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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, tixxdz@gmail.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred
Date: Tue, 01 Oct 2013 18:40:41 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <524B7999.60806@amacapital.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1380659178-28605-1-git-send-email-tixxdz@opendz.org>

On 10/01/2013 01:26 PM, Djalal Harouni wrote:
> /proc/<pid>/* entries varies at runtime, appropriate permission checks
> need to happen during each system call.
> 
> Currently some of these sensitive entries are protected by performing
> the ptrace_may_access() check. However even with that the /proc file
> descriptors can be passed to a more privileged process
> (e.g. a suid-exec) which will pass the classic ptrace_may_access()
> check. In general the ->open() call will be issued by an unprivileged
> process while the ->read(),->write() calls by a more privileged one.
> 
> Example of these files are:
> /proc/*/syscall, /proc/*/stack etc.
> 
> And any open(/proc/self/*) then suid-exec to read()/write() /proc/self/*
> 
> 
> These files are protected during read() by the ptrace_may_access(),
> however the file descriptor can be passed to a suid-exec which can be
> used to read data and bypass ASLR. Of course this was discussed several
> times on LKML.

Can you elaborate on what it is that you're fixing?  That is, can you
give a concrete example of what process opens what file and passes the
fd to what process?

I'm having trouble following your description.

--Andy

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, tixxdz@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred
Date: Tue, 01 Oct 2013 18:40:41 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <524B7999.60806@amacapital.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1380659178-28605-1-git-send-email-tixxdz@opendz.org>

On 10/01/2013 01:26 PM, Djalal Harouni wrote:
> /proc/<pid>/* entries varies at runtime, appropriate permission checks
> need to happen during each system call.
> 
> Currently some of these sensitive entries are protected by performing
> the ptrace_may_access() check. However even with that the /proc file
> descriptors can be passed to a more privileged process
> (e.g. a suid-exec) which will pass the classic ptrace_may_access()
> check. In general the ->open() call will be issued by an unprivileged
> process while the ->read(),->write() calls by a more privileged one.
> 
> Example of these files are:
> /proc/*/syscall, /proc/*/stack etc.
> 
> And any open(/proc/self/*) then suid-exec to read()/write() /proc/self/*
> 
> 
> These files are protected during read() by the ptrace_may_access(),
> however the file descriptor can be passed to a suid-exec which can be
> used to read data and bypass ASLR. Of course this was discussed several
> times on LKML.

Can you elaborate on what it is that you're fixing?  That is, can you
give a concrete example of what process opens what file and passes the
fd to what process?

I'm having trouble following your description.

--Andy

  parent reply	other threads:[~2013-10-02  1:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 136+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-10-01 20:26 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/9] procfs: add proc_same_open_cred() to check if the cred have changed Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02  1:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02  1:36     ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 14:55     ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 14:55       ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 16:44       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 16:44         ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 14:36         ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 14:36           ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 15:12           ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 15:12             ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 19:29             ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 19:29               ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 19:37               ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 19:37                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 20:13                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 20:13                   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 21:09                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 21:09                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04  8:59                     ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04  8:59                       ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 15:40                       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 15:40                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 18:23                         ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 18:23                           ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 18:34                           ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 18:34                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 19:11                             ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 19:11                               ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 19:16                               ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 19:16                                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 19:27                                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 19:27                                   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 19:32                                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 19:32                                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 19:41                                     ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 19:41                                       ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 22:17                                       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 22:17                                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 22:55                                         ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-04 22:55                                           ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-04 22:59                                           ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 22:59                                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 23:08                                             ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 23:08                                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-05  0:35                                             ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-05  0:35                                               ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-09 10:35                                               ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-09 10:35                                                 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-05 13:23                                         ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-05 13:23                                           ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-07 21:41                                           ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-07 21:41                                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-09 10:54                                             ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-09 10:54                                               ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-09 11:15                                               ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-09 11:15                                                 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-09 17:27                                               ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-09 17:27                                                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-13 10:18                                                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-13 10:18                                                   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/9] procfs: Document the proposed solution to protect procfs entries Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 4/9] procfs: make /proc/*/{stack,syscall} 0400 Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 5/9] procfs: make /proc entries that use seq files able to access file->f_cred Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 6/9] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/stat Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02  1:39   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02  1:39     ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 15:14     ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 15:14       ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 16:46       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 16:46         ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 19:00         ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 19:00           ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 7/9] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/personality Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 8/9] procfs: improve permission checks on /proc/*/stack Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 9/9] procfs: improve permission checks on /proc/*/syscall Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02  1:40 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2013-10-02  1:40   ` [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 14:37   ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 14:37     ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 16:51     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 16:51       ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 17:48       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-10-02 17:48         ` Kees Cook
2013-10-02 18:00         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 18:00           ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 18:07           ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-10-02 18:07             ` Kees Cook
2013-10-03 23:14             ` [kernel-hardening] " Julien Tinnes
2013-10-03 23:14               ` Julien Tinnes
2013-10-02 18:26           ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:26             ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:41             ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:41               ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:22         ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:22           ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:35           ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-10-02 18:35             ` Kees Cook
2013-10-02 18:48             ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:48               ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 19:43               ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-10-02 19:43                 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-03  6:12               ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2013-10-03  6:12                 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-10-03 12:29                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 12:29                   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 15:15                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 15:15                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 15:40                     ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 15:40                       ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 15:50                       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 15:50                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 18:37                         ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 18:37                           ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04  9:05                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04  9:05                   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:12       ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:12         ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03  6:22         ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2013-10-03  6:22           ` Ingo Molnar
2013-10-03 12:56           ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 12:56             ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 13:39             ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2013-10-03 13:39               ` Ingo Molnar

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