From: daw@taverner.cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner)
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: claim block dev in file struct rather than inode struct, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (3/8)
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2005 14:33:07 +0000 (UTC) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cuaij3$63h$1@abraham.cs.berkeley.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 200502080210.j182Aioh007619@turing-police.cc.vt.edu
>The attack is to hardlink some tempfile name to some file you want
>over-written. This usually involves just a little bit of work, such as
>recognizing that a given root cronjob uses an unsafe predictable filename
>in /tmp (look at the Bugtraq or Full-Disclosure archives, there's plenty).
>Then you set a little program that sleep()s till a few seconds before
>the cronjob runs, does a getpid(), and then sprays hardlinks into the
>next 15 or 20 things that mktemp() will generate...
Got it. Very good -- now I see. Thanks for the explanation.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-02-08 14:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2005-02-07 19:21 [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: printk overhaul, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (1/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-07 19:30 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: suid/sgid on directories; open/mknod issue, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (2/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-07 19:31 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: claim block dev in file struct rather than inode struct, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (3/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-07 22:26 ` Chris Wright
2005-02-07 22:41 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2005-02-08 1:48 ` David Wagner
2005-02-08 2:10 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2005-02-08 2:20 ` Chris Wright
2005-02-08 3:15 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2005-02-08 14:33 ` David Wagner [this message]
2005-02-07 22:42 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2005-02-08 17:24 ` Michael Halcrow
2005-02-08 17:47 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2005-02-08 20:08 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2005-02-08 23:38 ` Chris Wright
2005-02-07 19:32 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: memory alloc failure check, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (4/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-07 19:34 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: allow setuid/setgid on process if root, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (5/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-07 19:35 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: nits, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (6/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-08 23:43 ` Chris Wright
2005-02-07 19:36 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: comment cleanups, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (7/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-07 19:37 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: remove ptrace, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (8/8) Michael Halcrow
2005-02-10 21:59 ` [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: printk overhaul, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (1/8) Matt Mackall
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