All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 9/9] X.509: self_signed implies !unsupported_sig
Date: Wed, 07 Feb 2018 01:10:12 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180207011012.5928-10-ebiggers3@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180207011012.5928-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com>

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

The self_signed flag on a certificate implies we verified its signature.
Hence, the signature cannot have been unsupported.

Remove the dead code that resulted from this oversight.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 18 +++---------------
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h  |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index beb47fd2fca5..c23255240b93 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -206,13 +206,10 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 				 sig->auth_ids[1]->len, sig->auth_ids[1]->data);
 
 		if (x509->self_signed) {
-			/* If there's no authority certificate specified, then
-			 * the certificate must be self-signed and is the root
-			 * of the chain.  Likewise if the cert is its own
-			 * authority.
+			/*
+			 * If the certificate is self-signed, then it is the
+			 * root of the chain.
 			 */
-			if (x509->unsupported_sig)
-				goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509;
 			x509->signer = x509;
 			pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
 			return 0;
@@ -275,15 +272,6 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 		x509 = p;
 		might_sleep();
 	}
-
-unsupported_crypto_in_x509:
-	/* Just prune the certificate chain at this point if we lack some
-	 * crypto module to go further.  Note, however, we don't want to set
-	 * sinfo->unsupported_crypto as the signed info block may still be
-	 * validatable against an X.509 cert lower in the chain that we have a
-	 * trusted copy of.
-	 */
-	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index 217341276ae0..1294cc2c855d 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ struct x509_certificate {
 	unsigned	index;
 	bool		seen;			/* Infinite recursion prevention */
 	bool		verified;
-	bool		self_signed;		/* T if self-signed (check unsupported_sig too) */
+	bool		self_signed;		/* T if self-signed */
 	bool		unsupported_sig;	/* T if signature uses unsupported crypto */
 	bool		blacklisted;
 };
-- 
2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 9/9] X.509: self_signed implies !unsupported_sig
Date: Tue,  6 Feb 2018 17:10:12 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180207011012.5928-10-ebiggers3@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180207011012.5928-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com>

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

The self_signed flag on a certificate implies we verified its signature.
Hence, the signature cannot have been unsupported.

Remove the dead code that resulted from this oversight.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 18 +++---------------
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h  |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index beb47fd2fca5..c23255240b93 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -206,13 +206,10 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 				 sig->auth_ids[1]->len, sig->auth_ids[1]->data);
 
 		if (x509->self_signed) {
-			/* If there's no authority certificate specified, then
-			 * the certificate must be self-signed and is the root
-			 * of the chain.  Likewise if the cert is its own
-			 * authority.
+			/*
+			 * If the certificate is self-signed, then it is the
+			 * root of the chain.
 			 */
-			if (x509->unsupported_sig)
-				goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509;
 			x509->signer = x509;
 			pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
 			return 0;
@@ -275,15 +272,6 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 		x509 = p;
 		might_sleep();
 	}
-
-unsupported_crypto_in_x509:
-	/* Just prune the certificate chain at this point if we lack some
-	 * crypto module to go further.  Note, however, we don't want to set
-	 * sinfo->unsupported_crypto as the signed info block may still be
-	 * validatable against an X.509 cert lower in the chain that we have a
-	 * trusted copy of.
-	 */
-	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index 217341276ae0..1294cc2c855d 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ struct x509_certificate {
 	unsigned	index;
 	bool		seen;			/* Infinite recursion prevention */
 	bool		verified;
-	bool		self_signed;		/* T if self-signed (check unsupported_sig too) */
+	bool		self_signed;		/* T if self-signed */
 	bool		unsupported_sig;	/* T if signature uses unsupported crypto */
 	bool		blacklisted;
 };
-- 
2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-02-07  1:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-07  1:10 [PATCH 0/9] PKCS#7 / X.509 fixes and cleanups Eric Biggers
2018-02-07  1:10 ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-07  1:10 ` [PATCH 1/9] PKCS#7: fix certificate chain verification Eric Biggers
2018-02-07  1:10   ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-07  1:10 ` [PATCH 2/9] PKCS#7: fix certificate blacklisting Eric Biggers
2018-02-07  1:10   ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-07  1:10 ` [PATCH 3/9] PKCS#7: fix direct verification of SignerInfo signature Eric Biggers
2018-02-07  1:10   ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-07  1:10 ` [PATCH 4/9] X.509: fix BUG_ON() when hash algorithm is unsupported Eric Biggers
2018-02-07  1:10   ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-08 15:07   ` David Howells
2018-02-20 22:34     ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-20 22:34       ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-07  1:10 ` [PATCH 5/9] X.509: fix NULL dereference when restricting key with unsupported_sig Eric Biggers
2018-02-07  1:10   ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-07  1:10 ` [PATCH 6/9] PKCS#7: remove unnecessary check for NULL sinfo->sig->hash_algo Eric Biggers
2018-02-07  1:10   ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-08 15:13   ` David Howells
2018-02-07  1:10 ` [PATCH 7/9] X.509: remove never-set ->unsupported_key flag Eric Biggers
2018-02-07  1:10   ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-07  1:10 ` [PATCH 8/9] X.509: remove dead code that set ->unsupported_sig Eric Biggers
2018-02-07  1:10   ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-08 15:27   ` David Howells
2018-02-07  1:10 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2018-02-07  1:10   ` [PATCH 9/9] X.509: self_signed implies !unsupported_sig Eric Biggers
2018-02-08 14:28 ` [PATCH 0/9] PKCS#7 / X.509 fixes and cleanups David Howells

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20180207011012.5928-10-ebiggers3@gmail.com \
    --to=ebiggers3@gmail.com \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=ebiggers@google.com \
    --cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mhalcrow@google.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.