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From: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
To: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>, Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: allow setuid/setgid on process if root, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (5/8)
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2005 13:34:08 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050207193408.GD834@halcrow.us> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050207192108.GA776@halcrow.us>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 285 bytes --]

This is the fifth in a series of eight patches to the BSD Secure
Levels LSM.  It allows setuid and setgid on a process if the user is
already root.  This allows non-root users to log in.  Thanks to Serge
Hallyn for the suggestion.

Signed off by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>

[-- Attachment #2: seclvl_setuid_and_setgid.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 907 bytes --]

Index: linux-2.6.11-rc2-mm1-modules/security/seclvl.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.11-rc2-mm1-modules.orig/security/seclvl.c	2005-02-03 15:39:35.786556648 -0600
+++ linux-2.6.11-rc2-mm1-modules/security/seclvl.c	2005-02-03 15:41:46.043754544 -0600
@@ -442,12 +442,12 @@
 				      "in secure level [%d] denied\n",
 				      __FUNCTION__, seclvl);
 			return -EPERM;
-		} else if (cap == CAP_SETUID) {
+		} else if (cap == CAP_SETUID && current->uid != 0) {
 			seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING "%s: Attempt to setuid "
 				      "while in secure level [%d] denied\n",
 				      __FUNCTION__, seclvl);
 			return -EPERM;
-		} else if (cap == CAP_SETGID) {
+		} else if (cap == CAP_SETGID && current->uid != 0) {
 			seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING "%s: Attempt to setgid "
 				      "while in secure level [%d] denied\n",
 				      __FUNCTION__, seclvl);

  parent reply	other threads:[~2005-02-07 19:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2005-02-07 19:21 [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: printk overhaul, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (1/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-07 19:30 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: suid/sgid on directories; open/mknod issue, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (2/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-07 19:31 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: claim block dev in file struct rather than inode struct, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (3/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-07 22:26   ` Chris Wright
2005-02-07 22:41     ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2005-02-08  1:48       ` David Wagner
2005-02-08  2:10         ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2005-02-08  2:20           ` Chris Wright
2005-02-08  3:15             ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2005-02-08 14:33           ` David Wagner
2005-02-07 22:42     ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2005-02-08 17:24     ` Michael Halcrow
2005-02-08 17:47       ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2005-02-08 20:08         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2005-02-08 23:38       ` Chris Wright
2005-02-07 19:32 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: memory alloc failure check, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (4/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-07 19:34 ` Michael Halcrow [this message]
2005-02-07 19:35 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: nits, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (6/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-08 23:43   ` Chris Wright
2005-02-07 19:36 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: comment cleanups, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (7/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-07 19:37 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: remove ptrace, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (8/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-10 21:59 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: printk overhaul, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (1/8) Matt Mackall

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