All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
To: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@computergmbh.de>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: NFS4 authentification / fsuid
Date: Thu, 30 Aug 2007 17:44:31 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20070830214431.GF10808@fieldses.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1188486240.6755.51.camel@heimdal.trondhjem.org>

On Thu, Aug 30, 2007 at 11:04:00AM -0400, Trond Myklebust wrote:
> With CIFS or other password based protocols (including RPCSEC_GSS)

Well, rpcsec_gss isn't inherently password based, and you can
authenticate in some way that doesn't actually give away your password
(or other long-lived credential).

> What I'm saying is that the superuser can pretty much do whatever it
> takes to grab either your kerberos password (e.g. install a keyboard
> listener), a stored credential (read the contents of your kerberos
> on-disk credential cache), or s/he can access the cached contents of the
> file by hunting through /dev/kmem.
> 
> IOW: There is no such thing as security on a root-compromised machine.

And in theory a kernel could provide *some* guarantees against root,
right?  (Is there some reason a unix-like kernel must provide such
things as /dev/kmem?)

--b.

  reply	other threads:[~2007-08-30 21:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2007-08-30 14:12 NFS4 authentification / fsuid Jan Engelhardt
2007-08-30 14:29 ` Trond Myklebust
2007-08-30 14:32   ` Trond Myklebust
2007-08-30 14:42     ` Jan Engelhardt
2007-08-30 15:04       ` Trond Myklebust
2007-08-30 21:44         ` J. Bruce Fields [this message]
2007-09-06  8:14           ` Satyam Sharma
2007-09-06  8:29             ` Satyam Sharma
2007-09-06 15:11               ` J. Bruce Fields
2007-09-06 23:21                 ` Trond Myklebust
2007-09-06 23:32                   ` Trond Myklebust
2007-09-07 15:34                     ` J. Bruce Fields
2007-09-18 23:27                       ` Satyam Sharma
2007-09-18 23:12                 ` Satyam Sharma
2007-09-06 15:06             ` J. Bruce Fields
2007-09-06 23:30               ` Kyle Moffett
2007-09-06 23:35                 ` Trond Myklebust
2007-09-07  0:56                   ` Kyle Moffett
2007-09-07  5:14                     ` Trond Myklebust
2007-09-07  5:47                       ` Kyle Moffett
2007-09-07  6:37                         ` Bernd Eckenfels
2007-09-18 23:48                         ` Satyam Sharma
2007-09-18 23:44                     ` Satyam Sharma
2007-09-19  5:16                       ` Kyle Moffett
2007-09-19 12:16                         ` Satyam Sharma
2007-09-19 13:49                           ` Kyle Moffett
2007-09-19 14:12                             ` Satyam Sharma
2007-09-19 15:01                               ` J. Bruce Fields
2007-09-20  7:03                                 ` Satyam Sharma
2007-09-19 16:38                         ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2007-09-20  7:15                           ` Satyam Sharma
2007-08-30 15:12       ` J. Bruce Fields

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20070830214431.GF10808@fieldses.org \
    --to=bfields@fieldses.org \
    --cc=jengelh@computergmbh.de \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.