From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
To: Satyam Sharma <satyam@infradead.org>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>,
Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@computergmbh.de>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: NFS4 authentification / fsuid
Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2007 11:06:16 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20070906150616.GA28565@fieldses.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LFD.0.999.0709061333410.3781@enigma.security.iitk.ac.in>
On Thu, Sep 06, 2007 at 01:44:05PM +0530, Satyam Sharma wrote:
> /dev/kmem was just an example -- IMHO differentiating between kernel and
> userspace from a security p.o.v. is always tricky.
The things that come to mind are /dev/kmem and module-loading. What
else is there? And what is it that makes this inherently difficult?
> Like Trond said, there are very high number of ways in which
> privileged userspace can compromise a running kernel if it really
> wants to do that, root-is-God has always been *the* major problem with
> Unix :-)
>
> The only _real_ way a kernel can lock itself completely against
> malicious userspace involves trusted tamperproof hardware,
The question of how to protect against someone with *physical* access
certainly is more difficult, but surely that's a separate problem.
--b.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2007-09-06 15:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2007-08-30 14:12 NFS4 authentification / fsuid Jan Engelhardt
2007-08-30 14:29 ` Trond Myklebust
2007-08-30 14:32 ` Trond Myklebust
2007-08-30 14:42 ` Jan Engelhardt
2007-08-30 15:04 ` Trond Myklebust
2007-08-30 21:44 ` J. Bruce Fields
2007-09-06 8:14 ` Satyam Sharma
2007-09-06 8:29 ` Satyam Sharma
2007-09-06 15:11 ` J. Bruce Fields
2007-09-06 23:21 ` Trond Myklebust
2007-09-06 23:32 ` Trond Myklebust
2007-09-07 15:34 ` J. Bruce Fields
2007-09-18 23:27 ` Satyam Sharma
2007-09-18 23:12 ` Satyam Sharma
2007-09-06 15:06 ` J. Bruce Fields [this message]
2007-09-06 23:30 ` Kyle Moffett
2007-09-06 23:35 ` Trond Myklebust
2007-09-07 0:56 ` Kyle Moffett
2007-09-07 5:14 ` Trond Myklebust
2007-09-07 5:47 ` Kyle Moffett
2007-09-07 6:37 ` Bernd Eckenfels
2007-09-18 23:48 ` Satyam Sharma
2007-09-18 23:44 ` Satyam Sharma
2007-09-19 5:16 ` Kyle Moffett
2007-09-19 12:16 ` Satyam Sharma
2007-09-19 13:49 ` Kyle Moffett
2007-09-19 14:12 ` Satyam Sharma
2007-09-19 15:01 ` J. Bruce Fields
2007-09-20 7:03 ` Satyam Sharma
2007-09-19 16:38 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2007-09-20 7:15 ` Satyam Sharma
2007-08-30 15:12 ` J. Bruce Fields
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