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From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] rowhammer protection [was Re: Getting interrupt every million cache misses]
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:27:05 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161031082705.GA2863@amd> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161028140522.GH5806@leverpostej>

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Hi!

> On Fri, Oct 28, 2016 at 01:21:36PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > > Has this been tested on a system vulnerable to rowhammer, and if so, was
> > > it reliable in mitigating the issue?
> > > 
> > > Which particular attack codebase was it tested against?
> > 
> > I have rowhammer-test here,
> > 
> > commit 9824453fff76e0a3f5d1ac8200bc6c447c4fff57
> > Author: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
> 
> ... from which repo?
> 
> > I do not have vulnerable machine near me, so no "real" tests, but
> > I'm pretty sure it will make the error no longer reproducible with the
> > newer version. [Help welcome ;-)]
> 
> Even if we hope this works, I think we have to be very careful with that
> kind of assertion. Until we have data is to its efficacy, I don't think
> we should claim that this is an effective mitigation.

Ok, so it turns out I was right. On my vulnerable machine, normally
bug is reproducible in less than 500 iterations:

Iteration 432 (after 1013.31s)
  error at 0xda7cf280: got 0xffffffffffffffef
Iteration 446 (after 1102.56s)
  error at 0xec21ea00: got 0xffffffefffffffff
Iteration 206 (after 497.50s)
  error at 0xd07d1438: got 0xffffffffffffffdf
Iteration 409 (after 1350.96s)
  error at 0xbd3b9108: got 0xefffffffffffffff
Iteration 120 (after 326.08s)
  error at 0xe398c438: got 0xffffffffffffffdf

With nohammer, I'm at 2300 iterations, and still no faults.

Daniel Gruss <daniel@gruss.cc> claims he has an attack that can do 30
flips a second on modern hardware. I'm not going to buy broken
hardware just for a test. Code is at
https://github.com/IAIK/rowhammerjs/tree/master/native . Would someone
be willing to get it running on vulnerable machine and test kernel
patches?

Thanks,

									Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-10-31  8:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-10-26 20:54 Getting interrupt every million cache misses Pavel Machek
2016-10-27  8:28 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-27  8:46   ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-27  9:15     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-27  9:11   ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-27  9:33     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-27 20:40       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-27 20:40         ` Kees Cook
2016-10-27 21:27         ` [kernel-hardening] rowhammer protection [was Re: Getting interrupt every million cache misses] Pavel Machek
2016-10-27 21:27           ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28  7:07           ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-10-28  7:07             ` Ingo Molnar
2016-10-28  8:50             ` [kernel-hardening] " Pavel Machek
2016-10-28  8:50               ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28  8:59               ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-10-28  8:59                 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-10-28 11:55                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Pavel Machek
2016-10-28 11:55                   ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28  9:04               ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-28  9:04                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-28  9:27                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vegard Nossum
2016-10-28  9:27                   ` Vegard Nossum
2016-10-28  9:35                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-10-28  9:35                     ` Ingo Molnar
2016-10-28  9:47                     ` [kernel-hardening] " Vegard Nossum
2016-10-28  9:47                       ` Vegard Nossum
2016-10-28  9:53                     ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-10-28 11:27                 ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28 11:27                   ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28  9:51           ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-10-28 11:21             ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28 14:05               ` Mark Rutland
2016-10-28 14:18                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-28 18:30                   ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28 18:48                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-02 18:13                   ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28 17:27                 ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-29 13:06                   ` Daniel Gruss
2016-10-29 19:42                     ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-29 20:05                       ` Daniel Gruss
2016-10-29 20:14                         ` Daniel Gruss
2016-10-29 21:05                         ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-29 21:07                           ` Daniel Gruss
2016-10-29 21:45                             ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-29 21:49                               ` Daniel Gruss
2016-10-29 22:01                                 ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-29 22:02                                   ` Daniel Gruss
2016-10-31  8:27                 ` Pavel Machek [this message]
2016-10-31 14:47                   ` Mark Rutland
2016-10-31 21:13                     ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-31 22:09                       ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-01  6:33                   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-11-01  7:20                     ` Daniel Micay
2016-11-01  7:53                     ` Daniel Gruss
2016-11-01  8:10                     ` Pavel Machek
2016-11-01  8:13                       ` Daniel Gruss

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