From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality}
Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2013 18:20:55 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130826172054.GE27005@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <871u5gqtw3.fsf@xmission.com>
On Mon, Aug 26, 2013 at 09:49:48AM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> How does changing the permissions to S_IRUSR prevent someone from
> opening the file before, and reading the file after a suid exec?
>
> > This patch restores the old mode which was 0400
>
> Which seems to add no security whatsoever and obscure the fact that
> anyone who cares can read the file so what is the point?
Two words: "security sclerosis". Both patches NAKed, of course.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality}
Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2013 18:20:55 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130826172054.GE27005@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <871u5gqtw3.fsf@xmission.com>
On Mon, Aug 26, 2013 at 09:49:48AM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> How does changing the permissions to S_IRUSR prevent someone from
> opening the file before, and reading the file after a suid exec?
>
> > This patch restores the old mode which was 0400
>
> Which seems to add no security whatsoever and obscure the fact that
> anyone who cares can read the file so what is the point?
Two words: "security sclerosis". Both patches NAKed, of course.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-08-26 17:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-08-26 16:23 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality} Djalal Harouni
2013-08-26 16:23 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-08-26 16:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/pagemap Djalal Harouni
2013-08-26 16:24 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-08-26 16:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-26 16:50 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-26 16:49 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality} Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-26 16:49 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-26 17:20 ` Al Viro [this message]
2013-08-26 17:20 ` Al Viro
2013-08-27 17:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-08-27 17:24 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-08-28 20:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-08-28 20:11 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-08-28 20:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-08-28 20:49 ` Kees Cook
2013-08-28 21:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-08-28 21:11 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-08-29 0:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29 0:26 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29 0:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-08-29 0:30 ` Kees Cook
2013-08-29 1:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29 1:08 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29 3:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-08-29 3:33 ` Kees Cook
2013-08-29 7:42 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29 7:42 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29 9:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-08-29 9:11 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-08-29 22:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-08-29 22:14 ` Kees Cook
2013-08-31 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-08-31 20:26 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-09-01 1:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2013-09-01 1:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-09-01 15:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-09-01 15:04 ` Kees Cook
2013-09-12 1:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-09-12 1:23 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 0:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-10-04 0:41 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-04 0:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ryan Mallon
2013-10-04 0:53 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-08-26 20:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-08-26 20:34 ` Djalal Harouni
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20130826172054.GE27005@ZenIV.linux.org.uk \
--to=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
--cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=tixxdz@opendz.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.