From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
davem@davemloft.net, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 0/5] skb_to_sgvec hardening
Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 15:50:04 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170509135009.13751-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> (raw)
The recent bug with macsec and historical one with virtio have
indicated that letting skb_to_sgvec trounce all over an sglist
without checking the length is probably a bad idea. And it's not
necessary either: an sglist already explicitly marks its last
item, and the initialization functions are diligent in doing so.
Thus there's a clear way of avoiding future overflows.
So, this patchset, from a high level, makes skb_to_sgvec return
a potential error code, and then adjusts all callers to check
for the error code. There are two situations in which skb_to_sgvec
might return such an error:
1) When the passed in sglist is too small; and
2) When the passed in skbuff is too deeply nested.
So, the first patch in this series handles the issues with
skb_to_sgvec directly, and the remaining ones then handle the call
sites.
Jason A. Donenfeld (5):
skbuff: return -EMSGSIZE in skb_to_sgvec to prevent overflow
ipsec: check return value of skb_to_sgvec always
rxrpc: check return value of skb_to_sgvec always
macsec: check return value of skb_to_sgvec always
virtio_net: check return value of skb_to_sgvec always
drivers/net/macsec.c | 13 ++++++++--
drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 4 ++-
net/core/skbuff.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
net/ipv4/ah4.c | 8 ++++--
net/ipv4/esp4.c | 30 ++++++++++++++--------
net/ipv6/ah6.c | 8 ++++--
net/ipv6/esp6.c | 31 +++++++++++++++--------
net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 13 +++++++---
8 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
--
2.12.2
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
davem@davemloft.net, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 0/5] skb_to_sgvec hardening
Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 15:50:04 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170509135009.13751-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> (raw)
The recent bug with macsec and historical one with virtio have
indicated that letting skb_to_sgvec trounce all over an sglist
without checking the length is probably a bad idea. And it's not
necessary either: an sglist already explicitly marks its last
item, and the initialization functions are diligent in doing so.
Thus there's a clear way of avoiding future overflows.
So, this patchset, from a high level, makes skb_to_sgvec return
a potential error code, and then adjusts all callers to check
for the error code. There are two situations in which skb_to_sgvec
might return such an error:
1) When the passed in sglist is too small; and
2) When the passed in skbuff is too deeply nested.
So, the first patch in this series handles the issues with
skb_to_sgvec directly, and the remaining ones then handle the call
sites.
Jason A. Donenfeld (5):
skbuff: return -EMSGSIZE in skb_to_sgvec to prevent overflow
ipsec: check return value of skb_to_sgvec always
rxrpc: check return value of skb_to_sgvec always
macsec: check return value of skb_to_sgvec always
virtio_net: check return value of skb_to_sgvec always
drivers/net/macsec.c | 13 ++++++++--
drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 4 ++-
net/core/skbuff.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
net/ipv4/ah4.c | 8 ++++--
net/ipv4/esp4.c | 30 ++++++++++++++--------
net/ipv6/ah6.c | 8 ++++--
net/ipv6/esp6.c | 31 +++++++++++++++--------
net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 13 +++++++---
8 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
--
2.12.2
next reply other threads:[~2017-05-09 13:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-05-09 13:50 Jason A. Donenfeld [this message]
2017-05-09 13:50 ` [PATCH v7 0/5] skb_to_sgvec hardening Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-05-09 13:50 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 1/5] skbuff: return -EMSGSIZE in skb_to_sgvec to prevent overflow Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-05-09 13:50 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-05-09 13:50 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 2/5] ipsec: check return value of skb_to_sgvec always Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-05-09 13:50 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-05-09 14:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-05-09 14:09 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-05-09 13:50 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 3/5] rxrpc: " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-05-09 13:50 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-05-09 13:50 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 4/5] macsec: " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-05-09 13:50 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-05-09 13:50 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 5/5] virtio_net: " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-05-09 13:50 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-05-09 14:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-05-09 14:10 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-05-09 14:03 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] skb_to_sgvec hardening Johannes Berg
2017-05-09 14:03 ` Johannes Berg
2017-05-09 14:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-05-09 14:08 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20170509135009.13751-1-Jason@zx2c4.com \
--to=jason@zx2c4.com \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.