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From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>,
	Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: exec_id protection from bad child exit signals (was: Re: [PATCH 0/9] proc: protect /proc/<pid>/* files across execve)
Date: Sun, 11 Mar 2012 19:20:07 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120311182007.GA5601@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20120311103532.GA26980@openwall.com>

On 03/11, Solar Designer wrote:
>
> Actually, the original/historical purpose of the exec_id stuff was to
> protect privileged parent processes (those having done a SUID/SGID exec)
> from non-standard child exit signals, which could be set with clone().
> I think we may want to audit the current implementation and see if it
> still fully achieves the goal or maybe not (and fix it if not).

Funny that, I noticed this message only after I sent the question about
the current exec_id stuff.

> I include below pieces of the prototype implementation from
> linux-2.2.12-ow6.tar.gz released in 1999.

Perhaps I missed something, but ignoring the "cap_raised" issues, this
all is very simple. de_thread() should simply do:

	current->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;

	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
	list_for_each_entry(p, &current->children, sibling)
		p->exit_signal = SIGCHILD;
	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);

The only problem is CLONE_PARENT.

Oleg.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>,
	Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: Re: exec_id protection from bad child exit signals (was: Re: [PATCH 0/9] proc: protect /proc/<pid>/* files across execve)
Date: Sun, 11 Mar 2012 19:20:07 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120311182007.GA5601@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20120311103532.GA26980@openwall.com>

On 03/11, Solar Designer wrote:
>
> Actually, the original/historical purpose of the exec_id stuff was to
> protect privileged parent processes (those having done a SUID/SGID exec)
> from non-standard child exit signals, which could be set with clone().
> I think we may want to audit the current implementation and see if it
> still fully achieves the goal or maybe not (and fix it if not).

Funny that, I noticed this message only after I sent the question about
the current exec_id stuff.

> I include below pieces of the prototype implementation from
> linux-2.2.12-ow6.tar.gz released in 1999.

Perhaps I missed something, but ignoring the "cap_raised" issues, this
all is very simple. de_thread() should simply do:

	current->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;

	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
	list_for_each_entry(p, &current->children, sibling)
		p->exit_signal = SIGCHILD;
	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);

The only problem is CLONE_PARENT.

Oleg.

  reply	other threads:[~2012-03-11 18:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 102+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-03-10 23:25 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/9] proc: protect /proc/<pid>/* files across execve Djalal Harouni
2012-03-10 23:25 ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-10 23:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/9] exec: add a global execve counter Djalal Harouni
2012-03-10 23:25   ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-11  0:12   ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2012-03-11  0:12     ` Linus Torvalds
2012-03-11  0:36     ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2012-03-11  0:36       ` Linus Torvalds
2012-03-11  0:58       ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2012-03-11  0:58         ` Linus Torvalds
2012-03-11  8:24         ` [kernel-hardening] " Solar Designer
2012-03-11  8:24           ` Solar Designer
2012-03-11  9:56           ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2012-03-11  9:56             ` Ingo Molnar
2012-03-11 14:03       ` [kernel-hardening] " Alan Cox
2012-03-11 14:03         ` Alan Cox
2012-03-11 17:15         ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2012-03-11 17:15           ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-11  8:39     ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2012-03-11  8:39       ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-11  9:40     ` [kernel-hardening] " Solar Designer
2012-03-11  9:40       ` Solar Designer
2012-03-11 17:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-11 17:25     ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-11 17:49     ` [kernel-hardening] self_exec_id/parent_exec_id && CLONE_PARENT Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-11 17:49       ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-11 18:02       ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2012-03-11 18:02         ` Linus Torvalds
2012-03-11 18:37         ` [kernel-hardening] " richard -rw- weinberger
2012-03-11 18:37           ` richard -rw- weinberger
2012-03-11 18:39           ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-11 18:39             ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-14 18:55         ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/1] (Was: self_exec_id/parent_exec_id && CLONE_PARENT) Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-14 18:55           ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-14 18:55           ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/1] CLONE_PARENT shouldn't allow to set ->exit_signal Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-14 18:55             ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-18 18:25             ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2012-03-18 18:25               ` Linus Torvalds
2012-03-18 20:53               ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-18 20:53                 ` Oleg Nesterov
     [not found]           ` <20120314190939.GC14172@redhat.com>
2012-03-19 16:02             ` [PATCH 0/3] exec_id/exit_signal fixes Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-19 16:03               ` [PATCH 1/3] exit_signal: simplify the "we have changed execution domain" logic Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-19 16:03               ` [PATCH 2/3] exit_signal: fix the "parent has changed security " Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-19 16:04               ` [PATCH 3/3] exec: move de_thread()->setmax_mm_hiwater_rss() into exec_mmap() Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-11 22:48     ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/9] exec: add a global execve counter Linus Torvalds
2012-03-11 22:48       ` Linus Torvalds
2012-03-11 23:32       ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2012-03-11 23:32         ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-11 23:42         ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2012-03-11 23:42           ` Linus Torvalds
2012-03-12  0:25           ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2012-03-12  0:25             ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-12 10:11             ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2012-03-12 10:11               ` Linus Torvalds
2012-03-12 10:11               ` Linus Torvalds
2012-03-12 14:01               ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2012-03-12 14:01                 ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-12 14:01                 ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-11 23:36     ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2012-03-11 23:36       ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-12 14:34       ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-12 14:34         ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-10 23:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/9] proc: add proc_file_private struct to store private information Djalal Harouni
2012-03-10 23:25   ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-10 23:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/9] proc: new proc_exec_id_ok() helper function Djalal Harouni
2012-03-10 23:25   ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-10 23:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/9] proc: protect /proc/<pid>/* INF files from reader across execve Djalal Harouni
2012-03-10 23:25   ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-10 23:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/9] proc: add protection support for /proc/<pid>/* ONE files Djalal Harouni
2012-03-10 23:25   ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-10 23:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 6/9] proc: protect /proc/<pid>/* ONE files from reader across execve Djalal Harouni
2012-03-10 23:25   ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-10 23:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 7/9] proc: protect /proc/<pid>/{maps,smaps,numa_maps} Djalal Harouni
2012-03-10 23:25   ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-10 23:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 8/9] proc: protect /proc/<pid>/{environ,pagemap} across execve Djalal Harouni
2012-03-10 23:25   ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-11  8:05   ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexey Dobriyan
2012-03-11  8:05     ` Alexey Dobriyan
2012-03-11 17:01     ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2012-03-11 17:01       ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-10 23:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 9/9] proc: improve and clean up /proc/<pid>/mem protection Djalal Harouni
2012-03-10 23:25   ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-11  0:01 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 0/9] proc: protect /proc/<pid>/* files across execve Linus Torvalds
2012-03-11  0:01   ` Linus Torvalds
2012-03-11  0:27   ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2012-03-11  0:27     ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-11  8:46   ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2012-03-11  8:46     ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-11 10:35   ` [kernel-hardening] exec_id protection from bad child exit signals (was: Re: [PATCH 0/9] proc: protect /proc/<pid>/* files across execve) Solar Designer
2012-03-11 10:35     ` Solar Designer
2012-03-11 18:20     ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2012-03-11 18:20       ` Oleg Nesterov
2012-03-12 19:13 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 0/9] proc: protect /proc/<pid>/* files across execve Eric W. Biederman
2012-03-12 19:13   ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-03-12 20:44   ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2012-03-12 20:44     ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-12 21:47     ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2012-03-12 21:47       ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-03-12 22:41       ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2012-03-12 22:41         ` Djalal Harouni
2012-03-12 23:10         ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2012-03-12 23:10           ` Eric W. Biederman

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