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From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: steved@redhat.com,
	rasmus-tUP8e6pgWdNlY7y4Fx5NiA@public.gmane.org,
	linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] NFSD: Don't hold unrefcounted creds over call to nfsd_setuser()
Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2009 16:39:37 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090702203937.GA10504@fieldses.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20090702133532.28297.89635.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>

On Thu, Jul 02, 2009 at 02:35:32PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
> nfsd_open() gets an unrefcounted pointer to the current process's effective
> credentials at the top of the function, then calls nfsd_setuser() via
> fh_verify() - which may replace and destroy the current process's effective
> credentials - and then passes the unrefcounted pointer to dentry_open() - but
> the credentials may have been destroyed by this point.
> 
> Instead, the value from current_cred() should be passed directly to
> dentry_open() as one of its arguments, rather than being cached in a variable.

Got it, thanks.  How easy is it to hit this case?  (Just wondering
whether to submit for stable.)

--b.

> 
> Possibly fh_verify() should return the creds to use.
> 
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> ---
> 
>  fs/nfsd/vfs.c |    3 +--
>  1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> 
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> index 4145083..23341c1 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> @@ -678,7 +678,6 @@ __be32
>  nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type,
>  			int access, struct file **filp)
>  {
> -	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
>  	struct dentry	*dentry;
>  	struct inode	*inode;
>  	int		flags = O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE;
> @@ -733,7 +732,7 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type,
>  		vfs_dq_init(inode);
>  	}
>  	*filp = dentry_open(dget(dentry), mntget(fhp->fh_export->ex_path.mnt),
> -			    flags, cred);
> +			    flags, current_cred());
>  	if (IS_ERR(*filp))
>  		host_err = PTR_ERR(*filp);
>  	else
> 

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: steved@redhat.com, rasmus@msconsult.dk,
	linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] NFSD: Don't hold unrefcounted creds over call to nfsd_setuser()
Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2009 16:39:37 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090702203937.GA10504@fieldses.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20090702133532.28297.89635.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On Thu, Jul 02, 2009 at 02:35:32PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
> nfsd_open() gets an unrefcounted pointer to the current process's effective
> credentials at the top of the function, then calls nfsd_setuser() via
> fh_verify() - which may replace and destroy the current process's effective
> credentials - and then passes the unrefcounted pointer to dentry_open() - but
> the credentials may have been destroyed by this point.
> 
> Instead, the value from current_cred() should be passed directly to
> dentry_open() as one of its arguments, rather than being cached in a variable.

Got it, thanks.  How easy is it to hit this case?  (Just wondering
whether to submit for stable.)

--b.

> 
> Possibly fh_verify() should return the creds to use.
> 
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> ---
> 
>  fs/nfsd/vfs.c |    3 +--
>  1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> 
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> index 4145083..23341c1 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> @@ -678,7 +678,6 @@ __be32
>  nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type,
>  			int access, struct file **filp)
>  {
> -	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
>  	struct dentry	*dentry;
>  	struct inode	*inode;
>  	int		flags = O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE;
> @@ -733,7 +732,7 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type,
>  		vfs_dq_init(inode);
>  	}
>  	*filp = dentry_open(dget(dentry), mntget(fhp->fh_export->ex_path.mnt),
> -			    flags, cred);
> +			    flags, current_cred());
>  	if (IS_ERR(*filp))
>  		host_err = PTR_ERR(*filp);
>  	else
> 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2009-07-02 20:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-07-02 13:35 [PATCH] NFSD: Don't hold unrefcounted creds over call to nfsd_setuser() David Howells
2009-07-02 13:35 ` David Howells
     [not found] ` <20090702133532.28297.89635.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2009-07-02 13:59   ` Steve Dickson
2009-07-02 13:59     ` Steve Dickson
2009-07-02 20:39   ` J. Bruce Fields [this message]
2009-07-02 20:39     ` J. Bruce Fields
2009-07-02 21:31     ` David Howells
2009-07-02 21:31       ` David Howells
2009-07-02 23:09       ` J. Bruce Fields
2009-07-02 23:09         ` J. Bruce Fields
2009-07-03 14:22         ` J. Bruce Fields
2009-07-03 14:22           ` J. Bruce Fields
2009-07-03 14:41           ` David Howells
2009-07-03 14:41             ` David Howells
2009-07-03 15:47             ` J. Bruce Fields
2009-07-03 15:47               ` J. Bruce Fields

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