All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Michael Buesch <mbuesch@freenet.de>
To: Eric Lammerts <eric@lammerts.org>
Cc: Albert Cahalan <albert@users.sf.net>, Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>,
	Marc Ballarin <Ballarin.Marc@gmx.de>,
	albert@users.sourceforge.net,
	linux-kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: dynamic /dev security hole?
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 2004 19:14:16 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <200408091914.19412.mbuesch@freenet.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.58.0408091302010.9426@vivaldi.madbase.net>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Quoting Eric Lammerts <eric@lammerts.org>:
> Better not do it for symlinks.

Yes, you're right.

===== udev-remove.c 1.31 vs edited =====
- --- 1.31/udev-remove.c	2004-04-01 04:12:56 +02:00
+++ edited/udev-remove.c	2004-08-09 19:12:55 +02:00
@@ -65,6 +65,41 @@
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/** Remove all permissions on the device node, before
+  * unlinking it. This fixes a security issue.
+  * If the user created a hard-link to the device node,
+  * he can't use it any longer, because he lost permission
+  * to do so.
+  */
+static int secure_unlink(const char *filename)
+{
+	int retval;
+
+	retval = chown(filename, 0, 0);
+	if (retval) {
+		dbg("chown(%s, 0, 0) failed with error '%s'",
+		    filename, strerror(errno));
+		/* We continue nevertheless.
+		 * I think it's very unlikely for chown
+		 * to fail here, if the file exists.
+		 */
+	}
+	retval = chmod(filename, 0000);
+	if (retval) {
+		dbg("chmod(%s, 0000) failed with error '%s'",
+		    filename, strerror(errno));
+		/* We continue nevertheless. */
+	}
+	retval = unlink(filename);
+	if (errno == ENOENT)
+		retval = 0;
+	if (retval) {
+		dbg("unlink(%s) failed with error '%s'",
+			filename, strerror(errno));
+	}
+	return retval;
+}
+
 static int delete_node(struct udevice *dev)
 {
 	char filename[NAME_SIZE];
@@ -79,14 +114,9 @@
 	strfieldcat(filename, dev->name);
 
 	info("removing device node '%s'", filename);
- -	retval = unlink(filename);
- -	if (errno == ENOENT)
- -		retval = 0;
- -	if (retval) {
- -		dbg("unlink(%s) failed with error '%s'",
- -			filename, strerror(errno));
+	retval = secure_unlink(filename);
+	if (retval)
 		return retval;
- -	}
 
 	/* remove partition nodes */
 	if (dev->partitions > 0) {
@@ -94,7 +124,7 @@
 		for (i = 1; i <= dev->partitions; i++) {
 			strfieldcpy(partitionname, filename);
 			strintcat(partitionname, i);
- -			unlink(partitionname);
+			secure_unlink(partitionname);
 		}
 	}
 

- -- 
Regards Michael Buesch  [ http://www.tuxsoft.de.vu ]


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFBF7DoFGK1OIvVOP4RAklbAJ0QXZkfiDOExHqTXpue+mKJCeIBHwCgwzAa
3V4LF0jNgiDyXbm6rw4wxqI=
=wXmk
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

  reply	other threads:[~2004-08-09 17:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2004-08-08 12:47 dynamic /dev security hole? Albert Cahalan
2004-08-08 15:58 ` Marc Ballarin
2004-08-08 15:04   ` Albert Cahalan
2004-08-08 20:42     ` Greg KH
2004-08-08 16:21   ` Greg KH
2004-08-08 21:43     ` Marc Ballarin
2004-08-08 22:07     ` Marc Ballarin
2004-08-09  4:40       ` Eric Lammerts
2004-08-09 13:30         ` Michael Buesch
2004-08-09 13:19           ` Albert Cahalan
2004-08-09 16:54             ` Michael Buesch
2004-08-09 17:04               ` Eric Lammerts
2004-08-09 17:14                 ` Michael Buesch [this message]
2004-08-10  0:21                   ` Greg KH
2004-08-11 17:12             ` [RFC, PATCH] sys_revoke(), just a try. (was: Re: dynamic /dev security hole?) Michael Buesch
2004-08-12 16:49               ` Michael Buesch
2004-08-12 19:51                 ` Alan Cox
2004-08-12 19:39                   ` Albert Cahalan
2004-08-13 12:39                   ` Michael Buesch
2004-08-09 14:49         ` dynamic /dev security hole? Alan Cox
2004-08-09 16:17           ` Eric Lammerts
2004-08-09 15:33             ` Alan Cox
2004-08-09 16:47               ` Eric Lammerts
2004-08-09 17:54                 ` Alan Cox
2004-08-10  0:21       ` Greg KH

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=200408091914.19412.mbuesch@freenet.de \
    --to=mbuesch@freenet.de \
    --cc=Ballarin.Marc@gmx.de \
    --cc=albert@users.sf.net \
    --cc=albert@users.sourceforge.net \
    --cc=eric@lammerts.org \
    --cc=greg@kroah.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.