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From: David Brown <david.brown@linaro.org>
To: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	x86@kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] ARM: vdso: Mark vDSO code as read-only
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2016 14:36:59 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160216213659.GA47194@davidb.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1453226922-16831-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

Although the arm vDSO is cleanly separated by code/data with the code
being read-only in userspace mappings, the code page is still writable
from the kernel.  There have been exploits (such as
http://itszn.com/blog/?p=21) that take advantage of this on x86 to go
from a bad kernel write to full root.

Prevent this specific exploit on arm by putting the vDSO code page in
post-init read-only memory as well.

Before:
vdso: 1 text pages at base 80927000
root@Vexpress:/ cat /sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables
---[ Modules ]---
---[ Kernel Mapping ]---
0x80000000-0x80100000           1M     RW NX SHD
0x80100000-0x80600000           5M     ro x  SHD
0x80600000-0x80800000           2M     ro NX SHD
0x80800000-0xbe000000         984M     RW NX SHD

After:
vdso: 1 text pages at base 8072b000
root@Vexpress:/ cat /sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables
---[ Modules ]---
---[ Kernel Mapping ]---
0x80000000-0x80100000           1M     RW NX SHD
0x80100000-0x80600000           5M     ro x  SHD
0x80600000-0x80800000           2M     ro NX SHD
0x80800000-0xbe000000         984M     RW NX SHD

Inspired by https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/1/19/494 based on work by the
PaX Team, Brad Spengler, and Kees Cook.

Signed-off-by: David Brown <david.brown@linaro.org>
---
This patch depends on Kees Cook's series
https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/1/19/497 which adds the ro_after_init
section.

 arch/arm/vdso/vdso.S | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/vdso/vdso.S b/arch/arm/vdso/vdso.S
index b2b97e3..a62a7b6 100644
--- a/arch/arm/vdso/vdso.S
+++ b/arch/arm/vdso/vdso.S
@@ -23,9 +23,8 @@
 #include <linux/const.h>
 #include <asm/page.h>
 
-	__PAGE_ALIGNED_DATA
-
 	.globl vdso_start, vdso_end
+	.section .data..ro_after_init
 	.balign PAGE_SIZE
 vdso_start:
 	.incbin "arch/arm/vdso/vdso.so"
-- 
2.7.1

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Brown <david.brown@linaro.org>
To: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	x86@kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH] ARM: vdso: Mark vDSO code as read-only
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2016 14:36:59 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160216213659.GA47194@davidb.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1453226922-16831-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

Although the arm vDSO is cleanly separated by code/data with the code
being read-only in userspace mappings, the code page is still writable
from the kernel.  There have been exploits (such as
http://itszn.com/blog/?p=21) that take advantage of this on x86 to go
from a bad kernel write to full root.

Prevent this specific exploit on arm by putting the vDSO code page in
post-init read-only memory as well.

Before:
vdso: 1 text pages at base 80927000
root@Vexpress:/ cat /sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables
---[ Modules ]---
---[ Kernel Mapping ]---
0x80000000-0x80100000           1M     RW NX SHD
0x80100000-0x80600000           5M     ro x  SHD
0x80600000-0x80800000           2M     ro NX SHD
0x80800000-0xbe000000         984M     RW NX SHD

After:
vdso: 1 text pages at base 8072b000
root@Vexpress:/ cat /sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables
---[ Modules ]---
---[ Kernel Mapping ]---
0x80000000-0x80100000           1M     RW NX SHD
0x80100000-0x80600000           5M     ro x  SHD
0x80600000-0x80800000           2M     ro NX SHD
0x80800000-0xbe000000         984M     RW NX SHD

Inspired by https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/1/19/494 based on work by the
PaX Team, Brad Spengler, and Kees Cook.

Signed-off-by: David Brown <david.brown@linaro.org>
---
This patch depends on Kees Cook's series
https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/1/19/497 which adds the ro_after_init
section.

 arch/arm/vdso/vdso.S | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/vdso/vdso.S b/arch/arm/vdso/vdso.S
index b2b97e3..a62a7b6 100644
--- a/arch/arm/vdso/vdso.S
+++ b/arch/arm/vdso/vdso.S
@@ -23,9 +23,8 @@
 #include <linux/const.h>
 #include <asm/page.h>
 
-	__PAGE_ALIGNED_DATA
-
 	.globl vdso_start, vdso_end
+	.section .data..ro_after_init
 	.balign PAGE_SIZE
 vdso_start:
 	.incbin "arch/arm/vdso/vdso.so"
-- 
2.7.1

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: david.brown@linaro.org (David Brown)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH] ARM: vdso: Mark vDSO code as read-only
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2016 14:36:59 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160216213659.GA47194@davidb.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1453226922-16831-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

Although the arm vDSO is cleanly separated by code/data with the code
being read-only in userspace mappings, the code page is still writable
from the kernel.  There have been exploits (such as
http://itszn.com/blog/?p=21) that take advantage of this on x86 to go
from a bad kernel write to full root.

Prevent this specific exploit on arm by putting the vDSO code page in
post-init read-only memory as well.

Before:
vdso: 1 text pages at base 80927000
root at Vexpress:/ cat /sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables
---[ Modules ]---
---[ Kernel Mapping ]---
0x80000000-0x80100000           1M     RW NX SHD
0x80100000-0x80600000           5M     ro x  SHD
0x80600000-0x80800000           2M     ro NX SHD
0x80800000-0xbe000000         984M     RW NX SHD

After:
vdso: 1 text pages at base 8072b000
root at Vexpress:/ cat /sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables
---[ Modules ]---
---[ Kernel Mapping ]---
0x80000000-0x80100000           1M     RW NX SHD
0x80100000-0x80600000           5M     ro x  SHD
0x80600000-0x80800000           2M     ro NX SHD
0x80800000-0xbe000000         984M     RW NX SHD

Inspired by https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/1/19/494 based on work by the
PaX Team, Brad Spengler, and Kees Cook.

Signed-off-by: David Brown <david.brown@linaro.org>
---
This patch depends on Kees Cook's series
https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/1/19/497 which adds the ro_after_init
section.

 arch/arm/vdso/vdso.S | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/vdso/vdso.S b/arch/arm/vdso/vdso.S
index b2b97e3..a62a7b6 100644
--- a/arch/arm/vdso/vdso.S
+++ b/arch/arm/vdso/vdso.S
@@ -23,9 +23,8 @@
 #include <linux/const.h>
 #include <asm/page.h>
 
-	__PAGE_ALIGNED_DATA
-
 	.globl vdso_start, vdso_end
+	.section .data..ro_after_init
 	.balign PAGE_SIZE
 vdso_start:
 	.incbin "arch/arm/vdso/vdso.so"
-- 
2.7.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-02-16 21:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 86+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-01-19 18:08 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/8] introduce post-init read-only memory Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 1/8] asm-generic: consolidate mark_rodata_ro() Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08   ` Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 2/8] lib: add "on" and "off" to strtobool Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08   ` Kees Cook
2016-01-20  2:09   ` [kernel-hardening] " Joe Perches
2016-01-20  2:09     ` Joe Perches
2016-01-22 23:29     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-22 23:29       ` Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 3/8] param: convert some "on"/"off" users " Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08   ` Kees Cook
2016-01-27 21:11   ` [kernel-hardening] " David Brown
2016-01-27 21:11     ` David Brown
2016-01-27 21:19     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-28  0:09       ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] arm64: make CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA non-optional David Brown
2016-01-28  0:09         ` David Brown
2016-01-28  0:09         ` David Brown
2016-01-28  0:09         ` David Brown
2016-01-28  0:09         ` David Brown
2016-01-28  0:14         ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-28  0:14           ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28  0:14           ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28  0:14           ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28  8:20           ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel
2016-01-28  8:20             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-01-28  8:20             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-01-28  8:20             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-01-28 11:06         ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-01-28 11:06           ` Mark Rutland
2016-01-28 11:06           ` Mark Rutland
2016-01-28 11:06           ` Mark Rutland
2016-01-28 14:06           ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-28 14:06             ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28 14:06             ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28 14:06             ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28 14:59             ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-01-28 14:59               ` Mark Rutland
2016-01-28 14:59               ` Mark Rutland
2016-01-28 14:59               ` Mark Rutland
2016-01-28 15:17               ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-28 15:17                 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28 15:17                 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28 15:17                 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 4/8] init: create cmdline param to disable readonly Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08   ` Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 5/8] x86: make CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA non-optional Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08   ` Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 6/8] introduce post-init read-only memory Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08   ` Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 7/8] lkdtm: verify that __ro_after_init works correctly Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08   ` Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 8/8] x86, vdso: mark vDSO read-only after init Kees Cook
2016-01-19 18:08   ` Kees Cook
2016-01-19 19:09   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-19 19:09     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-20  2:51   ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2016-01-20  2:51     ` H. Peter Anvin
2016-01-20  2:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-20  2:56     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-22 17:19 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/8] introduce post-init read-only memory David Brown
2016-01-22 17:19   ` David Brown
2016-01-22 19:16   ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-22 19:57     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-23  9:49       ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2016-02-16 21:36 ` David Brown [this message]
2016-02-16 21:36   ` [PATCH] ARM: vdso: Mark vDSO code as read-only David Brown
2016-02-16 21:36   ` David Brown
2016-02-16 21:52   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-02-16 21:52     ` Kees Cook
2016-02-16 21:52     ` Kees Cook
2016-02-17  5:20     ` [kernel-hardening] " David Brown
2016-02-17  5:20       ` David Brown
2016-02-17  5:20       ` David Brown
2016-02-17 23:00       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-02-17 23:00         ` Kees Cook
2016-02-17 23:00         ` Kees Cook
2016-02-17 23:43         ` [kernel-hardening] " David Brown
2016-02-17 23:43           ` David Brown
2016-02-17 23:43           ` David Brown
2016-02-17 23:48           ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-02-17 23:48             ` Kees Cook
2016-02-17 23:48             ` Kees Cook
2016-02-18 10:46             ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2016-02-18 10:46               ` PaX Team
2016-02-18 10:46               ` PaX Team

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