Re: [PATCH net-next 1/2] bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs

[Ingo Molnar <mingo-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>]

* Alexei Starovoitov <ast-uqk4Ao+rVK5Wk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org> wrote:

> As far as sysctl we can look at two with similar purpose:
> sysctl_perf_event_paranoid and modules_disabled.
> First one is indeed multi level, but not because of the fear of bugs,
> but because of real security implications.

It serves both purposes flexibly, and note that most people and distros will use 
the default value.

> [...] Like raw events on hyperthreaded cpu or uncore events can extract data 
> from other user processes. So it controls these extra privileges.

It also controls the generally increased risk caused by a larger attack surface, 
which some users may not want to carry and which they can thus shrink.

With a static keys approach there would be no runtime overhead worth speaking of, 
so I see no reason why unprivileged eBPF couldn't have a sysctl too - with the 
default value set to permissive.

Thanks,

	Ingo