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From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: rowhammer protection [was Re: Getting interrupt every million cache misses]
Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2016 11:35:47 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161028093547.GA9291@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAOMGZ=HQxkFYhHuF0mDVcwO7m4z34e_PKb6jHGVC3Jwc-mhfXQ@mail.gmail.com>


* Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com> wrote:

> Would it make sense to sample the counter on context switch, do some
> accounting on a per-task cache miss counter, and slow down just the
> single task(s) with a too high cache miss rate? That way there's no
> global slowdown (which I assume would be the case here). The task's
> slice of CPU would have to be taken into account because otherwise you
> could have multiple cooperating tasks that each escape the limit but
> taken together go above it.

Attackers could work this around by splitting the rowhammer workload between 
multiple threads/processes.

I.e. the problem is that the risk may come from any 'unprivileged user-space 
code', where the rowhammer workload might be spread over multiple threads, 
processes or even users.

Thanks,

	Ingo

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: rowhammer protection [was Re: Getting interrupt every million cache misses]
Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2016 11:35:47 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161028093547.GA9291@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAOMGZ=HQxkFYhHuF0mDVcwO7m4z34e_PKb6jHGVC3Jwc-mhfXQ@mail.gmail.com>


* Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com> wrote:

> Would it make sense to sample the counter on context switch, do some
> accounting on a per-task cache miss counter, and slow down just the
> single task(s) with a too high cache miss rate? That way there's no
> global slowdown (which I assume would be the case here). The task's
> slice of CPU would have to be taken into account because otherwise you
> could have multiple cooperating tasks that each escape the limit but
> taken together go above it.

Attackers could work this around by splitting the rowhammer workload between 
multiple threads/processes.

I.e. the problem is that the risk may come from any 'unprivileged user-space 
code', where the rowhammer workload might be spread over multiple threads, 
processes or even users.

Thanks,

	Ingo

  reply	other threads:[~2016-10-28  9:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-10-26 20:54 Getting interrupt every million cache misses Pavel Machek
2016-10-27  8:28 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-27  8:46   ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-27  9:15     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-27  9:11   ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-27  9:33     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-27 20:40       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-27 20:40         ` Kees Cook
2016-10-27 21:27         ` [kernel-hardening] rowhammer protection [was Re: Getting interrupt every million cache misses] Pavel Machek
2016-10-27 21:27           ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28  7:07           ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-10-28  7:07             ` Ingo Molnar
2016-10-28  8:50             ` [kernel-hardening] " Pavel Machek
2016-10-28  8:50               ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28  8:59               ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-10-28  8:59                 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-10-28 11:55                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Pavel Machek
2016-10-28 11:55                   ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28  9:04               ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-28  9:04                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-28  9:27                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vegard Nossum
2016-10-28  9:27                   ` Vegard Nossum
2016-10-28  9:35                   ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2016-10-28  9:35                     ` Ingo Molnar
2016-10-28  9:47                     ` [kernel-hardening] " Vegard Nossum
2016-10-28  9:47                       ` Vegard Nossum
2016-10-28  9:53                     ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-10-28 11:27                 ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28 11:27                   ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28  9:51           ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-10-28 11:21             ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28 14:05               ` Mark Rutland
2016-10-28 14:18                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-28 18:30                   ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28 18:48                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-02 18:13                   ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28 17:27                 ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-29 13:06                   ` Daniel Gruss
2016-10-29 19:42                     ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-29 20:05                       ` Daniel Gruss
2016-10-29 20:14                         ` Daniel Gruss
2016-10-29 21:05                         ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-29 21:07                           ` Daniel Gruss
2016-10-29 21:45                             ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-29 21:49                               ` Daniel Gruss
2016-10-29 22:01                                 ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-29 22:02                                   ` Daniel Gruss
2016-10-31  8:27                 ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-31 14:47                   ` Mark Rutland
2016-10-31 21:13                     ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-31 22:09                       ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-01  6:33                   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-11-01  7:20                     ` Daniel Micay
2016-11-01  7:53                     ` Daniel Gruss
2016-11-01  8:10                     ` Pavel Machek
2016-11-01  8:13                       ` Daniel Gruss

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