From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>, Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com>,
Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v10 3/3] arm64/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return
Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2017 09:16:01 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170621081601.g6fsf6i3mxzar5sn@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170615011203.144108-3-thgarnie@google.com>
On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 06:12:03PM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to
> user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and
> elevate privileges [1].
>
> The set_fs function sets the TIF_SETFS flag to force a slow path on
> return. In the slow path, the address limit is checked to be USER_DS if
> needed.
>
> [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
> ---
> v10 redesigns the change to use work flags on set_fs as recommended by
> Linus and agreed by others.
>
> Based on next-20170609
> ---
> arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 4 +++-
> arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 3 +++
> arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 5 +++++
> 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
For arm64:
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>
To: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Rik van Riel <riel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>,
Miroslav Benes <mbenes-AlSwsSmVLrQ@public.gmane.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>,
Al Viro <viro-RmSDqhL/yNMiFSDQTTA3OLVCufUGDwFn@public.gmane.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd-r2nGTMty4D4@public.gmane.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Russell King <linux-I+IVW8TIWO2tmTQ+vhA3Yw@public.gmane.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto-kltTT9wpgjJwATOyAt5JVQ@public.gmane.org>,
Will Drewry <wad-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>,
Pratyush Anand <panand-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 3/3] arm64/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return
Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2017 09:16:01 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170621081601.g6fsf6i3mxzar5sn@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170615011203.144108-3-thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 06:12:03PM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to
> user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and
> elevate privileges [1].
>
> The set_fs function sets the TIF_SETFS flag to force a slow path on
> return. In the slow path, the address limit is checked to be USER_DS if
> needed.
>
> [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
> ---
> v10 redesigns the change to use work flags on set_fs as recommended by
> Linus and agreed by others.
>
> Based on next-20170609
> ---
> arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 4 +++-
> arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 3 +++
> arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 5 +++++
> 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
For arm64:
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: catalin.marinas@arm.com (Catalin Marinas)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v10 3/3] arm64/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return
Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2017 09:16:01 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170621081601.g6fsf6i3mxzar5sn@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170615011203.144108-3-thgarnie@google.com>
On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 06:12:03PM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to
> user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and
> elevate privileges [1].
>
> The set_fs function sets the TIF_SETFS flag to force a slow path on
> return. In the slow path, the address limit is checked to be USER_DS if
> needed.
>
> [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
> ---
> v10 redesigns the change to use work flags on set_fs as recommended by
> Linus and agreed by others.
>
> Based on next-20170609
> ---
> arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 4 +++-
> arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 3 +++
> arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 5 +++++
> 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
For arm64:
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>, Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com>,
Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 3/3] arm64/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return
Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2017 09:16:01 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170621081601.g6fsf6i3mxzar5sn@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170615011203.144108-3-thgarnie@google.com>
On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 06:12:03PM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to
> user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and
> elevate privileges [1].
>
> The set_fs function sets the TIF_SETFS flag to force a slow path on
> return. In the slow path, the address limit is checked to be USER_DS if
> needed.
>
> [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
> ---
> v10 redesigns the change to use work flags on set_fs as recommended by
> Linus and agreed by others.
>
> Based on next-20170609
> ---
> arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 4 +++-
> arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 3 +++
> arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 5 +++++
> 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
For arm64:
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-21 8:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-15 1:12 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 1/3] x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return Thomas Garnier
2017-06-15 1:12 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-15 1:12 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-15 1:12 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 2/3] arm/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
2017-06-15 1:12 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-15 1:12 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-20 20:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-20 20:18 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 20:18 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 20:18 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 20:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-06-20 20:31 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-20 20:31 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-20 20:31 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-21 9:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Deacon
2017-06-21 9:08 ` Will Deacon
2017-06-21 9:08 ` Will Deacon
2017-06-21 9:08 ` Will Deacon
2017-07-08 12:10 ` [tip:x86/syscall] " tip-bot for Thomas Garnier
2017-07-18 14:36 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v10 2/3] " Leonard Crestez
2017-07-18 14:36 ` Leonard Crestez
2017-07-18 14:36 ` Leonard Crestez
2017-07-18 14:36 ` Leonard Crestez
2017-07-18 16:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-07-18 16:04 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-18 16:04 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-18 16:04 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-18 17:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Leonard Crestez
2017-07-18 17:18 ` Leonard Crestez
2017-07-18 17:18 ` Leonard Crestez
2017-07-18 17:18 ` Leonard Crestez
2017-07-18 19:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-07-18 19:04 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-18 19:04 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-18 19:04 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-19 14:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Leonard Crestez
2017-07-19 14:58 ` Leonard Crestez
2017-07-19 14:58 ` Leonard Crestez
2017-07-19 14:58 ` Leonard Crestez
2017-07-19 16:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-07-19 16:51 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-19 16:51 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-19 16:51 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-19 17:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-07-19 17:06 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-07-19 17:06 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-07-19 17:06 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-07-19 17:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-07-19 17:20 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-19 17:20 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-19 18:35 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-07-19 18:35 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-07-19 18:35 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-07-19 18:50 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-19 18:50 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-19 18:50 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-15 1:12 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 3/3] arm64/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
2017-06-15 1:12 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-15 1:12 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-21 8:16 ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2017-06-21 8:16 ` Catalin Marinas
2017-06-21 8:16 ` Catalin Marinas
2017-06-21 8:16 ` Catalin Marinas
2017-06-21 13:57 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-06-21 13:57 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-21 13:57 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-06-21 13:57 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-08 12:10 ` [tip:x86/syscall] " tip-bot for Thomas Garnier
2017-06-20 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v10 1/3] x86/syscalls: " Kees Cook
2017-06-20 20:24 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 20:24 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 20:24 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-28 17:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-28 17:52 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-28 17:52 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-28 17:52 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-06 20:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-07-06 20:38 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-06 20:38 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-06 20:38 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-06 20:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner
2017-07-06 20:48 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-07-06 20:48 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-07-06 20:48 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-07-06 20:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-07-06 20:52 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-06 20:52 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-06 20:52 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-07-08 12:09 ` [tip:x86/syscall] " tip-bot for Thomas Garnier
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