From: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2013 10:05:38 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20131004090538.GB2157@dztty> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20131003061244.GC25345@gmail.com>
On Thu, Oct 03, 2013 at 08:12:44AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> So please first get consensus on this fundamental design question before
> spreading your solution to more areas.
Check file_ns_capable() added in commit 935d8aabd4331 by Linus
Add file_ns_capable() helper function for open-time capability checking
commit 6708075f104c3c9b0 by Eric,
userns: Don't let unprivileged users trick privileged users into setting
the id_map
So they add file_ns_capable() to inspect file->f_cred during ->write()
The difference between the function I've added proc_allow_access() and
file_ns_capable() is that proc_allow_access() will check if it's
absolutely the same user, otherwise fallback to security_capable() which
is the heart of file_ns_capable()
So it's already been done and proposed! this is an easy solution to
detect if current's cred have changed.
> Thanks,
>
> Ingo
--
Djalal Harouni
http://opendz.org
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2013 10:05:38 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20131004090538.GB2157@dztty> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20131003061244.GC25345@gmail.com>
On Thu, Oct 03, 2013 at 08:12:44AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> So please first get consensus on this fundamental design question before
> spreading your solution to more areas.
Check file_ns_capable() added in commit 935d8aabd4331 by Linus
Add file_ns_capable() helper function for open-time capability checking
commit 6708075f104c3c9b0 by Eric,
userns: Don't let unprivileged users trick privileged users into setting
the id_map
So they add file_ns_capable() to inspect file->f_cred during ->write()
The difference between the function I've added proc_allow_access() and
file_ns_capable() is that proc_allow_access() will check if it's
absolutely the same user, otherwise fallback to security_capable() which
is the heart of file_ns_capable()
So it's already been done and proposed! this is an easy solution to
detect if current's cred have changed.
> Thanks,
>
> Ingo
--
Djalal Harouni
http://opendz.org
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-10-04 9:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 136+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-10-01 20:26 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/9] procfs: add proc_same_open_cred() to check if the cred have changed Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 1:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 1:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 14:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 14:55 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 16:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 16:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 14:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 14:36 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 15:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 15:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 19:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 19:29 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 19:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 19:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 20:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 20:13 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 21:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 21:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 8:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 8:59 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 15:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 15:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 18:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 18:23 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 18:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 18:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 19:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 19:11 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 19:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 19:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 19:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 19:27 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 19:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 19:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 19:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 19:41 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 22:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 22:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 22:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-04 22:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-04 22:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 22:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 23:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 23:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-05 0:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-05 0:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-09 10:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-09 10:35 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-05 13:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-05 13:23 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-07 21:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-07 21:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-09 10:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-09 10:54 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-09 11:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-09 11:15 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-09 17:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-09 17:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-13 10:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-13 10:18 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/9] procfs: Document the proposed solution to protect procfs entries Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 4/9] procfs: make /proc/*/{stack,syscall} 0400 Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 5/9] procfs: make /proc entries that use seq files able to access file->f_cred Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 6/9] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/stat Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 1:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 1:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 15:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 15:14 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 16:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 16:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 19:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 19:00 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 7/9] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/personality Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 8/9] procfs: improve permission checks on /proc/*/stack Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 9/9] procfs: improve permission checks on /proc/*/syscall Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 1:40 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 1:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 14:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 14:37 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 16:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 16:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 17:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-10-02 17:48 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-02 18:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 18:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 18:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-10-02 18:07 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-03 23:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Julien Tinnes
2013-10-03 23:14 ` Julien Tinnes
2013-10-02 18:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:26 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:41 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:22 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-10-02 18:35 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-02 18:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:48 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 19:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-10-02 19:43 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-03 6:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2013-10-03 6:12 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-10-03 12:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 12:29 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 15:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 15:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 15:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 15:40 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 15:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 15:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 18:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 18:37 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 9:05 ` Djalal Harouni [this message]
2013-10-04 9:05 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:12 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 6:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2013-10-03 6:22 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-10-03 12:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 12:56 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 13:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2013-10-03 13:39 ` Ingo Molnar
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