[PATCH v2 0/1] Respun patch to match the latest secid patchset

[PATCH v2 0/1] Respun patch to match the latest secid patchset

[paul.moore]

This patchset is against the net-2.6 tree from this morning plus the secid
patches posted by Venkat yesterday night.  Unfortunately the net-2.6 trees from
the past few days seem to have problems booting on my test machine, so testing
of this patch has been ... well ... "minimal".  However, I know there are a lot
of deadlines floating around right now so I thought it best to post this ASAP.

This patch is basically what I posted last week plus some changes to make use
of the secid patches support of the peer_sid field in the sk_security_struct.
NetLabel used the field previously but had to special case it's handling since
it was the only user for INET sockets, the secid patchset makes this much
cleaner.  There are most likely additional NetLabel specific cleanups that can
be made, but considering my testing problems I thought it best to play it as
safe as possibile with this patch.  I'll deal with the other cleanups once I
can prove them during testing.

Please consider this for inclusion in 2.6.19.

--
paul moore
linux security @ hp

--
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[PATCH v2 0/1] Respun patch to match the latest secid patchset

[paul.moore]

This patchset is against the net-2.6 tree from this morning plus the secid
patches posted by Venkat yesterday night.  Unfortunately the net-2.6 trees from
the past few days seem to have problems booting on my test machine, so testing
of this patch has been ... well ... "minimal".  However, I know there are a lot
of deadlines floating around right now so I thought it best to post this ASAP.

This patch is basically what I posted last week plus some changes to make use
of the secid patches support of the peer_sid field in the sk_security_struct.
NetLabel used the field previously but had to special case it's handling since
it was the only user for INET sockets, the secid patchset makes this much
cleaner.  There are most likely additional NetLabel specific cleanups that can
be made, but considering my testing problems I thought it best to play it as
safe as possibile with this patch.  I'll deal with the other cleanups once I
can prove them during testing.

Please consider this for inclusion in 2.6.19.

--
paul moore
linux security @ hp

[PATCH v2 1/1] NetLabel: secid reconciliation support

[paul.moore]

This patch provides the missing NetLabel support to the secid reconciliation
patchset.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c                    |   67 +++++++++++------
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h           |    1 
 security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h |   28 +++----
 security/selinux/ss/services.c              |  106 ++++++++++------------------
 4 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)

Index: net-2.6/security/selinux/hooks.c
===================================================================
--- net-2.6.orig/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ net-2.6/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3465,6 +3465,10 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(s
 			goto out;
 	}
 
+	err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, sock_class, skb, ad);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
 	err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb, ad);
 
 out:
@@ -3501,10 +3505,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(s
 	else
 		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
 				   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
 
-	err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad);
 out:	
 	return err;
 }
@@ -3527,11 +3528,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_str
 		peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
 	}
 	else if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
-		peer_sid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(sock);
-		if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
-			ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
-			peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
-		}
+		ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
 		if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
 			err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
 			goto out;
@@ -3573,13 +3571,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgr
 	if (sock && (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX))
 		selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
 	else if (skb) {
-		peer_secid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(skb);
-		if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) {
-			if (selinux_compat_net)
+		if (selinux_compat_net) {
+			peer_secid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(
+				skb);
+			if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
 				peer_secid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb);
-			else
-				peer_secid = skb->secmark;
-		}
+		} else
+			peer_secid = skb->secmark;
 	}
 
 	if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
@@ -3641,13 +3639,11 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(str
 	u32 newsid;
 	u32 peersid;
 
-	newsid = selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(skb, sksec->sid);
-	if (newsid != SECSID_NULL) {
-		req->secid = newsid;
-		return 0;
-	}
-
 	if (selinux_compat_net) {
+		err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb, sksec->sid, &peersid);
+		if (err == 0 && peersid != SECSID_NULL)
+			goto out;
+
 		err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &peersid, 0);
 		BUG_ON(err);
 
@@ -3659,6 +3655,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(str
 	} else
 		peersid = skb->secmark;
 
+out:
 	err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
@@ -3700,6 +3697,7 @@ static void selinux_req_classify_flow(co
 static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned short family)
 {
 	u32 xfrm_sid;
+	u32 nlbl_sid;
 	int err;
 
 	if (selinux_compat_net)
@@ -3725,7 +3723,16 @@ static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk
 	if (xfrm_sid)
 		skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
 
-	/* See if NetLabel can flow in thru the current secmark here */
+	err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb, skb->secmark, &nlbl_sid);
+	BUG_ON(err);
+
+	err = avc_has_perm(nlbl_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+					PACKET__FLOW_IN, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (nlbl_sid)
+		skb->secmark = nlbl_sid;
 
 out:
 	return err ? 0 : 1;
@@ -3740,6 +3747,7 @@ static int selinux_skb_flow_out(struct s
 
 	if (!skb->secmark) {
 		u32 xfrm_sid;
+		u32 nlbl_sid;
 
 		selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
 
@@ -3749,6 +3757,12 @@ static int selinux_skb_flow_out(struct s
 			struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
 			skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
 		}
+
+		err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb, skb->secmark, &nlbl_sid);
+		BUG_ON(err);
+
+		if (nlbl_sid)
+			skb->secmark = nlbl_sid;
 	}
 
 	err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, nf_secid, SECCLASS_PACKET,
@@ -3903,6 +3917,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
 	else {
 		if (!skb->secmark) {
 			u32 xfrm_sid;
+			u32 nlbl_sid;
 
 			selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
 
@@ -3913,9 +3928,15 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
 						skb->sk->sk_security;
 				skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
 			}
+
+			err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb,
+						     skb->secmark,
+						     &nlbl_sid);
+			BUG_ON(err);
+
+			if (nlbl_sid)
+				skb->secmark = nlbl_sid;
 		}
-		err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
-				   SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_OUT, &ad);
 	}
 out:
 	return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
Index: net-2.6/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
===================================================================
--- net-2.6.orig/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ net-2.6/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -102,7 +102,6 @@ struct sk_security_struct {
 	u32 sid;			/* SID of this object */
 	u32 peer_sid;			/* SID of peer */
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
-	u16 sclass;			/* sock security class */
 	enum {				/* NetLabel state */
 		NLBL_UNSET = 0,
 		NLBL_REQUIRE,
Index: net-2.6/security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h
===================================================================
--- net-2.6.orig/security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h
+++ net-2.6/security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h
@@ -42,17 +42,17 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(st
 				      int sock_family,
 				      u32 sid);
 void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock);
-u32 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 sock_sid);
-int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
+int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sock_sid,
+				u16 sock_class,
 				struct sk_buff *skb,
 				struct avc_audit_data *ad);
-u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock);
 u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb);
 void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 				     int family);
 void selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 				      struct sk_security_struct *newssec);
 int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask);
+int selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid);
 #else
 static inline void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
 {
@@ -72,24 +72,14 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_sock_g
 	return;
 }
 
-static inline u32 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct sk_buff *skb,
-						   u32 sock_sid)
-{
-	return SECSID_NULL;
-}
-
-static inline int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sock_sid,
+					      u16 sock_class,
 					      struct sk_buff *skb,
 					      struct avc_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock)
-{
-	return SECSID_NULL;
-}
-
 static inline u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	return SECSID_NULL;
@@ -114,6 +104,14 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_inode_p
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					 u32 base_sid,
+					 u32 *sid)
+{
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
 
 #endif
Index: net-2.6/security/selinux/ss/services.c
===================================================================
--- net-2.6.orig/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ net-2.6/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
 #include "selinux_netlabel.h"
 
 extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
+extern int selinux_compat_net;
 unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
 
 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
@@ -2454,7 +2455,6 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(str
 void selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 				      struct sk_security_struct *newssec)
 {
-	newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
 	if (ssec->nlbl_state != NLBL_UNSET)
 		newssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQUIRE;
 	else
@@ -2476,11 +2476,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(st
 				      int sock_family,
 				      u32 sid)
 {
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
 
-	sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
-
 	if (sock_family != PF_INET)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -2500,24 +2497,23 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(st
  */
 void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock)
 {
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
 	u32 nlbl_peer_sid;
 
-	sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
-
 	if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET)
 		return;
 
-	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
-	if (netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr) == 0 &&
-	    selinux_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(NULL,
-					  &secattr,
-					  sksec->sid,
-					  &nlbl_peer_sid) == 0)
-		sksec->peer_sid = nlbl_peer_sid;
-	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr, 0);
+	if (selinux_compat_net) {
+		netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+		if (netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr) == 0 &&
+		    selinux_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(NULL,
+						  &secattr,
+						  sksec->sid,
+						  &nlbl_peer_sid) == 0)
+			sksec->peer_sid = nlbl_peer_sid;
+		netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr, 0);
+	}
 
 	sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQUIRE;
 
@@ -2528,32 +2524,6 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct so
 }
 
 /**
- * selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request - Handle a new connection request
- * @skb: the packet
- * @sock_sid: the SID of the parent socket
- *
- * Description:
- * If present, use the security attributes of the packet in @skb and the
- * parent sock's SID to arrive at a SID for the new child sock.  Returns the
- * SID of the connection or SECSID_NULL on failure.
- *
- */
-u32 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 sock_sid)
-{
-	int rc;
-	u32 peer_sid;
-
-	rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, sock_sid, &peer_sid);
-	if (rc != 0)
-		return SECSID_NULL;
-
-	if (peer_sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
-		return SECSID_NULL;
-
-	return peer_sid;
-}
-
-/**
  * selinux_netlbl_inode_permission - Verify the socket is NetLabel labeled
  * @inode: the file descriptor's inode
  * @mask: the permission mask
@@ -2593,7 +2563,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(stru
 
 /**
  * selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb - Do an inbound access check using NetLabel
- * @sksec: the sock's sk_security_struct
+ * @sock_sid: the socket's SID
+ * @sock_class: the socket's class
  * @skb: the packet
  * @ad: the audit data
  *
@@ -2603,7 +2574,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(stru
  * error.
  *
  */
-int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
+int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sock_sid,
+				u16 sock_class,
 				struct sk_buff *skb,
 				struct avc_audit_data *ad)
 {
@@ -2618,7 +2590,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct s
 	if (netlbl_sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
 		return 0;
 
-	switch (sksec->sclass) {
+	switch (sock_class) {
 	case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
 		recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
 		break;
@@ -2629,9 +2601,9 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct s
 		recv_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
 	}
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sock_sid,
 			  netlbl_sid,
-			  sksec->sclass,
+			  sock_class,
 			  recv_perm,
 			  ad);
 	if (rc == 0)
@@ -2642,25 +2614,6 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct s
 }
 
 /**
- * selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream - Return the connected peer's SID
- * @sock: the socket
- *
- * Description:
- * Examine @sock to find the connected peer's SID.  Returns the SID on success
- * or SECSID_NULL on error.
- *
- */
-u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock)
-{
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
-
-	if (sksec->peer_sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
-		return SECSID_NULL;
-
-	return sksec->peer_sid;
-}
-
-/**
  * selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram - Return the SID of a NetLabel packet
  * @skb: the packet
  *
@@ -2686,4 +2639,27 @@ u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgr
 
 	return peer_sid;
 }
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_skb_sid - Calculate the NetLabel SID of a packet
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only attributes
+ * @sid: the SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Call the NetLabel mechanism to get the security attributes of the given
+ * packet and use those attributes to determine the correct context/SID to
+ * assign to the packet.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, base_sid, sid);
+	if (rc == 0 && *sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
+		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	return rc;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */

--
paul moore
linux security @ hp

--
This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
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the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.

[PATCH v2 1/1] NetLabel: secid reconciliation support

[paul.moore]

[-- Attachment #1: netlabel-secid_support --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 12892 bytes --]

This patch provides the missing NetLabel support to the secid reconciliation
patchset.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c                    |   67 +++++++++++------
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h           |    1 
 security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h |   28 +++----
 security/selinux/ss/services.c              |  106 ++++++++++------------------
 4 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)

Index: net-2.6/security/selinux/hooks.c
===================================================================
--- net-2.6.orig/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ net-2.6/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3465,6 +3465,10 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(s
 			goto out;
 	}
 
+	err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, sock_class, skb, ad);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
 	err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb, ad);
 
 out:
@@ -3501,10 +3505,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(s
 	else
 		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
 				   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
 
-	err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad);
 out:	
 	return err;
 }
@@ -3527,11 +3528,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_str
 		peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
 	}
 	else if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
-		peer_sid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(sock);
-		if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
-			ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
-			peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
-		}
+		ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
 		if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
 			err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
 			goto out;
@@ -3573,13 +3571,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgr
 	if (sock && (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX))
 		selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
 	else if (skb) {
-		peer_secid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(skb);
-		if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) {
-			if (selinux_compat_net)
+		if (selinux_compat_net) {
+			peer_secid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(
+				skb);
+			if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
 				peer_secid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb);
-			else
-				peer_secid = skb->secmark;
-		}
+		} else
+			peer_secid = skb->secmark;
 	}
 
 	if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
@@ -3641,13 +3639,11 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(str
 	u32 newsid;
 	u32 peersid;
 
-	newsid = selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(skb, sksec->sid);
-	if (newsid != SECSID_NULL) {
-		req->secid = newsid;
-		return 0;
-	}
-
 	if (selinux_compat_net) {
+		err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb, sksec->sid, &peersid);
+		if (err == 0 && peersid != SECSID_NULL)
+			goto out;
+
 		err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &peersid, 0);
 		BUG_ON(err);
 
@@ -3659,6 +3655,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(str
 	} else
 		peersid = skb->secmark;
 
+out:
 	err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
@@ -3700,6 +3697,7 @@ static void selinux_req_classify_flow(co
 static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned short family)
 {
 	u32 xfrm_sid;
+	u32 nlbl_sid;
 	int err;
 
 	if (selinux_compat_net)
@@ -3725,7 +3723,16 @@ static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk
 	if (xfrm_sid)
 		skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
 
-	/* See if NetLabel can flow in thru the current secmark here */
+	err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb, skb->secmark, &nlbl_sid);
+	BUG_ON(err);
+
+	err = avc_has_perm(nlbl_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+					PACKET__FLOW_IN, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (nlbl_sid)
+		skb->secmark = nlbl_sid;
 
 out:
 	return err ? 0 : 1;
@@ -3740,6 +3747,7 @@ static int selinux_skb_flow_out(struct s
 
 	if (!skb->secmark) {
 		u32 xfrm_sid;
+		u32 nlbl_sid;
 
 		selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
 
@@ -3749,6 +3757,12 @@ static int selinux_skb_flow_out(struct s
 			struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
 			skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
 		}
+
+		err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb, skb->secmark, &nlbl_sid);
+		BUG_ON(err);
+
+		if (nlbl_sid)
+			skb->secmark = nlbl_sid;
 	}
 
 	err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, nf_secid, SECCLASS_PACKET,
@@ -3903,6 +3917,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
 	else {
 		if (!skb->secmark) {
 			u32 xfrm_sid;
+			u32 nlbl_sid;
 
 			selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
 
@@ -3913,9 +3928,15 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
 						skb->sk->sk_security;
 				skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
 			}
+
+			err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb,
+						     skb->secmark,
+						     &nlbl_sid);
+			BUG_ON(err);
+
+			if (nlbl_sid)
+				skb->secmark = nlbl_sid;
 		}
-		err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
-				   SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_OUT, &ad);
 	}
 out:
 	return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
Index: net-2.6/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
===================================================================
--- net-2.6.orig/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ net-2.6/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -102,7 +102,6 @@ struct sk_security_struct {
 	u32 sid;			/* SID of this object */
 	u32 peer_sid;			/* SID of peer */
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
-	u16 sclass;			/* sock security class */
 	enum {				/* NetLabel state */
 		NLBL_UNSET = 0,
 		NLBL_REQUIRE,
Index: net-2.6/security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h
===================================================================
--- net-2.6.orig/security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h
+++ net-2.6/security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h
@@ -42,17 +42,17 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(st
 				      int sock_family,
 				      u32 sid);
 void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock);
-u32 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 sock_sid);
-int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
+int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sock_sid,
+				u16 sock_class,
 				struct sk_buff *skb,
 				struct avc_audit_data *ad);
-u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock);
 u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb);
 void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 				     int family);
 void selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 				      struct sk_security_struct *newssec);
 int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask);
+int selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid);
 #else
 static inline void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
 {
@@ -72,24 +72,14 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_sock_g
 	return;
 }
 
-static inline u32 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct sk_buff *skb,
-						   u32 sock_sid)
-{
-	return SECSID_NULL;
-}
-
-static inline int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sock_sid,
+					      u16 sock_class,
 					      struct sk_buff *skb,
 					      struct avc_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock)
-{
-	return SECSID_NULL;
-}
-
 static inline u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	return SECSID_NULL;
@@ -114,6 +104,14 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_inode_p
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					 u32 base_sid,
+					 u32 *sid)
+{
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
 
 #endif
Index: net-2.6/security/selinux/ss/services.c
===================================================================
--- net-2.6.orig/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ net-2.6/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
 #include "selinux_netlabel.h"
 
 extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
+extern int selinux_compat_net;
 unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
 
 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
@@ -2454,7 +2455,6 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(str
 void selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
 				      struct sk_security_struct *newssec)
 {
-	newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
 	if (ssec->nlbl_state != NLBL_UNSET)
 		newssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQUIRE;
 	else
@@ -2476,11 +2476,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(st
 				      int sock_family,
 				      u32 sid)
 {
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
 
-	sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
-
 	if (sock_family != PF_INET)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -2500,24 +2497,23 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(st
  */
 void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock)
 {
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
 	u32 nlbl_peer_sid;
 
-	sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
-
 	if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET)
 		return;
 
-	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
-	if (netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr) == 0 &&
-	    selinux_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(NULL,
-					  &secattr,
-					  sksec->sid,
-					  &nlbl_peer_sid) == 0)
-		sksec->peer_sid = nlbl_peer_sid;
-	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr, 0);
+	if (selinux_compat_net) {
+		netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+		if (netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr) == 0 &&
+		    selinux_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(NULL,
+						  &secattr,
+						  sksec->sid,
+						  &nlbl_peer_sid) == 0)
+			sksec->peer_sid = nlbl_peer_sid;
+		netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr, 0);
+	}
 
 	sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQUIRE;
 
@@ -2528,32 +2524,6 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct so
 }
 
 /**
- * selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request - Handle a new connection request
- * @skb: the packet
- * @sock_sid: the SID of the parent socket
- *
- * Description:
- * If present, use the security attributes of the packet in @skb and the
- * parent sock's SID to arrive at a SID for the new child sock.  Returns the
- * SID of the connection or SECSID_NULL on failure.
- *
- */
-u32 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 sock_sid)
-{
-	int rc;
-	u32 peer_sid;
-
-	rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, sock_sid, &peer_sid);
-	if (rc != 0)
-		return SECSID_NULL;
-
-	if (peer_sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
-		return SECSID_NULL;
-
-	return peer_sid;
-}
-
-/**
  * selinux_netlbl_inode_permission - Verify the socket is NetLabel labeled
  * @inode: the file descriptor's inode
  * @mask: the permission mask
@@ -2593,7 +2563,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(stru
 
 /**
  * selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb - Do an inbound access check using NetLabel
- * @sksec: the sock's sk_security_struct
+ * @sock_sid: the socket's SID
+ * @sock_class: the socket's class
  * @skb: the packet
  * @ad: the audit data
  *
@@ -2603,7 +2574,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(stru
  * error.
  *
  */
-int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
+int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sock_sid,
+				u16 sock_class,
 				struct sk_buff *skb,
 				struct avc_audit_data *ad)
 {
@@ -2618,7 +2590,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct s
 	if (netlbl_sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
 		return 0;
 
-	switch (sksec->sclass) {
+	switch (sock_class) {
 	case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
 		recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
 		break;
@@ -2629,9 +2601,9 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct s
 		recv_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
 	}
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sock_sid,
 			  netlbl_sid,
-			  sksec->sclass,
+			  sock_class,
 			  recv_perm,
 			  ad);
 	if (rc == 0)
@@ -2642,25 +2614,6 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct s
 }
 
 /**
- * selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream - Return the connected peer's SID
- * @sock: the socket
- *
- * Description:
- * Examine @sock to find the connected peer's SID.  Returns the SID on success
- * or SECSID_NULL on error.
- *
- */
-u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock)
-{
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
-
-	if (sksec->peer_sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
-		return SECSID_NULL;
-
-	return sksec->peer_sid;
-}
-
-/**
  * selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram - Return the SID of a NetLabel packet
  * @skb: the packet
  *
@@ -2686,4 +2639,27 @@ u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgr
 
 	return peer_sid;
 }
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_skb_sid - Calculate the NetLabel SID of a packet
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only attributes
+ * @sid: the SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Call the NetLabel mechanism to get the security attributes of the given
+ * packet and use those attributes to determine the correct context/SID to
+ * assign to the packet.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, base_sid, sid);
+	if (rc == 0 && *sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
+		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	return rc;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */

--
paul moore
linux security @ hp

Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] NetLabel: secid reconciliation support

[Stephen Smalley]

On Mon, 2006-10-02 at 14:06 -0400, paul.moore@hp.com wrote:
> plain text document attachment (netlabel-secid_support)
> This patch provides the missing NetLabel support to the secid reconciliation
> patchset.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
> ---
>  security/selinux/hooks.c                    |   67 +++++++++++------
>  security/selinux/include/objsec.h           |    1 
>  security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h |   28 +++----
>  security/selinux/ss/services.c              |  106 ++++++++++------------------
>  4 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)

> @@ -3725,7 +3723,16 @@ static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk
>  	if (xfrm_sid)
>  		skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
>  
> -	/* See if NetLabel can flow in thru the current secmark here */
> +	err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb, skb->secmark, &nlbl_sid);
> +	BUG_ON(err);

If this selinux_netlbl_skb_sid() call can fail for any reason other than
a kernel bug, then this needs to goto out instead of using BUG_ON.  For
example, if the function can fail due to temporary memory pressure
leading to a failed allocation, then you want to simply drop the packet,
not panic the kernel.  

> +
> +	err = avc_has_perm(nlbl_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
> +					PACKET__FLOW_IN, NULL);

This means we end up with two flow_in checks each time, even if only one
or none of the two labeling mechanisms was used, right?  Given the
conclusion on the discussion of what it means to use them together (just
redundant), this seems to be pointless overhead.

> @@ -3749,6 +3757,12 @@ static int selinux_skb_flow_out(struct s
>  			struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
>  			skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
>  		}
> +
> +		err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb, skb->secmark, &nlbl_sid);
> +		BUG_ON(err);

Same concern about BUG_ON as above.  Also, I'd have expected this to
happen at the same point that selinux_skb_xfrm_sid() is called.

> +		if (nlbl_sid)
> +			skb->secmark = nlbl_sid;

And then I'd expect this to be moved up prior to the if (xfrm_sid)
clause, turning that into an else clause, e.g.:
	if (nlbl_sid)
		skb->secmark = nlbl_sid;
	else if (xfrm_sid)
		skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
	else if (skb->sk) ...

> @@ -3913,9 +3928,15 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
>  						skb->sk->sk_security;
>  				skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
>  			}
> +
> +			err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb,
> +						     skb->secmark,
> +						     &nlbl_sid);
> +			BUG_ON(err);
> +
> +			if (nlbl_sid)
> +				skb->secmark = nlbl_sid;

Similar comments as above.

>  		}
> -		err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
> -				   SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_OUT, &ad);

Why do you think you can remove this?

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] NetLabel: secid reconciliation support

[Stephen Smalley]

On Mon, 2006-10-02 at 14:06 -0400, paul.moore@hp.com wrote:
> plain text document attachment (netlabel-secid_support)
> This patch provides the missing NetLabel support to the secid reconciliation
> patchset.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
> ---
>  security/selinux/hooks.c                    |   67 +++++++++++------
>  security/selinux/include/objsec.h           |    1 
>  security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h |   28 +++----
>  security/selinux/ss/services.c              |  106 ++++++++++------------------
>  4 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)

> @@ -3725,7 +3723,16 @@ static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk
>  	if (xfrm_sid)
>  		skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
>  
> -	/* See if NetLabel can flow in thru the current secmark here */
> +	err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb, skb->secmark, &nlbl_sid);
> +	BUG_ON(err);

If this selinux_netlbl_skb_sid() call can fail for any reason other than
a kernel bug, then this needs to goto out instead of using BUG_ON.  For
example, if the function can fail due to temporary memory pressure
leading to a failed allocation, then you want to simply drop the packet,
not panic the kernel.  

> +
> +	err = avc_has_perm(nlbl_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
> +					PACKET__FLOW_IN, NULL);

This means we end up with two flow_in checks each time, even if only one
or none of the two labeling mechanisms was used, right?  Given the
conclusion on the discussion of what it means to use them together (just
redundant), this seems to be pointless overhead.

> @@ -3749,6 +3757,12 @@ static int selinux_skb_flow_out(struct s
>  			struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
>  			skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
>  		}
> +
> +		err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb, skb->secmark, &nlbl_sid);
> +		BUG_ON(err);

Same concern about BUG_ON as above.  Also, I'd have expected this to
happen at the same point that selinux_skb_xfrm_sid() is called.

> +		if (nlbl_sid)
> +			skb->secmark = nlbl_sid;

And then I'd expect this to be moved up prior to the if (xfrm_sid)
clause, turning that into an else clause, e.g.:
	if (nlbl_sid)
		skb->secmark = nlbl_sid;
	else if (xfrm_sid)
		skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
	else if (skb->sk) ...

> @@ -3913,9 +3928,15 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
>  						skb->sk->sk_security;
>  				skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
>  			}
> +
> +			err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb,
> +						     skb->secmark,
> +						     &nlbl_sid);
> +			BUG_ON(err);
> +
> +			if (nlbl_sid)
> +				skb->secmark = nlbl_sid;

Similar comments as above.

>  		}
> -		err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
> -				   SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_OUT, &ad);

Why do you think you can remove this?

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency

Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] NetLabel: secid reconciliation support

[Paul Moore]

Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Mon, 2006-10-02 at 14:06 -0400, paul.moore@hp.com wrote:
> 
>>plain text document attachment (netlabel-secid_support)
>>This patch provides the missing NetLabel support to the secid reconciliation
>>patchset.
>>
>>Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
>>---
>> security/selinux/hooks.c                    |   67 +++++++++++------
>> security/selinux/include/objsec.h           |    1 
>> security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h |   28 +++----
>> security/selinux/ss/services.c              |  106 ++++++++++------------------
>> 4 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)
> 
> 
>>@@ -3725,7 +3723,16 @@ static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk
>> 	if (xfrm_sid)
>> 		skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
>> 
>>-	/* See if NetLabel can flow in thru the current secmark here */
>>+	err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb, skb->secmark, &nlbl_sid);
>>+	BUG_ON(err);
> 
> 
> If this selinux_netlbl_skb_sid() call can fail for any reason other than
> a kernel bug, then this needs to goto out instead of using BUG_ON.  For
> example, if the function can fail due to temporary memory pressure
> leading to a failed allocation, then you want to simply drop the packet,
> not panic the kernel.  

That's fine - see the discussion Venkat and I had earlier.  I'll change
it to jump to "out".

>>+
>>+	err = avc_has_perm(nlbl_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
>>+					PACKET__FLOW_IN, NULL);
> 
> 
> This means we end up with two flow_in checks each time, even if only one
> or none of the two labeling mechanisms was used, right?  Given the
> conclusion on the discussion of what it means to use them together (just
> redundant), this seems to be pointless overhead.

I was just trying to match what Venkat had already done.

It's easy enough to distinguish when there is not a NetLabel present and
skip the second check, but I think we need a second access check for
NetLabel when it is present as to skip that check could result in some
wierd behaviors if both forms of external labeling are used.

Yes, we all agree it's redundant to use both at the same time, but I
don't think there is anything preventing users from doing so at the
present time.

>>@@ -3749,6 +3757,12 @@ static int selinux_skb_flow_out(struct s
>> 			struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
>> 			skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
>> 		}
>>+
>>+		err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb, skb->secmark, &nlbl_sid);
>>+		BUG_ON(err);
> 
> 
> Same concern about BUG_ON as above.  Also, I'd have expected this to
> happen at the same point that selinux_skb_xfrm_sid() is called.
>
>>+		if (nlbl_sid)
>>+			skb->secmark = nlbl_sid;
> 
> 
> And then I'd expect this to be moved up prior to the if (xfrm_sid)
> clause, turning that into an else clause, e.g.:
> 	if (nlbl_sid)
> 		skb->secmark = nlbl_sid;
> 	else if (xfrm_sid)
> 		skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
> 	else if (skb->sk) ...

Easy enough to change.

>>@@ -3913,9 +3928,15 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
>> 						skb->sk->sk_security;
>> 				skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
>> 			}
>>+
>>+			err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb,
>>+						     skb->secmark,
>>+						     &nlbl_sid);
>>+			BUG_ON(err);
>>+
>>+			if (nlbl_sid)
>>+				skb->secmark = nlbl_sid;
> 
> 
> Similar comments as above.
> 
>> 		}
>>-		err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
>>-				   SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_OUT, &ad);
> 
> 
> Why do you think you can remove this?

I don't, that was a mistake/typo that I missed.  Thanks.

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp

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Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] NetLabel: secid reconciliation support

[Paul Moore]

Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Mon, 2006-10-02 at 14:06 -0400, paul.moore@hp.com wrote:
> 
>>plain text document attachment (netlabel-secid_support)
>>This patch provides the missing NetLabel support to the secid reconciliation
>>patchset.
>>
>>Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
>>---
>> security/selinux/hooks.c                    |   67 +++++++++++------
>> security/selinux/include/objsec.h           |    1 
>> security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h |   28 +++----
>> security/selinux/ss/services.c              |  106 ++++++++++------------------
>> 4 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)
> 
> 
>>@@ -3725,7 +3723,16 @@ static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk
>> 	if (xfrm_sid)
>> 		skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
>> 
>>-	/* See if NetLabel can flow in thru the current secmark here */
>>+	err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb, skb->secmark, &nlbl_sid);
>>+	BUG_ON(err);
> 
> 
> If this selinux_netlbl_skb_sid() call can fail for any reason other than
> a kernel bug, then this needs to goto out instead of using BUG_ON.  For
> example, if the function can fail due to temporary memory pressure
> leading to a failed allocation, then you want to simply drop the packet,
> not panic the kernel.  

That's fine - see the discussion Venkat and I had earlier.  I'll change
it to jump to "out".

>>+
>>+	err = avc_has_perm(nlbl_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
>>+					PACKET__FLOW_IN, NULL);
> 
> 
> This means we end up with two flow_in checks each time, even if only one
> or none of the two labeling mechanisms was used, right?  Given the
> conclusion on the discussion of what it means to use them together (just
> redundant), this seems to be pointless overhead.

I was just trying to match what Venkat had already done.

It's easy enough to distinguish when there is not a NetLabel present and
skip the second check, but I think we need a second access check for
NetLabel when it is present as to skip that check could result in some
wierd behaviors if both forms of external labeling are used.

Yes, we all agree it's redundant to use both at the same time, but I
don't think there is anything preventing users from doing so at the
present time.

>>@@ -3749,6 +3757,12 @@ static int selinux_skb_flow_out(struct s
>> 			struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
>> 			skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
>> 		}
>>+
>>+		err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb, skb->secmark, &nlbl_sid);
>>+		BUG_ON(err);
> 
> 
> Same concern about BUG_ON as above.  Also, I'd have expected this to
> happen at the same point that selinux_skb_xfrm_sid() is called.
>
>>+		if (nlbl_sid)
>>+			skb->secmark = nlbl_sid;
> 
> 
> And then I'd expect this to be moved up prior to the if (xfrm_sid)
> clause, turning that into an else clause, e.g.:
> 	if (nlbl_sid)
> 		skb->secmark = nlbl_sid;
> 	else if (xfrm_sid)
> 		skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
> 	else if (skb->sk) ...

Easy enough to change.

>>@@ -3913,9 +3928,15 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
>> 						skb->sk->sk_security;
>> 				skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
>> 			}
>>+
>>+			err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb,
>>+						     skb->secmark,
>>+						     &nlbl_sid);
>>+			BUG_ON(err);
>>+
>>+			if (nlbl_sid)
>>+				skb->secmark = nlbl_sid;
> 
> 
> Similar comments as above.
> 
>> 		}
>>-		err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
>>-				   SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_OUT, &ad);
> 
> 
> Why do you think you can remove this?

I don't, that was a mistake/typo that I missed.  Thanks.

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp

Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] NetLabel: secid reconciliation support

[Paul Moore]

Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Mon, 2006-10-02 at 14:06 -0400, paul.moore@hp.com wrote:
> 
>>plain text document attachment (netlabel-secid_support)
>>This patch provides the missing NetLabel support to the secid reconciliation
>>patchset.
>>
>>Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
>>---
>> security/selinux/hooks.c                    |   67 +++++++++++------
>> security/selinux/include/objsec.h           |    1 
>> security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h |   28 +++----
>> security/selinux/ss/services.c              |  106 ++++++++++------------------
>> 4 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)
> 
> 
>>@@ -3725,7 +3723,16 @@ static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk
>>+
>>+	err = avc_has_perm(nlbl_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
>>+					PACKET__FLOW_IN, NULL);
> 
> 
> This means we end up with two flow_in checks each time, even if only one
> or none of the two labeling mechanisms was used, right?  Given the
> conclusion on the discussion of what it means to use them together (just
> redundant), this seems to be pointless overhead.

Okay, how about something like this?

static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned short family)
{
	u32 xfrm_sid;
	u32 nlbl_sid;
	u32 ext_sid;
	int err;

	if (selinux_compat_net)
		return 1;

	/*
	 * loopback traffic already labeled and
	 * flow-controlled on outbound. We may
	 * need to flow-control on the inbound
	 * as well if there's ever a use-case for it.
	 */
	if (skb->dev == &loopback_dev)
		return 1;

	err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &xfrm_sid, 0);
	BUG_ON(err);

	err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb,
				     xfrm_sid ? xfrm_sid : skb->secmark,
				     &nlbl_sid);
	if (err)
		goto out;

	if (nlbl_sid)
		ext_sid = nlbl_sid;
	else
		ext_sid = xfrm_sid;

	err = avc_has_perm(ext_sid,
			   skb->secmark,
			   SECCLASS_PACKET,
			   PACKET__FLOW_IN,
			   NULL);
	if (err)
		goto out;

	if (ext_sid)
		skb->secmark = ext_sid;

out:
	return err ? 0 : 1;
};

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp

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Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] NetLabel: secid reconciliation support

[Paul Moore]

Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Mon, 2006-10-02 at 14:06 -0400, paul.moore@hp.com wrote:
> 
>>plain text document attachment (netlabel-secid_support)
>>This patch provides the missing NetLabel support to the secid reconciliation
>>patchset.
>>
>>Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
>>---
>> security/selinux/hooks.c                    |   67 +++++++++++------
>> security/selinux/include/objsec.h           |    1 
>> security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h |   28 +++----
>> security/selinux/ss/services.c              |  106 ++++++++++------------------
>> 4 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)
> 
> 
>>@@ -3725,7 +3723,16 @@ static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk
>>+
>>+	err = avc_has_perm(nlbl_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
>>+					PACKET__FLOW_IN, NULL);
> 
> 
> This means we end up with two flow_in checks each time, even if only one
> or none of the two labeling mechanisms was used, right?  Given the
> conclusion on the discussion of what it means to use them together (just
> redundant), this seems to be pointless overhead.

Okay, how about something like this?

static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned short family)
{
	u32 xfrm_sid;
	u32 nlbl_sid;
	u32 ext_sid;
	int err;

	if (selinux_compat_net)
		return 1;

	/*
	 * loopback traffic already labeled and
	 * flow-controlled on outbound. We may
	 * need to flow-control on the inbound
	 * as well if there's ever a use-case for it.
	 */
	if (skb->dev == &loopback_dev)
		return 1;

	err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &xfrm_sid, 0);
	BUG_ON(err);

	err = selinux_netlbl_skb_sid(skb,
				     xfrm_sid ? xfrm_sid : skb->secmark,
				     &nlbl_sid);
	if (err)
		goto out;

	if (nlbl_sid)
		ext_sid = nlbl_sid;
	else
		ext_sid = xfrm_sid;

	err = avc_has_perm(ext_sid,
			   skb->secmark,
			   SECCLASS_PACKET,
			   PACKET__FLOW_IN,
			   NULL);
	if (err)
		goto out;

	if (ext_sid)
		skb->secmark = ext_sid;

out:
	return err ? 0 : 1;
};

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp