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From: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: What should the default lockdown mode be if the bootloader sentinel triggers sanitization?
Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2017 11:57:01 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170131115701.GN31613@codeblueprint.co.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <12081.1485784892@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On Mon, 30 Jan, at 02:01:32PM, David Howells wrote:
> Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> wrote:
> 
> > > Matt argues, however, that boot_params->secure_boot should be propagated from
> > > the bootloader and if the bootloader wants to set it, then we should skip the
> > > check in efi_main() and go with the bootloader's opinion.  This is something
> > > we probably want to do with kexec() so that the lockdown state is propagated
> > > there.
> >  
> > Actually what I was arguing for was that if the boot loader wants to
> > set it and bypass the EFI boot stub, e.g. by going via the legacy
> > 64-bit entry point, startup_64, then we should allow that as well as
> > setting the flag in the EFI boot stub.
> 
> That brings up another question:  Should the non-EFI entry points clear the
> secure_boot mode flag and set a default?

There are no non-EFI boot entry points. EFI worked before we added the
EFI boot stub. The boot stub just provides new features (and allows us
to bundle firmware/boot fixes workarounds with kernel updates).

This is exactly why we should allow, or at least not actively
prohibit, the boot loader to set ->secure_boot and jump to the old
entry point if it wants to do that.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk (Matt Fleming)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: What should the default lockdown mode be if the bootloader sentinel triggers sanitization?
Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2017 11:57:01 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170131115701.GN31613@codeblueprint.co.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <12081.1485784892@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On Mon, 30 Jan, at 02:01:32PM, David Howells wrote:
> Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> wrote:
> 
> > > Matt argues, however, that boot_params->secure_boot should be propagated from
> > > the bootloader and if the bootloader wants to set it, then we should skip the
> > > check in efi_main() and go with the bootloader's opinion.  This is something
> > > we probably want to do with kexec() so that the lockdown state is propagated
> > > there.
> >  
> > Actually what I was arguing for was that if the boot loader wants to
> > set it and bypass the EFI boot stub, e.g. by going via the legacy
> > 64-bit entry point, startup_64, then we should allow that as well as
> > setting the flag in the EFI boot stub.
> 
> That brings up another question:  Should the non-EFI entry points clear the
> secure_boot mode flag and set a default?

There are no non-EFI boot entry points. EFI worked before we added the
EFI boot stub. The boot stub just provides new features (and allows us
to bundle firmware/boot fixes workarounds with kernel updates).

This is exactly why we should allow, or at least not actively
prohibit, the boot loader to set ->secure_boot and jump to the old
entry point if it wants to do that.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>,
	mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Subject: Re: What should the default lockdown mode be if the bootloader sentinel triggers sanitization?
Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2017 11:57:01 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170131115701.GN31613@codeblueprint.co.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <12081.1485784892@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On Mon, 30 Jan, at 02:01:32PM, David Howells wrote:
> Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> wrote:
> 
> > > Matt argues, however, that boot_params->secure_boot should be propagated from
> > > the bootloader and if the bootloader wants to set it, then we should skip the
> > > check in efi_main() and go with the bootloader's opinion.  This is something
> > > we probably want to do with kexec() so that the lockdown state is propagated
> > > there.
> >  
> > Actually what I was arguing for was that if the boot loader wants to
> > set it and bypass the EFI boot stub, e.g. by going via the legacy
> > 64-bit entry point, startup_64, then we should allow that as well as
> > setting the flag in the EFI boot stub.
> 
> That brings up another question:  Should the non-EFI entry points clear the
> secure_boot mode flag and set a default?

There are no non-EFI boot entry points. EFI worked before we added the
EFI boot stub. The boot stub just provides new features (and allows us
to bundle firmware/boot fixes workarounds with kernel updates).

This is exactly why we should allow, or at least not actively
prohibit, the boot loader to set ->secure_boot and jump to the old
entry point if it wants to do that.

  reply	other threads:[~2017-01-31 11:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-12-08 12:30 [PATCH 0/8] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #6] David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` [PATCH 1/8] efi: use typed function pointers for runtime services table " David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30   ` David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` [PATCH 2/8] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30   ` David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` [PATCH 3/8] arm/efi: " David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30   ` David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` [PATCH 4/8] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions " David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30   ` David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status " David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30   ` David Howells
     [not found]   ` <148120024570.5854.10638278395097394138.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-01-11 14:33     ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-11 14:33       ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-11 14:33       ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-11 15:27       ` David Howells
2017-01-11 15:27         ` David Howells
2017-01-11 15:27         ` David Howells
     [not found]         ` <7948.1484148443-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-01-16 14:49           ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-16 14:49             ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-16 14:49             ` Matt Fleming
     [not found]         ` <20170116144954.GB27351-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
2017-01-16 15:39           ` David Howells
2017-01-16 15:39             ` David Howells
2017-01-16 15:39             ` David Howells
     [not found]         ` <794.1484581158-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-01-23 10:52           ` David Howells
2017-01-23 10:52             ` David Howells
2017-01-23 10:52             ` David Howells
2017-01-23 21:26           ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-23 21:26             ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-23 21:26             ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-23 22:11             ` David Howells
2017-01-23 22:11               ` David Howells
2017-01-27 14:01               ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-27 14:01                 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-31 14:02                 ` David Howells
2017-01-31 14:02                   ` David Howells
2017-01-31 14:02                   ` David Howells
2017-01-30 12:10               ` What should the default lockdown mode be if the bootloader sentinel triggers sanitization? David Howells
2017-01-30 12:10                 ` David Howells
2017-01-30 13:50                 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-30 13:50                   ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-30 13:50                   ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-30 14:01                   ` David Howells
2017-01-30 14:01                     ` David Howells
2017-01-30 14:01                     ` David Howells
2017-01-31 11:57                     ` Matt Fleming [this message]
2017-01-31 11:57                       ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-31 11:57                       ` Matt Fleming
     [not found] ` <148120020832.5854.5448601415491330495.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-12-08 12:30   ` [PATCH 6/8] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode [ver #6] David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30     ` David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30     ` David Howells
2016-12-08 12:31 ` [PATCH 7/8] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 " David Howells
2016-12-08 12:31   ` David Howells
2016-12-08 12:31 ` [PATCH 8/8] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit " David Howells
2016-12-08 12:31   ` David Howells
2017-01-11 14:51   ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-11 14:51     ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-11 15:29     ` David Howells
2017-01-11 15:29       ` David Howells
2017-01-11 15:29       ` David Howells
2017-01-16 13:40       ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-16 13:40         ` Matt Fleming
     [not found]       ` <20170116134041.GA27351-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
2017-01-16 15:40         ` David Howells
2017-01-16 15:40           ` David Howells
2017-01-16 15:40           ` David Howells
2017-01-11 15:01 ` [PATCH 0/8] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel " Matt Fleming
2017-01-11 15:01   ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-11 15:05   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-11 15:05     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-11 15:05     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-24 17:15     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-24 17:15       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-27 18:03       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-27 18:03         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-27 18:03         ` Ard Biesheuvel

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