From: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, chanson@TrustedCS.com
Subject: [PATCH 0/7] secid reconciliation-v02: Repost patchset with updates
Date: Fri, 08 Sep 2006 11:50:24 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <45019F50.1090408@trustedcs.com> (raw)
The following are the changes included in this patchset since the previous post:
- Perform flow_in check before (as opposed to after) computing transition
secid on inbound; this seems more intuitive and correct.
- Implement reconciliation and flow control for outbound traffic
(forward case being a sequence of inbound checks followed by outbound checks).
- Make selinux_xfrm_postroute_last checks conditional on compat_net.
This patchset is relative to David Miller's net-2.6.19.git (last updated on Sep 1st).
Please consider for inclusion in 2.6.19.
UPCOMING WORK:
The following per the discussion at:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=selinux&m=115755980516072&w=2
- Create IPSec SAs to be acquired with the creating sock's context as opposed
to that of the matching SPD rule, resulting in a simpler SPD as well as policy.
- Set peer_sid on tcp sockets to the reconciled secmark so trusted applications
can retrieve and service the data at the appropriate context.
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, chanson@trustedcs.com
Subject: [PATCH 0/7] secid reconciliation-v02: Repost patchset with updates
Date: Fri, 08 Sep 2006 11:50:24 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <45019F50.1090408@trustedcs.com> (raw)
The following are the changes included in this patchset since the previous post:
- Perform flow_in check before (as opposed to after) computing transition
secid on inbound; this seems more intuitive and correct.
- Implement reconciliation and flow control for outbound traffic
(forward case being a sequence of inbound checks followed by outbound checks).
- Make selinux_xfrm_postroute_last checks conditional on compat_net.
This patchset is relative to David Miller's net-2.6.19.git (last updated on Sep 1st).
Please consider for inclusion in 2.6.19.
UPCOMING WORK:
The following per the discussion at:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=selinux&m=115755980516072&w=2
- Create IPSec SAs to be acquired with the creating sock's context as opposed
to that of the matching SPD rule, resulting in a simpler SPD as well as policy.
- Set peer_sid on tcp sockets to the reconciled secmark so trusted applications
can retrieve and service the data at the appropriate context.
next reply other threads:[~2006-09-08 16:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2006-09-08 16:50 Venkat Yekkirala [this message]
2006-09-08 16:50 ` [PATCH 0/7] secid reconciliation-v02: Repost patchset with updates Venkat Yekkirala
2006-09-18 21:25 ` Paul Moore
2006-09-18 21:25 ` Paul Moore
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