From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: "Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार)" <maheshb@google.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Christian Brauner" <christian.brauner@canonical.com>,
"Boris Lukashev" <blukashev@sempervictus.com>,
"Daniel Micay" <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
"Mahesh Bandewar" <mahesh@bandewar.net>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Netdev <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
Kernel-hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
"Linux API" <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Eric Dumazet" <edumazet@google.com>,
"David Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH resend 2/2] userns: control capabilities of some user namespaces
Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2017 22:46:46 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171110044645.GA3694@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <871sl7dsh8.fsf@xmission.com>
Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com):
> single sandbox. I am not at all certain that the capabilities is the
> proper place to limit code reachability.
Right, I keep having this gut feeling that there is another way we
should be doing that. Maybe based on ksplice or perf, or maybe more
based on subsystems. And I hope someone pursues that. But I can't put
my finger on it, and meanwhile the capability checks obviously *are* in
fact gates...
-serge
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge-A9i7LUbDfNHQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
Cc: "Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार)"
<maheshb-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge-A9i7LUbDfNHQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Christian Brauner"
<christian.brauner-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>,
"Boris Lukashev"
<blukashev-JNja4Z15B3SvB/ACxS1yDA@public.gmane.org>,
"Daniel Micay"
<danielmicay-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
"Mahesh Bandewar"
<mahesh-bmGAjcP2qsnk1uMJSBkQmQ@public.gmane.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
Netdev <netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
Kernel-hardening
<kernel-hardening-ZwoEplunGu1jrUoiu81ncdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>,
"Linux API" <linux-api-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>,
"Eric Dumazet" <edumazet-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"David Miller" <davem-fT/PcQaiUtIeIZ0/mPfg9Q@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH resend 2/2] userns: control capabilities of some user namespaces
Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2017 22:46:46 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171110044645.GA3694@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <871sl7dsh8.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org):
> single sandbox. I am not at all certain that the capabilities is the
> proper place to limit code reachability.
Right, I keep having this gut feeling that there is another way we
should be doing that. Maybe based on ksplice or perf, or maybe more
based on subsystems. And I hope someone pursues that. But I can't put
my finger on it, and meanwhile the capability checks obviously *are* in
fact gates...
-serge
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-11-10 4:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-11-03 0:44 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH resend 2/2] userns: control capabilities of some user namespaces Mahesh Bandewar
2017-11-03 0:44 ` Mahesh Bandewar
2017-11-04 23:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-04 23:53 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-04 23:53 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-06 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार)
2017-11-06 7:23 ` Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार)
2017-11-06 7:23 ` Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार)
2017-11-06 15:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-06 15:03 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-06 21:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2017-11-06 21:33 ` Daniel Micay
2017-11-06 22:14 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-06 22:14 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-06 22:42 ` Christian Brauner
2017-11-06 22:42 ` Christian Brauner
2017-11-06 23:17 ` Boris Lukashev
2017-11-06 23:39 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-07 0:01 ` Boris Lukashev
2017-11-07 0:01 ` Boris Lukashev
2017-11-07 3:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-07 3:28 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-08 11:09 ` Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार)
2017-11-08 11:09 ` Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार)
2017-11-08 19:02 ` Christian Brauner
2017-11-09 0:55 ` Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार)
2017-11-09 0:55 ` Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार)
2017-11-09 3:21 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-09 3:21 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-09 7:13 ` Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार)
2017-11-09 7:13 ` Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार)
2017-11-09 7:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार)
2017-11-09 7:18 ` Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार)
2017-11-09 16:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-09 16:14 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-09 21:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2017-11-09 21:58 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-11-10 4:30 ` Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार)
2017-11-10 4:30 ` Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार)
2017-11-10 4:46 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2017-11-10 4:46 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-10 5:28 ` Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार)
2017-11-10 5:28 ` Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार)
2017-11-07 2:16 ` Daniel Micay
2017-11-07 2:16 ` Daniel Micay
2017-11-07 3:23 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-07 3:23 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-09 18:01 ` chris hyser
2017-11-09 18:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-09 18:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-09 18:27 ` chris hyser
2017-11-09 17:25 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-09 17:25 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-10 1:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार)
2017-11-10 1:49 ` Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार)
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