From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #6]
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2017 15:27:23 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7948.1484148443@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170111143304.GA29649@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> wrote:
> > + movb $0, BP_secure_boot(%rsi)
> > #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
> > /*
> > * The entry point for the PE/COFF executable is efi_pe_entry, so
>
> Is clearing ::secure_boot really necessary? Any code path that goes
> via efi_main() will set it correctly and all other code paths should
> get it cleared in sanitize_boot_params(), no?
No.
The boot_params->secure_boot parameter exists whether or not efi_main() is
traversed (ie. if EFI isn't enabled or CONFIG_EFI_STUB=n) and, if not cleared,
is of uncertain value.
Further, sanitize_boot_params() has to be modified by this patch so as not to
clobber the secure_boot flag.
> What's the distinction between the unset and unknown enums?
unset -> The flag was cleared by head.S and efi_get_secureboot() was never
called.
unknown -> efi_get_secureboot() tried and failed to access the EFI variables
that should give the state.
David
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: dhowells@redhat.com (David Howells)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #6]
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2017 15:27:23 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7948.1484148443@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170111143304.GA29649@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> wrote:
> > + movb $0, BP_secure_boot(%rsi)
> > #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
> > /*
> > * The entry point for the PE/COFF executable is efi_pe_entry, so
>
> Is clearing ::secure_boot really necessary? Any code path that goes
> via efi_main() will set it correctly and all other code paths should
> get it cleared in sanitize_boot_params(), no?
No.
The boot_params->secure_boot parameter exists whether or not efi_main() is
traversed (ie. if EFI isn't enabled or CONFIG_EFI_STUB=n) and, if not cleared,
is of uncertain value.
Further, sanitize_boot_params() has to be modified by this patch so as not to
clobber the secure_boot flag.
> What's the distinction between the unset and unknown enums?
unset -> The flag was cleared by head.S and efi_get_secureboot() was never
called.
unknown -> efi_get_secureboot() tried and failed to access the EFI variables
that should give the state.
David
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #6]
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2017 15:27:23 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7948.1484148443@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170111143304.GA29649@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> wrote:
> > + movb $0, BP_secure_boot(%rsi)
> > #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
> > /*
> > * The entry point for the PE/COFF executable is efi_pe_entry, so
>
> Is clearing ::secure_boot really necessary? Any code path that goes
> via efi_main() will set it correctly and all other code paths should
> get it cleared in sanitize_boot_params(), no?
No.
The boot_params->secure_boot parameter exists whether or not efi_main() is
traversed (ie. if EFI isn't enabled or CONFIG_EFI_STUB=n) and, if not cleared,
is of uncertain value.
Further, sanitize_boot_params() has to be modified by this patch so as not to
clobber the secure_boot flag.
> What's the distinction between the unset and unknown enums?
unset -> The flag was cleared by head.S and efi_get_secureboot() was never
called.
unknown -> efi_get_secureboot() tried and failed to access the EFI variables
that should give the state.
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-01-11 15:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-12-08 12:30 [PATCH 0/8] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #6] David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` [PATCH 1/8] efi: use typed function pointers for runtime services table " David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` [PATCH 2/8] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` [PATCH 3/8] arm/efi: " David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` [PATCH 4/8] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions " David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status " David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <148120024570.5854.10638278395097394138.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-01-11 14:33 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-11 14:33 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-11 14:33 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-11 15:27 ` David Howells [this message]
2017-01-11 15:27 ` David Howells
2017-01-11 15:27 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <7948.1484148443-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-01-16 14:49 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-16 14:49 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-16 14:49 ` Matt Fleming
[not found] ` <20170116144954.GB27351-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
2017-01-16 15:39 ` David Howells
2017-01-16 15:39 ` David Howells
2017-01-16 15:39 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <794.1484581158-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-01-23 10:52 ` David Howells
2017-01-23 10:52 ` David Howells
2017-01-23 10:52 ` David Howells
2017-01-23 21:26 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-23 21:26 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-23 21:26 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-23 22:11 ` David Howells
2017-01-23 22:11 ` David Howells
2017-01-27 14:01 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-27 14:01 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-31 14:02 ` David Howells
2017-01-31 14:02 ` David Howells
2017-01-31 14:02 ` David Howells
2017-01-30 12:10 ` What should the default lockdown mode be if the bootloader sentinel triggers sanitization? David Howells
2017-01-30 12:10 ` David Howells
2017-01-30 13:50 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-30 13:50 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-30 13:50 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-30 14:01 ` David Howells
2017-01-30 14:01 ` David Howells
2017-01-30 14:01 ` David Howells
2017-01-31 11:57 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-31 11:57 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-31 11:57 ` Matt Fleming
[not found] ` <148120020832.5854.5448601415491330495.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-12-08 12:30 ` [PATCH 6/8] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode [ver #6] David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` David Howells
2016-12-08 12:30 ` David Howells
2016-12-08 12:31 ` [PATCH 7/8] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 " David Howells
2016-12-08 12:31 ` David Howells
2016-12-08 12:31 ` [PATCH 8/8] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit " David Howells
2016-12-08 12:31 ` David Howells
2017-01-11 14:51 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-11 14:51 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-11 15:29 ` David Howells
2017-01-11 15:29 ` David Howells
2017-01-11 15:29 ` David Howells
2017-01-16 13:40 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-16 13:40 ` Matt Fleming
[not found] ` <20170116134041.GA27351-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
2017-01-16 15:40 ` David Howells
2017-01-16 15:40 ` David Howells
2017-01-16 15:40 ` David Howells
2017-01-11 15:01 ` [PATCH 0/8] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel " Matt Fleming
2017-01-11 15:01 ` Matt Fleming
2017-01-11 15:05 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-11 15:05 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-11 15:05 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-24 17:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-24 17:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-27 18:03 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-27 18:03 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-27 18:03 ` Ard Biesheuvel
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