From: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
To: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, jmorris@namei.org,
sds@tycho.nsa.gov, chanson@TrustedCS.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] secid reconciliation-v02: Repost patchset with updates
Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2006 17:25:46 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <200609181725.46900.paul.moore@hp.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <45019F50.1090408@trustedcs.com>
On Friday 08 September 2006 12:50 pm, Venkat Yekkirala wrote:
> UPCOMING WORK:
>
> The following per the discussion at:
> http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=selinux&m=115755980516072&w=2
>
> - Create IPSec SAs to be acquired with the creating sock's context as
> opposed to that of the matching SPD rule, resulting in a simpler SPD as
> well as policy. - Set peer_sid on tcp sockets to the reconciled secmark so
> trusted applications can retrieve and service the data at the appropriate
> context.
Considering the discussions that have taken place on the SELinux list I think
doing the work to set the peer_sid value on TCP sockets is an important part
of the secid work and should be included in this patchset. I don't believe
it would be that difficult, and it would make some of the code much
cleaner/simpler I think.
--
paul moore
linux security @ hp
--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
To: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, jmorris@namei.org,
sds@tycho.nsa.gov, chanson@trustedcs.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] secid reconciliation-v02: Repost patchset with updates
Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2006 17:25:46 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <200609181725.46900.paul.moore@hp.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <45019F50.1090408@trustedcs.com>
On Friday 08 September 2006 12:50 pm, Venkat Yekkirala wrote:
> UPCOMING WORK:
>
> The following per the discussion at:
> http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=selinux&m=115755980516072&w=2
>
> - Create IPSec SAs to be acquired with the creating sock's context as
> opposed to that of the matching SPD rule, resulting in a simpler SPD as
> well as policy. - Set peer_sid on tcp sockets to the reconciled secmark so
> trusted applications can retrieve and service the data at the appropriate
> context.
Considering the discussions that have taken place on the SELinux list I think
doing the work to set the peer_sid value on TCP sockets is an important part
of the secid work and should be included in this patchset. I don't believe
it would be that difficult, and it would make some of the code much
cleaner/simpler I think.
--
paul moore
linux security @ hp
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2006-09-18 21:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2006-09-08 16:50 [PATCH 0/7] secid reconciliation-v02: Repost patchset with updates Venkat Yekkirala
2006-09-08 16:50 ` Venkat Yekkirala
2006-09-18 21:25 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2006-09-18 21:25 ` Paul Moore
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