All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Michael Buesch <mbuesch@freenet.de>
To: Eric Lammerts <eric@lammerts.org>
Cc: Marc Ballarin <Ballarin.Marc@gmx.de>, Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>,
	albert@users.sourceforge.net, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: dynamic /dev security hole?
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 2004 15:30:40 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <200408091530.55244.mbuesch@freenet.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.58.0408090025590.26834@vivaldi.madbase.net>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Quoting Eric Lammerts <eric@lammerts.org>:
> Just an idea for a fix for this problem: If udev would change the
> permissions to 000 and ownership to root.root just before it unlinks
> the device node, the copy would become useless.

Like this?
Only compile tested against glibc.


===== udev-remove.c 1.31 vs edited =====
- --- 1.31/udev-remove.c	2004-04-01 04:12:56 +02:00
+++ edited/udev-remove.c	2004-08-09 15:23:12 +02:00
@@ -79,6 +79,23 @@
 	strfieldcat(filename, dev->name);
 
 	info("removing device node '%s'", filename);
+	/* first remove all permissions on the device node.
+	 * This fixes a security issue. If the user created
+	 * a hard-link to the device node, he can't use this
+	 * anymore, if we change permissions.
+	 */
+	retval = chmod(filename, 0000);
+	if (retval) {
+		info("chmod(%s, 0000) failed with error '%s'",
+		     filename, strerror(errno));
+		// we continue nevertheless.
+	}
+	retval = chown(filename, 0, 0);
+	if (retval) {
+		info("chown(%s, 0, 0) failed with error '%s'",
+		     filename, strerror(errno));
+		// we continue nevertheless.
+	}
 	retval = unlink(filename);
 	if (errno == ENOENT)
 		retval = 0;

- -- 
Regards Michael Buesch  [ http://www.tuxsoft.de.vu ]


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFBF3yMFGK1OIvVOP4RArMrAJ0SvykBehCxPUYPLPIQuGRn3m5eHgCfShXs
e/S0iWzu/qTtDVb1+zp9LRo=
=UsXa
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

  reply	other threads:[~2004-08-09 15:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2004-08-08 12:47 dynamic /dev security hole? Albert Cahalan
2004-08-08 15:58 ` Marc Ballarin
2004-08-08 15:04   ` Albert Cahalan
2004-08-08 20:42     ` Greg KH
2004-08-08 16:21   ` Greg KH
2004-08-08 21:43     ` Marc Ballarin
2004-08-08 22:07     ` Marc Ballarin
2004-08-09  4:40       ` Eric Lammerts
2004-08-09 13:30         ` Michael Buesch [this message]
2004-08-09 13:19           ` Albert Cahalan
2004-08-09 16:54             ` Michael Buesch
2004-08-09 17:04               ` Eric Lammerts
2004-08-09 17:14                 ` Michael Buesch
2004-08-10  0:21                   ` Greg KH
2004-08-11 17:12             ` [RFC, PATCH] sys_revoke(), just a try. (was: Re: dynamic /dev security hole?) Michael Buesch
2004-08-12 16:49               ` Michael Buesch
2004-08-12 19:51                 ` Alan Cox
2004-08-12 19:39                   ` Albert Cahalan
2004-08-13 12:39                   ` Michael Buesch
2004-08-09 14:49         ` dynamic /dev security hole? Alan Cox
2004-08-09 16:17           ` Eric Lammerts
2004-08-09 15:33             ` Alan Cox
2004-08-09 16:47               ` Eric Lammerts
2004-08-09 17:54                 ` Alan Cox
2004-08-10  0:21       ` Greg KH

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=200408091530.55244.mbuesch@freenet.de \
    --to=mbuesch@freenet.de \
    --cc=Ballarin.Marc@gmx.de \
    --cc=albert@users.sourceforge.net \
    --cc=eric@lammerts.org \
    --cc=greg@kroah.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.