From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Karol Lewandowski <k.lewandowsk@samsung.com>,
Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>, Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>,
Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>,
John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
"dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org"
<dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Ryan
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create()
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 11:48:11 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <53A00EDB.3050108@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrVmaGNCxo-L4-dPbUev3VXXEPR7xBzo3Fux6ny7yh_Gzw@mail.gmail.com>
On 04/10/2014 10:37 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> It occurs to me that, before going nuts with these kinds of flags, it
> may pay to just try to fix the /proc/self/fd issue for real -- we
> could just make open("/proc/self/fd/3", O_RDWR) fail if fd 3 is
> read-only. That may be enough for the file sealing thing.
Increasing privilege on O_PATH descriptors via access through
/proc/self/fd is part of the userspace API. The same thing might be
true for O_RDONLY descriptors, but it's a bit less likely that there are
any users out there. In any case, I'm not sure it makes sense to plug
the O_RDONLY hole while leaving the O_PATH hole open.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Karol Lewandowski <k.lewandowsk@samsung.com>,
Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>, Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>,
Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>,
John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
"dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org"
<dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Ryan Lo
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create()
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 11:48:11 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <53A00EDB.3050108@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrVmaGNCxo-L4-dPbUev3VXXEPR7xBzo3Fux6ny7yh_Gzw@mail.gmail.com>
On 04/10/2014 10:37 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> It occurs to me that, before going nuts with these kinds of flags, it
> may pay to just try to fix the /proc/self/fd issue for real -- we
> could just make open("/proc/self/fd/3", O_RDWR) fail if fd 3 is
> read-only. That may be enough for the file sealing thing.
Increasing privilege on O_PATH descriptors via access through
/proc/self/fd is part of the userspace API. The same thing might be
true for O_RDONLY descriptors, but it's a bit less likely that there are
any users out there. In any case, I'm not sure it makes sense to plug
the O_RDONLY hole while leaving the O_PATH hole open.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Karol Lewandowski <k.lewandowsk@samsung.com>,
Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>, Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>,
Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>,
John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
"dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org"
<dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>,
"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create()
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 11:48:11 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <53A00EDB.3050108@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrVmaGNCxo-L4-dPbUev3VXXEPR7xBzo3Fux6ny7yh_Gzw@mail.gmail.com>
On 04/10/2014 10:37 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> It occurs to me that, before going nuts with these kinds of flags, it
> may pay to just try to fix the /proc/self/fd issue for real -- we
> could just make open("/proc/self/fd/3", O_RDWR) fail if fd 3 is
> read-only. That may be enough for the file sealing thing.
Increasing privilege on O_PATH descriptors via access through
/proc/self/fd is part of the userspace API. The same thing might be
true for O_RDONLY descriptors, but it's a bit less likely that there are
any users out there. In any case, I'm not sure it makes sense to plug
the O_RDONLY hole while leaving the O_PATH hole open.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Karol Lewandowski <k.lewandowsk@samsung.com>,
Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>, Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>,
Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>,
John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
"dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org"
<dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>,
"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create()
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 11:48:11 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <53A00EDB.3050108@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrVmaGNCxo-L4-dPbUev3VXXEPR7xBzo3Fux6ny7yh_Gzw@mail.gmail.com>
On 04/10/2014 10:37 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> It occurs to me that, before going nuts with these kinds of flags, it
> may pay to just try to fix the /proc/self/fd issue for real -- we
> could just make open("/proc/self/fd/3", O_RDWR) fail if fd 3 is
> read-only. That may be enough for the file sealing thing.
Increasing privilege on O_PATH descriptors via access through
/proc/self/fd is part of the userspace API. The same thing might be
true for O_RDONLY descriptors, but it's a bit less likely that there are
any users out there. In any case, I'm not sure it makes sense to plug
the O_RDONLY hole while leaving the O_PATH hole open.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-06-17 9:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-03-19 19:06 [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create() David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH 1/6] fs: fix i_writecount on shmem and friends David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH 2/6] shm: add sealing API David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH 3/6] shm: add memfd_create() syscall David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 8:47 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2014-03-20 8:47 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2014-03-20 9:01 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2014-03-20 9:01 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2014-03-20 11:29 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 11:29 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 11:29 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 11:29 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 11:50 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2014-03-20 11:50 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2014-03-20 19:22 ` John Stultz
2014-03-20 19:22 ` John Stultz
2014-04-02 13:38 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2014-04-02 13:38 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2014-04-02 14:18 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-02 14:18 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-02 14:52 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2014-04-02 14:52 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2014-04-02 14:52 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2014-04-10 19:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 19:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH 4/6] selftests: add memfd_create() + sealing tests David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH man-pages 5/6] fcntl.2: document SHMEM_SET/GET_SEALS commands David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH man-pages 6/6] memfd_create.2: add memfd_create() man-page David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 2:55 ` [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-03-20 2:55 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-03-20 2:55 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-03-20 2:55 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-03-20 3:49 ` Linus Torvalds
2014-03-20 3:49 ` Linus Torvalds
2014-03-20 8:07 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 8:07 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 8:07 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 8:07 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 14:41 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 14:41 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 14:41 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 15:12 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 15:12 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 15:12 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 15:12 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 15:26 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 15:26 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 15:26 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 15:32 ` tytso
2014-03-20 15:32 ` tytso
2014-03-20 15:39 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 15:48 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 15:48 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 16:38 ` tytso
2014-03-20 16:38 ` tytso
2014-04-10 19:14 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 19:14 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 20:32 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-04-10 20:32 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-04-10 20:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 20:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 20:49 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 20:49 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 21:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 21:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 22:57 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 22:57 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 22:57 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 22:57 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 23:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 23:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 23:16 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 23:16 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 23:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 23:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-20 15:03 ` Pavel Machek
2014-04-20 15:03 ` Pavel Machek
2014-06-17 9:48 ` Florian Weimer [this message]
2014-06-17 9:48 ` Florian Weimer
2014-06-17 9:48 ` Florian Weimer
2014-06-17 9:48 ` Florian Weimer
2014-06-17 16:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 14:45 ` Colin Walters
2014-04-10 14:45 ` Colin Walters
2014-04-10 19:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 19:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 19:45 ` Colin Walters
2014-04-10 19:45 ` Colin Walters
2014-04-11 6:09 ` Alex Elsayed
2014-04-11 6:09 ` Alex Elsayed
2014-04-08 13:00 ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-08 13:00 ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-09 21:31 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-09 21:31 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-22 9:10 ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-22 9:10 ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-22 11:55 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-22 11:55 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-22 12:44 ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-22 12:44 ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-22 12:55 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-22 12:55 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 19:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 19:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
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