: latest policy patch
2002-10-17 12:48 ` Tom
@ 2002-10-17 13:46 ` Russell Coker
2002-10-17 23:10 ` Brian May
0 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Russell Coker @ 2002-10-17 13:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tom; +Cc: selinux
On Thu, 17 Oct 2002 14:48, Tom wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 17, 2002 at 10:50:09AM +0200, Russell Coker wrote:
> > > Will you update your policy.tgz file on coker.com.au as well? I've
> > > deviated somewhat from the old default policy, and believe it's easier
> > > and cleaner to install a new one and redo the few changes that were not
> > > added with the apache diff.
> >
> > OK. But why not just use the Debian package for this?
>
> I can extract the .tgz to some other directory and check for diffs
> _before_ applying it. :)
Of course you could just run the following command when it first asks you
about changing policy:
diff -ru /usr/share/selinux/policy/default /usr/share/selinux/policy/current \
| grep -v ^Only
--
http://www.coker.com.au/selinux/ My NSA Security Enhanced Linux packages
http://www.coker.com.au/bonnie++/ Bonnie++ hard drive benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/postal/ Postal SMTP/POP benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/~russell/ My home page
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: latest policy patch
2002-10-17 13:46 ` Russell Coker
@ 2002-10-17 23:10 ` Brian May
2002-10-18 6:20 ` Tom
0 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Brian May @ 2002-10-17 23:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Russell Coker; +Cc: Tom, selinux
On Thu, Oct 17, 2002 at 03:46:46PM +0200, Russell Coker wrote:
> Of course you could just run the following command when it first asks you
> about changing policy:
> diff -ru /usr/share/selinux/policy/default /usr/share/selinux/policy/current \
> | grep -v ^Only
One suggestion with selinux-policy-default:
Installing the new policy should be optional when installing the Debian
package. Perhaps with a config option /etc/selinux-policy.conf (maybe)
or an extra question (but I am not a fan of all of these questions...).
I have, in the past, broken my running SE-Linux config, because it has
installed /usr/share/selinux/policy/current into the running kernel, but
I am not yet ready to use it...
(eg. once this occured when I deleted the "user bam" option. I intended
to fix this, but with the new kernel policy loaded, it would no longer
let me log in as sysadm_r, saying my current context was invalid).
--
Brian May <bam@snoopy.apana.org.au>
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: latest policy patch
2002-10-17 23:10 ` Brian May
@ 2002-10-18 6:20 ` Tom
2002-10-18 12:07 ` Russell Coker
0 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Tom @ 2002-10-18 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: selinux
On Fri, Oct 18, 2002 at 09:10:11AM +1000, Brian May wrote:
> One suggestion with selinux-policy-default:
>
> Installing the new policy should be optional when installing the Debian
> package. Perhaps with a config option /etc/selinux-policy.conf (maybe)
> or an extra question (but I am not a fan of all of these questions...).
Yes, please. It could simply check if a policy is already installed,
and if so, ask "should I update your policy?" just like every other
debian package does before changing config files. It could then
automatically step over all the files that I choose not to have the
first time, to reduce the number of questions asked.
--
http://web.lemuria.org/pubkey.html
pub 1024D/2D7A04F5 2002-05-16 Tom Vogt <tom@lemuria.org>
Key fingerprint = C731 64D1 4BCF 4C20 48A4 29B2 BF01 9FA1 2D7A 04F5
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* Re: latest policy patch
2002-10-18 6:20 ` Tom
@ 2002-10-18 12:07 ` Russell Coker
0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Russell Coker @ 2002-10-18 12:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tom, selinux
On Fri, 18 Oct 2002 08:20, Tom wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 18, 2002 at 09:10:11AM +1000, Brian May wrote:
> > One suggestion with selinux-policy-default:
> >
> > Installing the new policy should be optional when installing the Debian
> > package. Perhaps with a config option /etc/selinux-policy.conf (maybe)
> > or an extra question (but I am not a fan of all of these questions...).
>
> Yes, please. It could simply check if a policy is already installed,
> and if so, ask "should I update your policy?" just like every other
> debian package does before changing config files. It could then
> automatically step over all the files that I choose not to have the
> first time, to reduce the number of questions asked.
OK. I'll make an upgrade ask you "update yes/no/never".
--
http://www.coker.com.au/selinux/ My NSA Security Enhanced Linux packages
http://www.coker.com.au/bonnie++/ Bonnie++ hard drive benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/postal/ Postal SMTP/POP benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/~russell/ My home page
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: latest policy patch
2002-10-16 22:17 latest policy patch Russell Coker
2002-10-17 8:40 ` Tom
@ 2002-10-17 13:15 ` Stephen Smalley
1 sibling, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Smalley @ 2002-10-17 13:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Russell Coker; +Cc: selinux
On Thu, 17 Oct 2002, Russell Coker wrote:
> This one has my latest patch. It's nothing serious at all.
Thanks, merged.
--
Stephen D. Smalley, NAI Labs
ssmalley@nai.com
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* latest policy patch
@ 2003-01-01 16:54 Russell Coker
0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Russell Coker @ 2003-01-01 16:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: selinux
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 894 bytes --]
I've attached a policy patch against the latest CVS tree.
It contains a number of patches I've already posted here and a new patch for
login.te that uses a macro for the local_login_t and remote_login_t domains.
This patch adds the attributes { mlstrustedreader mlstrustedwriter
mlstrustedobject } to remote_login_t, I am not sure if this is OK.
Also I added a number of small things to remote_login_t (such as access to
check for new mail) to make it have equivalent functionality to
local_login_t.
I did this when I noticed that telnet logins to my system were not working due
to policy deficiencies so I decided to do it right.
--
http://www.coker.com.au/selinux/ My NSA Security Enhanced Linux packages
http://www.coker.com.au/bonnie++/ Bonnie++ hard drive benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/postal/ Postal SMTP/POP benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/~russell/ My home page
[-- Attachment #2: diff --]
[-- Type: text/x-diff, Size: 24414 bytes --]
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/misc/auth-net.te ./domains/misc/auth-net.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/misc/auth-net.te 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ ./domains/misc/auth-net.te 2002-12-28 21:46:38.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+#DESC Policy for using network servers for authenticating users (IE PAM-LDAP)
+
+can_network(auth)
+allow auth resolv_conf_t:file { getattr read };
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/bootloader.te ./domains/program/bootloader.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/program/bootloader.te 2002-12-16 17:06:02.000000000 +0100
+++ ./domains/program/bootloader.te 2002-12-13 21:03:06.000000000 +0100
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
# for ldd
allow bootloader_t { insmod_exec_t fsadm_exec_t }:file { rx_file_perms execute_no_trans };
+allow bootloader_t insmod_exec_t:lnk_file { getattr read };
dontaudit bootloader_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir search;
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/crack.te ./domains/program/crack.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/program/crack.te 2002-12-03 15:56:39.000000000 +0100
+++ ./domains/program/crack.te 2002-12-13 21:03:18.000000000 +0100
@@ -35,4 +35,6 @@
allow crack_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t }:file { getattr read };
allow crack_t etc_t:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow crack_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
+
dontaudit crack_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir { getattr search };
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/crond.te ./domains/program/crond.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/program/crond.te 2002-12-03 15:56:39.000000000 +0100
+++ ./domains/program/crond.te 2002-12-13 21:03:38.000000000 +0100
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
file_type_auto_trans(crond_t, var_log_t, cron_log_t)
# Use capabilities.
-allow crond_t crond_t:capability { setgid setuid net_bind_service };
+allow crond_t crond_t:capability { setgid setuid net_bind_service dac_override };
# Check entrypoint permission on crontab files.
allow crond_t security_t:security compute_av;
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/dpkg.te ./domains/program/dpkg.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/program/dpkg.te 2002-12-03 15:56:40.000000000 +0100
+++ ./domains/program/dpkg.te 2002-12-28 21:24:16.000000000 +0100
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
can_exec(dpkg_t, init_exec_t)
file_type_auto_trans(dpkg_t, tmp_t, tmp_dpkg_t)
ifdef(`mta.te', `
-allow system_mail_t tmp_dpkg_t:file read;
+allow system_mail_t tmp_dpkg_t:file { getattr read };
')
allow dpkg_t random_device_t:chr_file read;
@@ -70,6 +70,10 @@
domain_auto_trans(dpkg_t, klogd_exec_t, klogd_t)
domain_auto_trans(dpkg_t, syslogd_exec_t, syslogd_t)
')
+# mysqld is broken too
+ifdef(`mysqld.te', `
+domain_auto_trans(dpkg_t, mysqld_exec_t, mysqld_t)
+')
# for apt
type apt_t, domain, admin, privmail;
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/fsadm.te ./domains/program/fsadm.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/program/fsadm.te 2002-11-04 13:27:51.000000000 +0100
+++ ./domains/program/fsadm.te 2002-12-13 21:54:24.000000000 +0100
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@
type fsadm_tmp_t, file_type, sysadmfile, tmpfile;
file_type_auto_trans(fsadm_t, tmp_t, fsadm_tmp_t)
+# remount file system to apply changes
+allow fsadm_t fs_t:filesystem remount;
+
# Use capabilities.
allow fsadm_t fsadm_t:capability { sys_admin sys_rawio };
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/hotplug.te ./domains/program/hotplug.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/program/hotplug.te 2002-12-03 15:56:40.000000000 +0100
+++ ./domains/program/hotplug.te 2002-12-13 21:05:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
domain_auto_trans(kmod_t, hotplug_exec_t, hotplug_t)
domain_auto_trans_read(hotplug_t, insmod_exec_t, insmod_t)
+allow hotplug_t insmod_exec_t:lnk_file read;
domain_auto_trans_read(hotplug_t, mount_exec_t, mount_t)
domain_auto_trans_read(hotplug_t, ifconfig_exec_t, ifconfig_t)
ifdef(`pump.te', `domain_auto_trans_read(hotplug_t, pump_exec_t, pump_t)')
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/login.te ./domains/program/login.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/program/login.te 2002-10-23 21:38:17.000000000 +0200
+++ ./domains/program/login.te 2003-01-01 17:50:12.000000000 +0100
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
#
# Authors: Stephen Smalley <sds@tislabs.com> and Timothy Fraser <tfraser@tislabs.com> (NAI Labs)
+# Macroised by Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
#
#################################
@@ -8,37 +9,74 @@
# and the remote_login_t domain.
#
+# $1 is the name of the domain (local or remote)
+# I added "mlstrustedreader, mlstrustedwriter, mlstrustedobject" to
+# remote_login_t, not sure if this is right
+define(`login_domain', `
+type $1_login_t, domain, privuser, privrole, privlog, auth, privowner, mlstrustedreader, mlstrustedwriter, mlstrustedobject, privfd;
+role system_r types $1_login_t;
+every_domain($1_login_t)
+
+tmp_domain($1_login)
+
+# Use capabilities
+allow $1_login_t self:capability { setuid setgid chown fowner fsetid net_bind_service sys_tty_config dac_override sys_nice sys_resource };
+
+# Run shells in user_t by default.
+domain_auto_trans($1_login_t, shell_exec_t, user_t)
+
+# Permit login to search the user home directories.
+allow $1_login_t home_root_t:dir search;
+allow $1_login_t home_dir_type:dir search;
+
+# Write to /var/run/utmp.
+allow $1_login_t initrc_var_run_t:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Write to /var/log/wtmp.
+allow $1_login_t wtmp_t:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Write to /var/log/lastlog.
+allow $1_login_t lastlog_t:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Write to /var/log/btmp
+allow $1_login_t faillog_t:file { append read write };
+
+# Search for mail spool file.
+allow $1_login_t mail_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow $1_login_t mail_spool_t:file getattr;
+allow $1_login_t mail_spool_t:lnk_file read;
+
+# Determine the set of legal user SIDs that can be reached.
+allow $1_login_t security_t:security get_user_sids;
+
+# Obtain the SID to use for relabeling terminals.
+allow $1_login_t security_t:security change_sid;
+
+# allow read access to default_contexts in /etc/security
+allow $1_login_t default_context_t:file r_file_perms;
+
+')
+
#################################
#
# Rules for the local_login_t domain.
#
# local_login_t is the domain of a login process
# spawned by getty.
+#
+# remote_login_t is the domain of a login process
+# spawned by rlogind.
+#
# login_exec_t is the type of the login program
#
-type local_login_t, domain, privuser, privrole, privlog, auth, privowner, mlstrustedreader, mlstrustedwriter, mlstrustedobject, privfd;
-role system_r types local_login_t;
-every_domain(local_login_t)
type login_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
type_transition init_t login_exec_t:process local_login_t;
-type local_login_tmp_t, file_type, sysadmfile, tmpfile;
-file_type_auto_trans(local_login_t, tmp_t, local_login_tmp_t)
-
-# Use capabilities.
-allow local_login_t local_login_t:capability { setuid setgid chown fowner fsetid net_bind_service sys_tty_config dac_override sys_resource };
+login_domain(local)
-allow local_login_t shadow_t:file { read getattr };
-
-# Run shells in user_t by default.
-domain_auto_trans(local_login_t, shell_exec_t, user_t)
# But also permit other user domains to be entered by login.
domain_trans(local_login_t, shell_exec_t, userdomain)
-# Permit login to search the user home directories.
-allow local_login_t home_root_t:dir search;
-allow local_login_t home_dir_type:dir search;
-
# Do not audit denied attempts to access devices.
dontaudit local_login_t fixed_disk_device_t:blk_file { getattr setattr };
dontaudit local_login_t removable_device_t:blk_file { getattr setattr };
@@ -52,29 +90,11 @@
# Do not audit denied attempts to access /mnt.
dontaudit local_login_t file_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-# Write to /var/run/utmp.
-allow local_login_t initrc_var_run_t:file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Write to /var/log/wtmp.
-allow local_login_t wtmp_t:file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Write to /var/log/lastlog.
-allow local_login_t lastlog_t:file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Write to /var/log/btmp
-allow local_login_t faillog_t:file { append read write };
# Create lock file.
allow local_login_t var_lock_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow local_login_t var_lock_t:file create_file_perms;
-# Search for mail spool file.
-allow local_login_t mail_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow local_login_t mail_spool_t:file getattr;
-allow local_login_t mail_spool_t:lnk_file read;
-
-# Obtain the SID to use for relabeling terminals.
-allow local_login_t security_t:security change_sid;
# Read and write ttys.
allow local_login_t tty_device_t:chr_file { setattr rw_file_perms };
@@ -94,65 +114,24 @@
allow local_login_t var_run_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow local_login_t var_run_t:file create_file_perms;
-# allow read access to default_contexts in /etc/security
-allow local_login_t default_context_t:file r_file_perms;
-
-# Determine the set of legal user SIDs that can be reached.
-allow local_login_t security_t:security get_user_sids;
-
#################################
#
# Rules for the remote_login_t domain.
#
-# remote_login_t is the domain of a login process
-# spawned by rlogind.
-#
-type remote_login_t, domain, privuser, privrole, privlog, auth, privowner, privfd;
-role system_r types remote_login_t;
-every_domain(remote_login_t)
-
-type remote_login_tmp_t, file_type, sysadmfile, tmpfile;
-file_type_auto_trans(remote_login_t, tmp_t, remote_login_tmp_t)
-# Use capabilities.
-allow remote_login_t remote_login_t:capability { setuid setgid chown fowner fsetid net_bind_service sys_tty_config dac_override };
+login_domain(remote)
-# Run shells in user_t by default.
-domain_auto_trans(remote_login_t, shell_exec_t, user_t)
# Only permit unprivileged user domains to be entered via rlogin,
# since very weak authentication is used.
domain_trans(remote_login_t, shell_exec_t, unpriv_userdomain)
-allow remote_login_t home_root_t:dir search;
-allow remote_login_t home_dir_type:dir search;
# Use the pty created by rlogind.
ifdef(`rlogind.te', `
allow remote_login_t rlogind_devpts_t:chr_file { setattr rw_file_perms };
')
-# Write to /var/run/utmp.
-allow remote_login_t initrc_var_run_t:file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Write to /var/log/wtmp.
-allow remote_login_t wtmp_t:file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Write to /var/log/lastlog.
-allow remote_login_t lastlog_t:file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Search for mail spool file.
-allow remote_login_t mail_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow remote_login_t mail_spool_t:file getattr;
-
-# Obtain the SID to use for relabeling ptys.
-allow remote_login_t security_t:security change_sid;
-
# Relabel ptys created by rlogind.
ifdef(`rlogind.te',
`allow remote_login_t rlogind_devpts_t:chr_file { relabelfrom relabelto };')
allow remote_login_t ptyfile:chr_file { getattr relabelfrom relabelto };
-# allow read access to default_context in /etc/security
-allow remote_login_t default_context_t:file r_file_perms;
-
-# Determine the set of legal user SIDs that can be reached.
-allow remote_login_t security_t:security get_user_sids;
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/modutil.te ./domains/program/modutil.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/program/modutil.te 2002-12-16 17:06:04.000000000 +0100
+++ ./domains/program/modutil.te 2002-12-29 21:47:13.000000000 +0100
@@ -55,10 +55,7 @@
allow insmod_t var_log_ksyms_t:dir create_dir_perms;
ifdef(`crond.te', `
-# for old modutils
rw_dir_create_file(system_crond_t, var_log_ksyms_t)
-# for new modutils that is 2.5 compatable
-can_exec(insmod_t, bin_t)
')
#################################
@@ -126,7 +123,7 @@
allow update_modules_t self:process { fork sigchld };
allow update_modules_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow update_modules_t modules_dep_t:file rw_file_perms;
-r_dir_file(update_modules_t, modules_object_t)
+file_type_auto_trans(update_modules_t, modules_object_t, modules_conf_t)
domain_auto_trans_read(update_modules_t, depmod_exec_t, depmod_t)
can_exec(update_modules_t, bin_t)
allow update_modules_t { sbin_t bin_t }:dir search;
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/nsd.te ./domains/program/nsd.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/program/nsd.te 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ ./domains/program/nsd.te 2002-12-28 21:40:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+#DESC Authoritative only name server
+#
+# Author: Russell Coker
+#
+#
+
+#################################
+#
+# Rules for the nsd_t domain.
+#
+ifdef(`named.te', `', `
+type named_port_t, port_type;
+')
+
+daemon_domain(nsd)
+
+# A type for configuration files of nsd
+type nsd_conf_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
+# A type for zone files
+type nsd_zone_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
+
+r_dir_file(nsd_t, { nsd_conf_t nsd_zone_t })
+r_dir_file(initrc_t, nsd_conf_t)
+
+# Use capabilities. Surplus capabilities may be allowed.
+allow nsd_t self:capability { setuid setgid net_bind_service };
+
+allow nsd_t etc_t:{ file lnk_file } { getattr read };
+allow nsd_t resolv_conf_t:file { getattr read };
+
+# nsd can use network
+can_network(nsd_t)
+# allow client access from caching BIND
+ifdef(`named.te', `
+can_udp_send(named_t, nsd_t)
+can_udp_send(nsd_t, named_t)
+can_tcp_connect(named_t, nsd_t)
+')
+
+# if you want to allow all programs to contact the primary name server
+#can_udp_send(domain, nsd_t)
+#can_udp_send(nsd_t, domain)
+#can_tcp_connect(domain, nsd_t)
+
+# Bind to the named port.
+allow nsd_t named_port_t:udp_socket name_bind;
+allow nsd_t named_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
+
+allow nsd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
+allow nsd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
+
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/postfix.te ./domains/program/postfix.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/program/postfix.te 2002-12-03 15:56:41.000000000 +0100
+++ ./domains/program/postfix.te 2002-12-28 21:07:50.000000000 +0100
@@ -82,14 +82,15 @@
allow postfix_master_t postfix_private_t:fifo_file create_file_perms;
can_network(postfix_master_t)
allow postfix_master_t smtp_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-allow postfix_master_t postfix_spool_maildrop_t:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow postfix_master_t postfix_spool_maildrop_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow postfix_master_t postfix_spool_maildrop_t:file { rename getattr };
allow postfix_master_t postfix_prng_t:file getattr;
-allow postfix_master_t postfix_spool_maildrop_t:file getattr;
allow postfix_master_t privfd:fd use;
allow postfix_master_t etc_aliases_t:file r_file_perms;
create_dir_file(postfix_master_t, postfix_spool_flush_t)
allow postfix_master_t random_device_t:chr_file { read getattr };
allow postfix_master_t postfix_prng_t:file rw_file_perms;
+file_type_auto_trans(postfix_master_t, var_spool_t, postfix_spool_t, dir)
# allow access to deferred queue
allow postfix_master_t postfix_spool_t:dir create_dir_perms;
@@ -125,6 +126,7 @@
allow postfix_smtpd_t { postfix_private_t postfix_public_t }:dir search;
allow postfix_smtpd_t { postfix_private_t postfix_public_t }:sock_file rw_file_perms;
allow postfix_smtpd_t postfix_master_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+allow postfix_smtpd_t etc_aliases_t:file r_file_perms;
allow { postfix_smtp_t postfix_smtpd_t } postfix_prng_t:file rw_file_perms;
@@ -134,7 +136,7 @@
# for a bug in the postfix local program
dontaudit procmail_t postfix_local_t:tcp_socket { read write };
')
-allow postfix_local_t { etc_aliases_t }:file r_file_perms;
+allow postfix_local_t etc_aliases_t:file r_file_perms;
allow postfix_local_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow postfix_local_t postfix_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow postfix_local_t postfix_spool_t:file rw_file_perms;
@@ -241,7 +243,7 @@
type postfix_spool_bounce_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
create_dir_file(postfix_bounce_t, postfix_spool_bounce_t)
create_dir_file(postfix_bounce_t, postfix_spool_t)
-allow postfix_master_t postfix_spool_bounce_t:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow postfix_master_t postfix_spool_bounce_t:dir create_dir_perms;
allow postfix_bounce_t self:capability { dac_read_search };
allow postfix_bounce_t postfix_public_t:sock_file write;
allow postfix_bounce_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/procmail.te ./domains/program/procmail.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/program/procmail.te 2002-12-03 15:56:41.000000000 +0100
+++ ./domains/program/procmail.te 2002-12-16 17:19:07.000000000 +0100
@@ -22,12 +22,14 @@
allow procmail_t self:capability { sys_nice chown setuid setgid dac_override };
allow procmail_t etc_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow procmail_t { etc_t resolv_conf_t }:file r_file_perms;
+allow procmail_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t resolv_conf_t }:file { getattr read };
allow procmail_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
-allow procmail_t self:process { setsched fork sigchld };
+allow procmail_t self:process { setsched fork sigchld signal };
can_exec(procmail_t, { bin_t shell_exec_t })
-allow procmail_t self:fifo_file { read write getattr };
+allow procmail_t bin_t:dir search;
+allow procmail_t bin_t:lnk_file read;
+allow procmail_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow procmail_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
allow procmail_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
@@ -50,3 +52,6 @@
# Do not audit attempts to access /root.
dontaudit procmail_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir { getattr search };
+
+allow procmail_t devtty_t:chr_file { read write };
+
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/quota.te ./domains/program/quota.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/program/quota.te 2002-12-03 15:56:42.000000000 +0100
+++ ./domains/program/quota.te 2002-12-13 21:07:17.000000000 +0100
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
rw_dir_create_file(initrc_t, quota_flag_t)
allow quota_t fs_t:filesystem { getattr quotaget quotamod };
-allow quota_t home_root_t:dir getattr;
+allow quota_t { home_root_t var_t usr_t src_t }:dir getattr;
allow quota_t self:capability sys_admin;
allow quota_t file_t:file quotaon;
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/samba.te ./domains/program/samba.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/program/samba.te 2002-10-28 21:31:46.000000000 +0100
+++ ./domains/program/samba.te 2002-12-26 15:33:14.000000000 +0100
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
allow smbd_t var_run_nmbd_t:file rw_file_perms;
ifdef(`crond.te', `
-allow system_crond_t samba_etc_t:file { read getattr };
+allow system_crond_t samba_etc_t:file { read getattr lock };
')
#################################
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
#allow smbd_t samba_etc_t:dir { search getattr };
file_type_auto_trans(smbd_t, samba_etc_t, samba_secrets_t, file)
-allow smbd_t samba_etc_t:file { getattr read };
+allow smbd_t samba_etc_t:file { getattr read lock };
# Permissions for Samba cache files in /var/cache/samba
allow smbd_t samba_var_t:dir { write remove_name add_name lock getattr search };
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/slapd.te ./domains/program/slapd.te
--- /tmp/policy/domains/program/slapd.te 2002-10-28 22:55:57.000000000 +0100
+++ ./domains/program/slapd.te 2002-12-28 21:07:50.000000000 +0100
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@
# read config files
allow slapd_t { etc_t etc_slapd_t resolv_conf_t etc_runtime_t }:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
+# for startup script
+allow initrc_t etc_slapd_t:file read;
+
allow slapd_t etc_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow slapd_t sysctl_kernel_t:dir search;
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/crond.fc ./file_contexts/program/crond.fc
--- /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/crond.fc 2002-11-29 12:19:36.000000000 +0100
+++ ./file_contexts/program/crond.fc 2002-12-28 21:08:31.000000000 +0100
@@ -16,4 +16,5 @@
/var/spool/fcron system_u:object_r:cron_spool_t
/var/spool/fcron/.* <<none>>
/var/spool/fcron/systab.orig system_u:object_r:sysadm_cron_spool_t
+/var/spool/fcron/systab system_u:object_r:sysadm_cron_spool_t
/var/run/fcron.fifo system_u:object_r:var_run_crond_t
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/fsadm.fc ./file_contexts/program/fsadm.fc
--- /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/fsadm.fc 2002-12-03 15:56:44.000000000 +0100
+++ ./file_contexts/program/fsadm.fc 2002-12-13 21:56:43.000000000 +0100
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
/sbin/e2fsck system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t
/sbin/reiserfs(ck|tune) system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t
/sbin/mkreiserfs system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t
+/sbin/resize.*fs system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t
/sbin/e2label system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t
/sbin/mkfs system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t
/sbin/mke2fs system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t
@@ -12,6 +13,7 @@
/sbin/sfdisk system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t
/sbin/cfdisk system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t
/sbin/fdisk system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t
+/sbin/parted system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t
/sbin/tune2fs system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t
/sbin/dumpe2fs system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t
/sbin/swapon system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/initrc.fc ./file_contexts/program/initrc.fc
--- /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/initrc.fc 2002-10-28 22:56:00.000000000 +0100
+++ ./file_contexts/program/initrc.fc 2002-12-13 21:08:39.000000000 +0100
@@ -11,3 +11,4 @@
/usr/local/selinux/sbin/open_init_pty system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t
/usr/sbin/run_init system_u:object_r:run_init_exec_t
/usr/sbin/open_init_pty system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t
+/etc/nologin.boot system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/modutil.fc ./file_contexts/program/modutil.fc
--- /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/modutil.fc 2002-12-16 17:06:32.000000000 +0100
+++ ./file_contexts/program/modutil.fc 2002-12-29 21:48:19.000000000 +0100
@@ -2,9 +2,10 @@
/etc/modules.conf(.old)? system_u:object_r:modules_conf_t
/lib/modules(/.*)? system_u:object_r:modules_object_t
/lib/modules/[^/]*/modules\..* system_u:object_r:modules_dep_t
+/lib/modules/modprobe.conf system_u:object_r:modules_conf_t
/sbin/depmod.* system_u:object_r:depmod_exec_t
/sbin/modprobe.* system_u:object_r:insmod_exec_t
/sbin/insmod.* system_u:object_r:insmod_exec_t
-/sbin/insmod.static system_u:object_r:insmod_exec_t
+/sbin/insmod_ksymoops_clean system_u:object_r:sbin_t
/sbin/rmmod.* system_u:object_r:insmod_exec_t
/sbin/update-modules system_u:object_r:update_modules_exec_t
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/nsd.fc ./file_contexts/program/nsd.fc
--- /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/nsd.fc 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ ./file_contexts/program/nsd.fc 2002-12-28 21:32:56.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# nsd
+/etc/nsd(/.*)? system_u:object_r:nsd_conf_t
+/usr/sbin/nsd system_u:object_r:nsd_exec_t
+/var/run/nsd.pid system_u:object_r:var_run_nsd_t
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/postfix.fc ./file_contexts/program/postfix.fc
--- /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/postfix.fc 2002-12-03 15:56:45.000000000 +0100
+++ ./file_contexts/program/postfix.fc 2002-12-28 21:08:31.000000000 +0100
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
/usr/sbin/postsuper system_u:object_r:postfix_master_exec_t
/usr/sbin/rmail system_u:object_r:postfix_master_exec_t
/var/spool/postfix/active(/.*)? system_u:object_r:postfix_spool_t
+/var/spool/postfix/hold(/.*)? system_u:object_r:postfix_spool_t
/var/spool/postfix/incoming(/.*)? system_u:object_r:postfix_spool_t
/var/spool/postfix/maildrop(/.*)? system_u:object_r:postfix_spool_maildrop_t
/var/spool/postfix/pid system_u:object_r:var_run_t
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/postgresql.fc ./file_contexts/program/postgresql.fc
--- /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/postgresql.fc 2002-08-23 20:44:20.000000000 +0200
+++ ./file_contexts/program/postgresql.fc 2002-12-13 21:08:39.000000000 +0100
@@ -4,3 +4,4 @@
/var/run/postgresql(/.*)? system_u:object_r:var_run_postgresql_t
/etc/postgresql(/.*)? system_u:object_r:etc_postgresql_t
/var/log/postgres.log.* system_u:object_r:postgresql_log_t
+/var/log/postgresql(/.*)? system_u:object_r:postgresql_log_t
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/slapd.fc ./file_contexts/program/slapd.fc
--- /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/slapd.fc 2002-07-12 17:19:44.000000000 +0200
+++ ./file_contexts/program/slapd.fc 2002-12-13 21:54:50.000000000 +0100
@@ -3,3 +3,4 @@
/var/lib/ldap(/.*)? system_u:object_r:slapd_db_t
/var/lib/ldap/replog(/.*)? system_u:object_r:slapd_replog_t
/var/run/slapd.args system_u:object_r:var_run_slapd_t
+/etc/ldap/slapd.conf system_u:object_r:etc_slapd_t
diff -ruN /tmp/policy/macros/program/ssh_macros.te ./macros/program/ssh_macros.te
--- /tmp/policy/macros/program/ssh_macros.te 2002-10-23 21:38:26.000000000 +0200
+++ ./macros/program/ssh_macros.te 2002-12-13 21:10:46.000000000 +0100
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
allow $1_ssh_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# Allow the user shell to signal the ssh program.
-allow $1_t $1_ssh_t:process signal;
+allow $1_t $1_ssh_t:process { signal setpgid };
# allow ps to show ssh
allow $1_t $1_ssh_t:dir { search getattr read };
allow $1_t $1_ssh_t:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr };
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2003-01-01 16:54 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2002-10-16 22:17 latest policy patch Russell Coker
2002-10-17 8:40 ` Tom
2002-10-17 8:50 ` Russell Coker
2002-10-17 12:48 ` Tom
2002-10-17 13:46 ` Russell Coker
2002-10-17 23:10 ` Brian May
2002-10-18 6:20 ` Tom
2002-10-18 12:07 ` Russell Coker
2002-10-17 13:15 ` Stephen Smalley
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2003-01-01 16:54 Russell Coker
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