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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, x86@kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	keescook@google.com, hughd@google.com,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>,
	aliguori@amazon.com, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com,
	dan.j.williams@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 01/17] mm/gup: Fixup p*_access_permitted()
Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2017 22:18:41 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171214211841.GJ3857@worktop> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171214205450.GI3326@worktop>

On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 09:54:50PM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 12:44:58PM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
> > On 12/14/2017 06:37 AM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > > I'm also looking at pte_access_permitted() in handle_pte_fault(); that
> > > looks very dodgy to me. How does that not result in endlessly CoW'ing
> > > the same page over and over when we have a PKEY disallowing write access
> > > on that page?
> > 
> > I'm not seeing the pte_access_permitted() in handle_pte_fault().  I
> > assume that's something you added in this series.
> 
> No, Dan did in 5c9d2d5c269c4.
> 
> > But, one of the ways that we keep pkeys from causing these kinds of
> > repeating loops when interacting with other things is this hunk in the
> > page fault code:
> > 
> > > static inline int
> > > access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> > > {
> > ...
> > >         /*
> > >          * Read or write was blocked by protection keys.  This is
> > >          * always an unconditional error and can never result in
> > >          * a follow-up action to resolve the fault, like a COW.
> > >          */
> > >         if (error_code & PF_PK)
> > >                 return 1;
> > 
> > That short-circuits the page fault pretty quickly.  So, basically, the
> > rule is: if the hardware says you tripped over pkey permissions, you
> > die.  We don't try to do anything to the underlying page *before* saying
> > that you die.
> 
> That only works when you trip the fault from hardware. Not if you do a
> software fault using gup().
> 
> AFAIK __get_user_pages(FOLL_FORCE|FOLL_WRITE|FOLL_GET) will loop
> indefinitely on the case I described.

Note that my patch actually fixes this by making can_follow_write_pte()
not return NULL (we'll take the CoW fault irrespective of PKEYs) and
then on the second go-around, we'll find a writable PTE but return
-EFAULT from follow_page_mask() because of PKEY and terminate.

But as is, follow_page_mask() will return NULL because either !write or
PKEY, faultin_page()->handle_mm_fault() will see !write because of PKEY
go into the CoW path, we rety follow_page_mask() it will _still_ return
NULL because PKEY, again to the fault, again retry, again ....

--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, x86@kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	keescook@google.com, hughd@google.com,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>,
	aliguori@amazon.com, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com,
	dan.j.williams@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 01/17] mm/gup: Fixup p*_access_permitted()
Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2017 22:18:41 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171214211841.GJ3857@worktop> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171214205450.GI3326@worktop>

On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 09:54:50PM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 12:44:58PM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
> > On 12/14/2017 06:37 AM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > > I'm also looking at pte_access_permitted() in handle_pte_fault(); that
> > > looks very dodgy to me. How does that not result in endlessly CoW'ing
> > > the same page over and over when we have a PKEY disallowing write access
> > > on that page?
> > 
> > I'm not seeing the pte_access_permitted() in handle_pte_fault().  I
> > assume that's something you added in this series.
> 
> No, Dan did in 5c9d2d5c269c4.
> 
> > But, one of the ways that we keep pkeys from causing these kinds of
> > repeating loops when interacting with other things is this hunk in the
> > page fault code:
> > 
> > > static inline int
> > > access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> > > {
> > ...
> > >         /*
> > >          * Read or write was blocked by protection keys.  This is
> > >          * always an unconditional error and can never result in
> > >          * a follow-up action to resolve the fault, like a COW.
> > >          */
> > >         if (error_code & PF_PK)
> > >                 return 1;
> > 
> > That short-circuits the page fault pretty quickly.  So, basically, the
> > rule is: if the hardware says you tripped over pkey permissions, you
> > die.  We don't try to do anything to the underlying page *before* saying
> > that you die.
> 
> That only works when you trip the fault from hardware. Not if you do a
> software fault using gup().
> 
> AFAIK __get_user_pages(FOLL_FORCE|FOLL_WRITE|FOLL_GET) will loop
> indefinitely on the case I described.

Note that my patch actually fixes this by making can_follow_write_pte()
not return NULL (we'll take the CoW fault irrespective of PKEYs) and
then on the second go-around, we'll find a writable PTE but return
-EFAULT from follow_page_mask() because of PKEY and terminate.

But as is, follow_page_mask() will return NULL because either !write or
PKEY, faultin_page()->handle_mm_fault() will see !write because of PKEY
go into the CoW path, we rety follow_page_mask() it will _still_ return
NULL because PKEY, again to the fault, again retry, again ....

  reply	other threads:[~2017-12-14 21:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 151+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-12-14 11:27 [PATCH v2 00/17] x86/ldt: Use a VMA based read only mapping Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 01/17] mm/gup: Fixup p*_access_permitted() Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 12:41   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 12:41     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 14:37     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 14:37       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 20:44       ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-14 20:44         ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-14 20:54         ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 20:54           ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 21:18           ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2017-12-14 21:18             ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15  5:04           ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-15  5:04             ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-15  6:09             ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-15  7:51               ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15  7:51                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-16  0:20                 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  0:20                   ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  0:29                   ` Dan Williams
2017-12-16  0:29                     ` Dan Williams
2017-12-16  1:10                     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  1:10                       ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  1:25                       ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-16  1:25                         ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-16  2:28                         ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  2:28                           ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  2:48                           ` Al Viro
2017-12-16  2:48                             ` Al Viro
2017-12-16  2:52                             ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  2:52                               ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  3:00                               ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  3:00                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  3:21                               ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-16  3:21                                 ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-16  1:29                       ` Dan Williams
2017-12-16  1:29                         ` Dan Williams
2017-12-16  0:31                   ` Al Viro
2017-12-16  0:31                     ` Al Viro
2017-12-16  1:05                     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  1:05                       ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-15  8:00             ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15  8:00               ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15 10:25               ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15 10:25                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15 11:38                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15 11:38                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15 16:38                   ` Dan Williams
2017-12-15 16:38                     ` Dan Williams
2017-12-18 11:54                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-18 11:54                       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-18 18:42                       ` Dan Williams
2017-12-18 18:42                         ` Dan Williams
2017-12-15 14:04       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15 14:04         ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 02/17] mm: Exempt special mappings from mlock(), mprotect() and madvise() Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:19   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 16:19     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 17:36     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 17:36       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-02 16:44       ` Dmitry Safonov
2018-01-02 16:44         ` Dmitry Safonov
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 03/17] arch: Allow arch_dup_mmap() to fail Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:22   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 16:22     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 04/17] x86/ldt: Rework locking Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 05/17] x86/ldt: Prevent ldt inheritance on exec Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:32   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 16:32     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 06/17] x86/ldt: Do not install LDT for kernel threads Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 19:43   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 19:43     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 21:27     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 21:27       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 07/17] mm/softdirty: Move VM_SOFTDIRTY into high bits Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 08/17] mm/x86: Allow special mappings with user access cleared Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 09/17] mm: Provide vm_special_mapping::close Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 10/17] selftest/x86: Implement additional LDT selftests Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 11/17] selftests/x86/ldt_gdt: Prepare for access bit forced Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:20   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 16:20     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 19:43     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 19:43       ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 21:22       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 21:22         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 21:44         ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 21:44           ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 21:48           ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 21:48             ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:02             ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 22:02               ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 22:14               ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:14                 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:24                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 22:24                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 22:52                   ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:52                     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:11             ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 22:11               ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 22:15               ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:15                 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:30                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 22:30                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 22:23           ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 22:23             ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 22:50             ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:50               ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 12/17] mm: Make populate_vma_page_range() available Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 13/17] x86/mm: Force LDT desc accessed bit Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:21   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 16:21     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 14/17] x86/ldt: Reshuffle code Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:23   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 16:23     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 16:31     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 16:31       ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 16:32       ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 16:32         ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 16:34         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 16:34           ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 17:47           ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 17:47             ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 15/17] x86/ldt: Prepare for VMA mapping Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 16/17] x86/ldt: Add VMA management code Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 17/17] x86/ldt: Make it read only VMA mapped Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 12:03 ` [PATCH v2 00/17] x86/ldt: Use a VMA based read only mapping Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 12:03   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 12:08   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 12:08     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:35     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 16:35       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 17:50       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 17:50         ` Peter Zijlstra

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