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From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>, Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>,
	"Liguori, Anthony" <aliguori@amazon.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 01/17] mm/gup: Fixup p*_access_permitted()
Date: Sat, 16 Dec 2017 00:31:38 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171216003138.GJ21978@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFxdHSYYA0HOctCXeqLMjku8WjuAcddCGR_Lr5sOfca10Q@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Dec 15, 2017 at 04:20:31PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 11:51 PM, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote:
> >
> > So we actually need the pte_access_permitted() stuff if we want to
> > ensure we're not stepping on !PAGE_USER things.
> 
> We really don't. Not in that complex and broken format, and not for every level.
> 
> Also, while I think we *should* check the PAGE_USER bit when walking
> the page tables, like we used to, we should
> 
>  (a) do it much more simply, not with that broken interface that takes
> insane and pointless flags
> 
>  (b) not tie it together with this issue at all, since the PAGE_USER
> thing really is largely immaterial.
> 
> The fact is, if we have non-user mappings in the user part of the
> address space, we _need_ to teach access_ok() about them, because
> fundamentally any "get_user()/put_user()" will happily ignore the lack
> of PAGE_USER (since those happen from kernel space).

Details, please - how *can* access_ok() be taught of that?

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>, Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>,
	"Liguori, Anthony" <aliguori@amazon.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 01/17] mm/gup: Fixup p*_access_permitted()
Date: Sat, 16 Dec 2017 00:31:38 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171216003138.GJ21978@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFxdHSYYA0HOctCXeqLMjku8WjuAcddCGR_Lr5sOfca10Q@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Dec 15, 2017 at 04:20:31PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 11:51 PM, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote:
> >
> > So we actually need the pte_access_permitted() stuff if we want to
> > ensure we're not stepping on !PAGE_USER things.
> 
> We really don't. Not in that complex and broken format, and not for every level.
> 
> Also, while I think we *should* check the PAGE_USER bit when walking
> the page tables, like we used to, we should
> 
>  (a) do it much more simply, not with that broken interface that takes
> insane and pointless flags
> 
>  (b) not tie it together with this issue at all, since the PAGE_USER
> thing really is largely immaterial.
> 
> The fact is, if we have non-user mappings in the user part of the
> address space, we _need_ to teach access_ok() about them, because
> fundamentally any "get_user()/put_user()" will happily ignore the lack
> of PAGE_USER (since those happen from kernel space).

Details, please - how *can* access_ok() be taught of that?

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-12-16  0:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 151+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-12-14 11:27 [PATCH v2 00/17] x86/ldt: Use a VMA based read only mapping Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 01/17] mm/gup: Fixup p*_access_permitted() Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 12:41   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 12:41     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 14:37     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 14:37       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 20:44       ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-14 20:44         ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-14 20:54         ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 20:54           ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 21:18           ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 21:18             ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15  5:04           ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-15  5:04             ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-15  6:09             ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-15  7:51               ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15  7:51                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-16  0:20                 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  0:20                   ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  0:29                   ` Dan Williams
2017-12-16  0:29                     ` Dan Williams
2017-12-16  1:10                     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  1:10                       ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  1:25                       ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-16  1:25                         ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-16  2:28                         ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  2:28                           ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  2:48                           ` Al Viro
2017-12-16  2:48                             ` Al Viro
2017-12-16  2:52                             ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  2:52                               ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  3:00                               ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  3:00                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  3:21                               ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-16  3:21                                 ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-16  1:29                       ` Dan Williams
2017-12-16  1:29                         ` Dan Williams
2017-12-16  0:31                   ` Al Viro [this message]
2017-12-16  0:31                     ` Al Viro
2017-12-16  1:05                     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16  1:05                       ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-15  8:00             ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15  8:00               ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15 10:25               ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15 10:25                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15 11:38                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15 11:38                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15 16:38                   ` Dan Williams
2017-12-15 16:38                     ` Dan Williams
2017-12-18 11:54                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-18 11:54                       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-18 18:42                       ` Dan Williams
2017-12-18 18:42                         ` Dan Williams
2017-12-15 14:04       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15 14:04         ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 02/17] mm: Exempt special mappings from mlock(), mprotect() and madvise() Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:19   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 16:19     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 17:36     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 17:36       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-02 16:44       ` Dmitry Safonov
2018-01-02 16:44         ` Dmitry Safonov
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 03/17] arch: Allow arch_dup_mmap() to fail Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:22   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 16:22     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 04/17] x86/ldt: Rework locking Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 05/17] x86/ldt: Prevent ldt inheritance on exec Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:32   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 16:32     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 06/17] x86/ldt: Do not install LDT for kernel threads Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 19:43   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 19:43     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 21:27     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 21:27       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 07/17] mm/softdirty: Move VM_SOFTDIRTY into high bits Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 08/17] mm/x86: Allow special mappings with user access cleared Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 09/17] mm: Provide vm_special_mapping::close Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 10/17] selftest/x86: Implement additional LDT selftests Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 11/17] selftests/x86/ldt_gdt: Prepare for access bit forced Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:20   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 16:20     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 19:43     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 19:43       ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 21:22       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 21:22         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 21:44         ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 21:44           ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 21:48           ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 21:48             ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:02             ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 22:02               ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 22:14               ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:14                 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:24                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 22:24                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 22:52                   ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:52                     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:11             ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 22:11               ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 22:15               ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:15                 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:30                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 22:30                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 22:23           ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 22:23             ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 22:50             ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:50               ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 12/17] mm: Make populate_vma_page_range() available Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 13/17] x86/mm: Force LDT desc accessed bit Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:21   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 16:21     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 14/17] x86/ldt: Reshuffle code Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:23   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 16:23     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 16:31     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 16:31       ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 16:32       ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 16:32         ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 16:34         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 16:34           ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 17:47           ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 17:47             ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 15/17] x86/ldt: Prepare for VMA mapping Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 16/17] x86/ldt: Add VMA management code Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 17/17] x86/ldt: Make it read only VMA mapped Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 12:03 ` [PATCH v2 00/17] x86/ldt: Use a VMA based read only mapping Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 12:03   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 12:08   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 12:08     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:35     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 16:35       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 17:50       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 17:50         ` Peter Zijlstra

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