From: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>, Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com>,
Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 3/3] arm64/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return
Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2017 18:12:03 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170615011203.144108-3-thgarnie@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170615011203.144108-1-thgarnie@google.com>
Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to
user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and
elevate privileges [1].
The set_fs function sets the TIF_SETFS flag to force a slow path on
return. In the slow path, the address limit is checked to be USER_DS if
needed.
[1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
---
v10 redesigns the change to use work flags on set_fs as recommended by
Linus and agreed by others.
Based on next-20170609
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 4 +++-
arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 3 +++
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 5 +++++
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 46c3b93cf865..c5ba565544ee 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ struct thread_info {
#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME 2 /* callback before returning to user */
#define TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE 3 /* CPU's FP state is not current's */
#define TIF_UPROBE 4 /* uprobe breakpoint or singlestep */
+#define TIF_FSCHECK 5 /* Check FS is USER_DS on return */
#define TIF_NOHZ 7
#define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE 8
#define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 9
@@ -107,11 +108,12 @@ struct thread_info {
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
#define _TIF_SECCOMP (1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
#define _TIF_UPROBE (1 << TIF_UPROBE)
+#define _TIF_FSCHECK (1 << TIF_FSCHECK)
#define _TIF_32BIT (1 << TIF_32BIT)
#define _TIF_WORK_MASK (_TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_SIGPENDING | \
_TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE | \
- _TIF_UPROBE)
+ _TIF_UPROBE | _TIF_FSCHECK)
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_WORK (_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT | \
_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT | _TIF_SECCOMP | \
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 7b8a04789cef..ced7a7c2dd41 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
{
current_thread_info()->addr_limit = fs;
+ /* On user-mode return, check fs is correct */
+ set_thread_flag(TIF_FSCHECK);
+
/*
* Enable/disable UAO so that copy_to_user() etc can access
* kernel memory with the unprivileged instructions.
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
index c7b6de62f9d3..0f0279148bdc 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
#include <asm/elf.h>
@@ -408,6 +409,10 @@ asmlinkage void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs,
* Update the trace code with the current status.
*/
trace_hardirqs_off();
+
+ /* Check valid user FS if needed */
+ addr_limit_user_check();
+
do {
if (thread_flags & _TIF_NEED_RESCHED) {
schedule();
--
2.13.1.518.g3df882009-goog
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>, Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com>,
Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH v10 3/3] arm64/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return
Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2017 18:12:03 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170615011203.144108-3-thgarnie@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170615011203.144108-1-thgarnie@google.com>
Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to
user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and
elevate privileges [1].
The set_fs function sets the TIF_SETFS flag to force a slow path on
return. In the slow path, the address limit is checked to be USER_DS if
needed.
[1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
---
v10 redesigns the change to use work flags on set_fs as recommended by
Linus and agreed by others.
Based on next-20170609
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 4 +++-
arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 3 +++
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 5 +++++
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 46c3b93cf865..c5ba565544ee 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ struct thread_info {
#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME 2 /* callback before returning to user */
#define TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE 3 /* CPU's FP state is not current's */
#define TIF_UPROBE 4 /* uprobe breakpoint or singlestep */
+#define TIF_FSCHECK 5 /* Check FS is USER_DS on return */
#define TIF_NOHZ 7
#define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE 8
#define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 9
@@ -107,11 +108,12 @@ struct thread_info {
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
#define _TIF_SECCOMP (1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
#define _TIF_UPROBE (1 << TIF_UPROBE)
+#define _TIF_FSCHECK (1 << TIF_FSCHECK)
#define _TIF_32BIT (1 << TIF_32BIT)
#define _TIF_WORK_MASK (_TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_SIGPENDING | \
_TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE | \
- _TIF_UPROBE)
+ _TIF_UPROBE | _TIF_FSCHECK)
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_WORK (_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT | \
_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT | _TIF_SECCOMP | \
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 7b8a04789cef..ced7a7c2dd41 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
{
current_thread_info()->addr_limit = fs;
+ /* On user-mode return, check fs is correct */
+ set_thread_flag(TIF_FSCHECK);
+
/*
* Enable/disable UAO so that copy_to_user() etc can access
* kernel memory with the unprivileged instructions.
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
index c7b6de62f9d3..0f0279148bdc 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
#include <asm/elf.h>
@@ -408,6 +409,10 @@ asmlinkage void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs,
* Update the trace code with the current status.
*/
trace_hardirqs_off();
+
+ /* Check valid user FS if needed */
+ addr_limit_user_check();
+
do {
if (thread_flags & _TIF_NEED_RESCHED) {
schedule();
--
2.13.1.518.g3df882009-goog
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: thgarnie@google.com (Thomas Garnier)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v10 3/3] arm64/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return
Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2017 18:12:03 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170615011203.144108-3-thgarnie@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170615011203.144108-1-thgarnie@google.com>
Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to
user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and
elevate privileges [1].
The set_fs function sets the TIF_SETFS flag to force a slow path on
return. In the slow path, the address limit is checked to be USER_DS if
needed.
[1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
---
v10 redesigns the change to use work flags on set_fs as recommended by
Linus and agreed by others.
Based on next-20170609
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 4 +++-
arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 3 +++
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 5 +++++
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 46c3b93cf865..c5ba565544ee 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ struct thread_info {
#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME 2 /* callback before returning to user */
#define TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE 3 /* CPU's FP state is not current's */
#define TIF_UPROBE 4 /* uprobe breakpoint or singlestep */
+#define TIF_FSCHECK 5 /* Check FS is USER_DS on return */
#define TIF_NOHZ 7
#define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE 8
#define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 9
@@ -107,11 +108,12 @@ struct thread_info {
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
#define _TIF_SECCOMP (1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
#define _TIF_UPROBE (1 << TIF_UPROBE)
+#define _TIF_FSCHECK (1 << TIF_FSCHECK)
#define _TIF_32BIT (1 << TIF_32BIT)
#define _TIF_WORK_MASK (_TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_SIGPENDING | \
_TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE | \
- _TIF_UPROBE)
+ _TIF_UPROBE | _TIF_FSCHECK)
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_WORK (_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT | \
_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT | _TIF_SECCOMP | \
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 7b8a04789cef..ced7a7c2dd41 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
{
current_thread_info()->addr_limit = fs;
+ /* On user-mode return, check fs is correct */
+ set_thread_flag(TIF_FSCHECK);
+
/*
* Enable/disable UAO so that copy_to_user() etc can access
* kernel memory with the unprivileged instructions.
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
index c7b6de62f9d3..0f0279148bdc 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
#include <asm/elf.h>
@@ -408,6 +409,10 @@ asmlinkage void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs,
* Update the trace code with the current status.
*/
trace_hardirqs_off();
+
+ /* Check valid user FS if needed */
+ addr_limit_user_check();
+
do {
if (thread_flags & _TIF_NEED_RESCHED) {
schedule();
--
2.13.1.518.g3df882009-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-15 1:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-15 1:12 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 1/3] x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return Thomas Garnier
2017-06-15 1:12 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-15 1:12 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-15 1:12 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 2/3] arm/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
2017-06-15 1:12 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-15 1:12 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-20 20:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-20 20:18 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 20:18 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 20:18 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 20:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-06-20 20:31 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-20 20:31 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-20 20:31 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-21 9:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Deacon
2017-06-21 9:08 ` Will Deacon
2017-06-21 9:08 ` Will Deacon
2017-06-21 9:08 ` Will Deacon
2017-07-08 12:10 ` [tip:x86/syscall] " tip-bot for Thomas Garnier
2017-07-18 14:36 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v10 2/3] " Leonard Crestez
2017-07-18 14:36 ` Leonard Crestez
2017-07-18 14:36 ` Leonard Crestez
2017-07-18 14:36 ` Leonard Crestez
2017-07-18 16:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-07-18 16:04 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-18 16:04 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-18 16:04 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-18 17:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Leonard Crestez
2017-07-18 17:18 ` Leonard Crestez
2017-07-18 17:18 ` Leonard Crestez
2017-07-18 17:18 ` Leonard Crestez
2017-07-18 19:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-07-18 19:04 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-18 19:04 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-18 19:04 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-19 14:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Leonard Crestez
2017-07-19 14:58 ` Leonard Crestez
2017-07-19 14:58 ` Leonard Crestez
2017-07-19 14:58 ` Leonard Crestez
2017-07-19 16:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-07-19 16:51 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-19 16:51 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-19 16:51 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-19 17:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-07-19 17:06 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-07-19 17:06 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-07-19 17:06 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-07-19 17:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-07-19 17:20 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-19 17:20 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-19 18:35 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-07-19 18:35 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-07-19 18:35 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-07-19 18:50 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-19 18:50 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-19 18:50 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-15 1:12 ` Thomas Garnier [this message]
2017-06-15 1:12 ` [PATCH v10 3/3] arm64/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
2017-06-15 1:12 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-21 8:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2017-06-21 8:16 ` Catalin Marinas
2017-06-21 8:16 ` Catalin Marinas
2017-06-21 8:16 ` Catalin Marinas
2017-06-21 13:57 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-06-21 13:57 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-21 13:57 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-21 13:57 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-08 12:10 ` [tip:x86/syscall] " tip-bot for Thomas Garnier
2017-06-20 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v10 1/3] x86/syscalls: " Kees Cook
2017-06-20 20:24 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 20:24 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 20:24 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-28 17:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-28 17:52 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-28 17:52 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-28 17:52 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-06 20:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-07-06 20:38 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-06 20:38 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-06 20:38 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-06 20:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner
2017-07-06 20:48 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-07-06 20:48 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-07-06 20:48 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-07-06 20:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-07-06 20:52 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-06 20:52 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-06 20:52 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-08 12:09 ` [tip:x86/syscall] " tip-bot for Thomas Garnier
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