From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Karol Lewandowski <k.lewandowsk@samsung.com>,
Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>, Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>,
Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>,
John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
"dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org"
<dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>,
"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create()
Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2014 16:32:46 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140410203246.GB31614@thunk.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5346ED93.9040500@amacapital.net>
On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 12:14:27PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
> This is the second time in a week that someone has asked for a way to
> have a struct file (or struct inode or whatever) that can't be reopened
> through /proc/pid/fd. This should be quite easy to implement as a
> separate feature.
What I suggested on a different thread was to add the following new
file descriptor flags, to join FD_CLOEXEC, which would be maniuplated
using the F_GETFD and F_SETFD fcntl commands:
FD_NOPROCFS disallow being able to open the inode via /proc/<pid>/fd
FD_NOPASSFD disallow being able to pass the fd via a unix domain socket
FD_LOCKFLAGS if this bit is set, disallow any further changes of FD_CLOEXEC,
FD_NOPROCFS, FD_NOPASSFD, and FD_LOCKFLAGS flags.
Regardless of what else we might need to meet the use case for the
proposed File Sealing API, I think this is a useful feature that could
be used in many other contexts besides just the proposed
memfd_create() use case.
Cheers,
- Ted
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Karol Lewandowski <k.lewandowsk@samsung.com>,
Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>, Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>,
Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>,
John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
"dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org"
<dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>,
"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create()
Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2014 16:32:46 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140410203246.GB31614@thunk.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5346ED93.9040500@amacapital.net>
On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 12:14:27PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
> This is the second time in a week that someone has asked for a way to
> have a struct file (or struct inode or whatever) that can't be reopened
> through /proc/pid/fd. This should be quite easy to implement as a
> separate feature.
What I suggested on a different thread was to add the following new
file descriptor flags, to join FD_CLOEXEC, which would be maniuplated
using the F_GETFD and F_SETFD fcntl commands:
FD_NOPROCFS disallow being able to open the inode via /proc/<pid>/fd
FD_NOPASSFD disallow being able to pass the fd via a unix domain socket
FD_LOCKFLAGS if this bit is set, disallow any further changes of FD_CLOEXEC,
FD_NOPROCFS, FD_NOPASSFD, and FD_LOCKFLAGS flags.
Regardless of what else we might need to meet the use case for the
proposed File Sealing API, I think this is a useful feature that could
be used in many other contexts besides just the proposed
memfd_create() use case.
Cheers,
- Ted
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-04-10 20:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-03-19 19:06 [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create() David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH 1/6] fs: fix i_writecount on shmem and friends David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH 2/6] shm: add sealing API David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH 3/6] shm: add memfd_create() syscall David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 8:47 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2014-03-20 8:47 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2014-03-20 9:01 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2014-03-20 9:01 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2014-03-20 11:29 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 11:29 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 11:29 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 11:29 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 11:50 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2014-03-20 11:50 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2014-03-20 19:22 ` John Stultz
2014-03-20 19:22 ` John Stultz
2014-04-02 13:38 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2014-04-02 13:38 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2014-04-02 14:18 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-02 14:18 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-02 14:52 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2014-04-02 14:52 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2014-04-02 14:52 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2014-04-10 19:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 19:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH 4/6] selftests: add memfd_create() + sealing tests David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH man-pages 5/6] fcntl.2: document SHMEM_SET/GET_SEALS commands David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH man-pages 6/6] memfd_create.2: add memfd_create() man-page David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 2:55 ` [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-03-20 2:55 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-03-20 2:55 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-03-20 2:55 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-03-20 3:49 ` Linus Torvalds
2014-03-20 3:49 ` Linus Torvalds
2014-03-20 8:07 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 8:07 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 8:07 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 8:07 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 14:41 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 14:41 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 14:41 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 15:12 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 15:12 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 15:12 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 15:12 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 15:26 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 15:26 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 15:26 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 15:32 ` tytso
2014-03-20 15:32 ` tytso
2014-03-20 15:39 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 15:48 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 15:48 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 16:38 ` tytso
2014-03-20 16:38 ` tytso
2014-04-10 19:14 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 19:14 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 20:32 ` Theodore Ts'o [this message]
2014-04-10 20:32 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-04-10 20:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 20:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 20:49 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 20:49 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 21:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 21:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 22:57 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 22:57 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 22:57 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 22:57 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 23:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 23:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 23:16 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 23:16 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 23:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 23:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-20 15:03 ` Pavel Machek
2014-04-20 15:03 ` Pavel Machek
2014-06-17 9:48 ` Florian Weimer
2014-06-17 9:48 ` Florian Weimer
2014-06-17 9:48 ` Florian Weimer
2014-06-17 9:48 ` Florian Weimer
2014-06-17 16:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 14:45 ` Colin Walters
2014-04-10 14:45 ` Colin Walters
2014-04-10 19:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 19:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 19:45 ` Colin Walters
2014-04-10 19:45 ` Colin Walters
2014-04-11 6:09 ` Alex Elsayed
2014-04-11 6:09 ` Alex Elsayed
2014-04-08 13:00 ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-08 13:00 ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-09 21:31 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-09 21:31 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-22 9:10 ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-22 9:10 ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-22 11:55 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-22 11:55 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-22 12:44 ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-22 12:44 ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-22 12:55 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-22 12:55 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 19:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 19:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
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