[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCHv3 0/2] capability controlled user-namespaces

["Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>]

Quoting Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार) (maheshb@google.com):
> On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 10:11 AM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> wrote:
> > Quoting Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार) (maheshb@google.com):
> >> On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 7:47 AM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> wrote:
> >> > Quoting James Morris (james.l.morris@oracle.com):
> >> >> On Mon, 8 Jan 2018, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >> >> I meant in terms of "marking" a user ns as "controlled" type -- it's
> >> >> unnecessary jargon from an end user point of view.
> >> >
> >> > Ah, yes, that was my point in
> >> >
> >> > http://lkml.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1711.1/01845.html
> >> > and
> >> > http://lkml.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1711.1/02276.html
> >> >
> >> >> This may happen internally but don't make it a special case with a
> >> >> different name and don't bother users with internal concepts: simply
> >> >> implement capability whitelists with the default having equivalent
> >
> > So the challenge is to have unprivileged users be contained, while
> > allowing trusted workloads in containers created by a root user to
> > bypass the restriction.
> >
> > Now, the current proposal actually doesn't support a root user starting
> > an application that it doesn't quite trust in such a way that it *is*
> > subject to the whitelist.
> 
> Well, this is not hard since root process can spawn another process
> and loose privileges before creating user-ns to be controlled by the
> whitelist.

It would have to drop cap_sys_admin for the container to be marked as
"controlled", which may prevent the container runtime from properly starting
the container.

> You need an ability to preserve the creation of user-namespaces that
> exhibit 'the uncontrolled behavior' and only trusted/privileged (root)
> user should have it which is maintained here.
> 
> > Which is unfortunate.  But apart from using
> > ptags or a cgroup, I can't think of a good way to get us everything we
> > want:
> >
> > 1. unprivileged users always restricted
> > 2. existing unprivileged containers become restricted when whitelist
> > is enabled
> > 3. privileged users are able to create containers which are not restricted
> 
> all this is achieved by the patch-set without any changes to the
> application with the above knob.
> 
> > 4. privileged users are able to create containers which *are* restricted
> >
> With this patch-set; the root user process can fork another process
> with less privileges before creating a user-ns if the exec-ed process
> cannot be trusted. So there is a way with little modification as
> opposed to nothing available at this moment for this scenario.