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From: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>,
	Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality}
Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2013 10:11:27 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130829091127.GA2635@dztty> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87sixt735b.fsf@xmission.com>

Hi Eric,

On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 05:26:56PM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> 
> I have take a moment and read this thread, and have been completely
> unenlightend.  People are upset but it is totally unclear why.
> 
> There is no explanation why it is ok to ignore the suid-exec case, as
> the posted patches do.  Which ultimately means the patches provide
Please, did you take a look at the patches ?
-       INF("syscall",    S_IRUGO, proc_pid_syscall),
+       INF("syscall",    S_IRUSR, proc_pid_syscall),

Can you please tell me how did you come to the conclusion that the
patches "ignore the suid-exec case as the posted patches do" ?

I just did s/0444/0400/ which is pretty obvious and did not remove
that ptrace check at read() added by Al.

> little to no security benefit, and that the posted patches as written
> are broken.
They are correct. Perhaps you didn't take a closer look

Thanks Eric

-- 
Djalal Harouni
http://opendz.org

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>,
	Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality}
Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2013 10:11:27 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130829091127.GA2635@dztty> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87sixt735b.fsf@xmission.com>

Hi Eric,

On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 05:26:56PM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> 
> I have take a moment and read this thread, and have been completely
> unenlightend.  People are upset but it is totally unclear why.
> 
> There is no explanation why it is ok to ignore the suid-exec case, as
> the posted patches do.  Which ultimately means the patches provide
Please, did you take a look at the patches ?
-       INF("syscall",    S_IRUGO, proc_pid_syscall),
+       INF("syscall",    S_IRUSR, proc_pid_syscall),

Can you please tell me how did you come to the conclusion that the
patches "ignore the suid-exec case as the posted patches do" ?

I just did s/0444/0400/ which is pretty obvious and did not remove
that ptrace check at read() added by Al.

> little to no security benefit, and that the posted patches as written
> are broken.
They are correct. Perhaps you didn't take a closer look

Thanks Eric

-- 
Djalal Harouni
http://opendz.org

  parent reply	other threads:[~2013-08-29  9:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-08-26 16:23 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality} Djalal Harouni
2013-08-26 16:23 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-08-26 16:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/pagemap Djalal Harouni
2013-08-26 16:24   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-08-26 16:50   ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-26 16:50     ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-26 16:49 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality} Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-26 16:49   ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-26 17:20   ` [kernel-hardening] " Al Viro
2013-08-26 17:20     ` Al Viro
2013-08-27 17:24     ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-08-27 17:24       ` Djalal Harouni
2013-08-28 20:11       ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-08-28 20:11         ` Djalal Harouni
2013-08-28 20:49         ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-08-28 20:49           ` Kees Cook
2013-08-28 21:11           ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-08-28 21:11             ` Djalal Harouni
2013-08-29  0:26             ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29  0:26               ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29  0:30               ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-08-29  0:30                 ` Kees Cook
2013-08-29  1:08                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29  1:08                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29  3:33                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-08-29  3:33                     ` Kees Cook
2013-08-29  7:42                     ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29  7:42                       ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29  9:11               ` Djalal Harouni [this message]
2013-08-29  9:11                 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-08-29 22:14                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-08-29 22:14                   ` Kees Cook
2013-08-31 20:26                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-08-31 20:26                     ` Djalal Harouni
2013-09-01  1:44                     ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2013-09-01  1:44                       ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-09-01 15:04                       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-09-01 15:04                         ` Kees Cook
2013-09-12  1:23                       ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-09-12  1:23                         ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04  0:41           ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-10-04  0:41             ` Kees Cook
2013-10-04  0:53             ` [kernel-hardening] " Ryan Mallon
2013-10-04  0:53               ` Ryan Mallon
2013-08-26 20:34   ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-08-26 20:34     ` Djalal Harouni

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