From: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
"asit.k.mallick" <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
"Van De Ven, Arjan" <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>,
x86@kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [patch RFC 5/5] x86/speculation: Add basic speculation control code
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 16:13:17 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180110151317.GI9417@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1610a587-fe9e-28bd-dcd1-b9ec940c07ef@intel.com>
On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 06:59:54AM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 01/10/2018 06:10 AM, Andrea Arcangeli wrote:
> > Tim and Dave please comment too, Tim you originally wrote that code
> > that leaves IBRS always on and never toggles it in the kernel entry
> > point so you must know full well if Arjan is correct that you must
> > toggle IBRS every time you enter kernel and in turn ibrs_enabled 2
> > isn't valid mode.
>
> Hi Andrea,
>
> The "writing IBRS=1 acts as a barrier when it is already IBRS=1"
> behavior is something which I misunderstood in the past. Thanks, Arjan,
> for clearing it up.
"writing IBRS=1 acts as a barrier when it is already IBRS=1" would
have been much clearer wording frankly. IBPB is IBP "Barrier", but
also IBRS is a barrier, no problem :).
So we'll add a dummy IBRS write to SPEC_CTRL in kernel entry and
vmexit so that it is compliant with all released microcodes that may
require it, also when ibrs_enabled is 2. Can you confirm?
Can you also tell if IBRS must be written as a barrier to SPEC_CTRL in
return to userland (kernel exit) when ibrs_enabled 2? Generally we
wouldn't run a barrier there with ibrs_enabled 2, but absolutely
nothing is intuitive here so I need to ask explicitly.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-10 15:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-10 1:06 [patch RFC 0/5] x86/spectre_v2: Initial integration of IBRS into the spectre_v2 mechanics Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 1:06 ` [patch RFC 1/5] x86/CPU: Sync CPU feature flags late Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 1:37 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-10 1:39 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-10 1:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 2:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-10 11:02 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 1:44 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 6:20 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-10 11:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-10 12:38 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 1:06 ` [patch RFC 2/5] x86/spectre: Simplify spectre code a bit Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 6:22 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-10 1:06 ` [patch RFC 3/5] x86/spectre: Prepare for IBRS selection Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 1:51 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-10 1:06 ` [patch RFC 4/5] x86/cpufeatures: Detect Speculation control feature Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 6:32 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-10 11:06 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 1:06 ` [patch RFC 5/5] x86/speculation: Add basic speculation control code Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 2:02 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-10 4:11 ` Justin Forbes
2018-01-10 9:22 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-10 9:27 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 10:03 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-10 11:22 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 11:41 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 11:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-10 11:54 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 11:58 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 12:01 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 12:07 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 12:12 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 12:20 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 12:27 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 13:42 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-10 12:09 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 12:17 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 12:29 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 12:41 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 12:47 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-10 12:51 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 13:02 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 13:05 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 13:10 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 13:12 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 12:57 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 13:07 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 13:45 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-10 13:52 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 13:53 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-10 21:35 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-10 22:13 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 13:46 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 13:51 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-10 13:53 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 13:58 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 14:10 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 14:14 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-10 14:59 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-10 15:13 ` Andrea Arcangeli [this message]
2018-01-10 15:24 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 15:47 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 15:56 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 13:10 ` Jiri Kosina
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