Re: [PATCH net-next 1/2] bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs

[Alexei Starovoitov <ast-uqk4Ao+rVK5Wk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>]

On 10/5/15 3:14 PM, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> One scenario that comes to mind ... what happens when there are kernel
> pointers stored in skb->cb[] (either from the current layer or an old
> one from a different layer that the skb went through previously, but
> which did not get overwritten)?
>
> Socket filters could read a portion of skb->cb[] also when unprived and
> leak that out through maps. I think the verifier doesn't catch that,
> right?

grrr. indeed. previous layer before sk_filter() can leave junk in there.
Would need to disable cb[0-5] for unpriv, but that will make tail_call
much harder to use, since cb[0-5] is a way to pass arguments from
one prog to another and clearing them is not an option, since it's
too expensive. Like samples/bpf/sockex3_kern.c usage of cb[0]
won't work anymore. I guess that's the price of unpriv.
Will fix this, add few tail_call specific tests and respin.
Please keep poking.